# R1 vs Harvard BS

## 1NC

### FW

#### Interp and violation—topical affs must advocate explicit change in USFG advocacy—this ‘rethinking biz’ doesn’t make the cut

#### Resolved before a colon indicates a legislative forum

Army Officer School ’4 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### The “United States federal government” is the national government.

Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, 1999, 703

Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over small political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national political matters. – Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. The U.S. government. – Also termed national government.

#### The resolution is the most accessible, researchable, and rigorously developed baseline for debating. You should affirm it. Voting issue for fairness and education.

Galloway ‘7 Ryan Galloway, assistant professor of communication studies and director of debate at Samford University, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco

The central claim to this essay is that debate works best when it is dialogic and the topic is an invitation to participate. There are three pedagogical benefits to conceptualizing the resolution as an invitation. First, all teams have equal access to the resolution. Second, teams spend the entire year preparing approaches for and against the resolution. Finally, the resolution represents a community consensus of worthwhile and equitably debatable topics rooted in a collective history and experience of debate. First, teams have equal access to the resolution. The problem with relying upon prior disclosure, case lists, and word of mouth is that access is often tied to opportunity and resources. While it is true that there has been a phenomenal upsurge in the availability of case list access through technology, it is still the case that the resolution provides the most equal and fair access for all teams concerned. Each school in the community knows the wording of the resolution, even if they are not aware of the modifications made to any particular case. The notion that the negative team can rely upon the benevolence of the affirmative to provide strategic options radically tilts the argumentative table in favor of the affirmative. Providing the resolution as a baseline test operates as a demand for the negative’s approach to the topic to be heard. Instead of leaving the affirmative in complete control of what approaches to the topic the negative is allowed to argue, debate as a dialogue uses the resolution as a centerpiece of a demand to be heard. Second, teams spend the entire year preparing approaches for and against the resolution. The best debates often come from in-depth clash over a core area of the topic. It is not uncommon for debaters to spend between forty and sixty hours a week on debate, carefully refining their approaches to the topic. A common rejoinder is that debaters should think on their feet, and be prepared to debate against unusual affirmative cases and plans. While thinking on one’s feet is certainly valuable, allowing one side to think on their feet with the benefit of research, prior preparation, coaching, and thinking through arguments in advance, while depriving the other side of all such benefits hardly seems like a strategy that will result in a productive dialogue. Thinking on one’s feet is always framed by one’s past thoughts, arguments, and research base. Instead, debates are best when both sides have the opportunity to think ahead to the range of choices that the affirmative team can provide to the resolution. While there may always be some ground for the negative to respond to the affirmative team, that ground should stem from the resolution in order to maximize the benefits of the dialogical exchange which competitive debate allows. Finally, there has been a concerted community effort to ensure that the resolution provides subjects of controversy that are controversial, balanced, and anticipate a nuanced approach. Ross Smith notes, “Affirmative teams try to find what they think might be a slam dunk case, but in crafting resolutions the idea is to find a controversial area with ground for both sides” (2000). The resolution is the result of a painstaking process; it is thoroughly discussed, debated, and ultimately submitted to the debate community for a vote. It is framed, ultimately, as an issue about which reasonable minds could differ. Reliance upon alternative systems, such as germaneness, lists of ground provided by the other side in the debate, or the fact that a team has run a case in the past, betrays the central point of having a dialogue about the resolution and undermines the consensus upon which the whole enterprise depends. And while there are obviously some valid complaints about individual topics, as a whole, resolutions allow for a wide range of approaches to issues of the day. It is striking on the 20082009 resolution that conservative groups like the Heritage Foundation and the CATO Institute as well as Oxfam and the Sierra Club oppose agricultural subsidies, if for very different reasons. Teams could easily find evidence that subsidies go down a rat-hole, are counter-productive to free market economics, as well as arguing that subsidies entrench racism both domestically and globally, and prevent an ethic of care toward the global environment. Those that argue that the topic does not access issues relevant to a wide variety of special interests and minority groups may simply be asking for too much. Establishing the resolution as the bright line standard for evaluation of equity at the argumentative table allows all sides to the controversy access to formulating their approach to both sides of the topic question.

#### Role playing is essential to teaching responsible political practice

Esberg and Sagan ’12 Jane Esberg, special assistant to the director at NYU’s Center on International Cooperation, and Scott Sagan, professor of political science and director of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 19, issue 1, 2012, pp. 95-108, taylor & francis

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Claiming USFG action is inherently corrupted by neoliberalism is the height of ethical irresponsibility—preferencing theoretical purity commits the worst violence

Thomson ‘5 Alex Thomson, lecturer in English at the University of Glasgow, 2005, Deconstruction and Democracy, p. 171-73

What Derrida proposes is not the end of revolution, however, but an extension and revision of the concept: What I am saying is anything but conservative and anti-revolutionary. For beyond Benjamin’s explicit purpose I shall propose the interpreta­tion according to which the very violence of the foundation or position of law must envelop the violence of conservation and cannot break with it. It belongs to the structure of fundamental violence that it calls for the repetition of itself and founds what ought to be conserved, conservable, promised to heritage and tradition, to be shared. [FoL 38 / 93—4] Benjamin’s opposition of a ‘law-making’ to a ‘law-conserving’ violence depends on the revolutionary situation — his example is the general strike —in which a new founding of the law is at stake [FoL 34—5 / 84—5]. However, for Derrida, we cannot know whether or not we are in the middle of a law-founding moment; precisely because such a moment can never be said to be ‘present’. The event and the effects of a decision can only be revealed in retrospect: ‘those who say “our time”, while thinking “our present in light of a future anterior present do not know very well, by definition, what they are saying’. Instead, as I have shown in relation to the decision, for Derrida ‘the whole history of law’ is that of its continual refoundation and reformulation: but crucially, ‘This moment always takes place and never takes place in a presence’ [FoL 36 / 89]. Like the decision, which calls for its own reaffirmation, for another decision, but which becomes law as soon as it has been done, so the violent foundation of the law calls for confirmation and conservation which is also violence. On the one hand, the violence of the suspension of all laws, on the other hand the violent suspension of that sus­pension in the rule of law: ‘Deconstruction is also the idea of— and the idea adopted by necessity of — this difirantielle contamination’ [FoL 39 / 95]. Politics is the mixture of these two forms of decision, two forms of violence which cannot be opposed in the manner Benjamin wishes (rigorously) or in terms of Greek and Judaic origins. This suggests a complete revision of the concept of revolution. By analogy with Schmitt, we might say that the moment of revolution or of violent overthrow is the possibility of a pure and present politicization. The danger of such an analysis is that it will tend to a glorification of violence for its own sake. But for Derrida there can be no question of such a politics. His own overturning of the logic of the revolu­tionary could in some ways be considered more radical, if it didn’t subvert the traditional concept of the ‘radical’ as well. Instead of the moment of revolution becoming the defining moment of the political, every moment, every decision is to be considered revolutionary. The revolutionary moment of the exception, the suspension of all rules, can no longer be imagined to be something that could or would take place, and therefore no longer something to call for or aim at. Revolutionary politicization can no longer be thought of as something that could be made present, it is not of the order of possibility. Instead the revolutionary is the order of the perhaps. But this ‘perhaps’ is not found in the exceptional moment, but makes an exception of every moment and every decision. If there is a politics of Derrida’s work it lies here, in his insistence on the revolutionary act of interpretation, of foundation of the law, of negotiation and calculation. This is where we must work most patiently to show that his messianism without messiah, which he is at pains to distinguish from that of Benjamin, is a messianism without content, without expectation of any thing coming: no revolution, no God, nothing.7 But by relocating the mes­sianic to the structure of event-hood itself, to the everyday negotiation with the law, with responsibility and duty, Derrida radicalizes the possibility of thinking politically. If the political is the moment of absolute uncertainty, but such uncertainty that we do not know where it is to be found, then the political is both the most common and the least common experience. The possibility of change, of something else happening, of justice, of more equal distribution of wealth or power is witnessed to and attested to by every event; although this possibility is indissociable from the threat of less justice, less equality, less democracy. The challenge of deconstruction is to find ways of thinking and acting which are adequate to this not-knowing, to the radical condition of the perhaps. Alexander Garcia Duttmann suggests to Derrida that this is the case: ‘on the one hand, we could be talking in the name of reformism, because each decision calls for another one. We face an ongoing process of reform after reform after reform. But at the same time we could radicalise that thought into something like a permanent revolution.’ Derrida confirms his proposal, echoing the passage from ‘Psyche: Inventions of the Other’ with which I concluded my introduction: ‘When I referred a moment ago to messianicity without messianism, I was describing a revolutionary experience. ..... But when I insisted on the fact that we must nevertheless prepare the revolution, it was because we must not simply be open to what­ever comes. The revolution, however unpredictable it may be, can and must be prepared for in the most cautious slow and labourious [sic] way.’8 Such a thought of depoliticization will always be open to two accusations. The first is that it is too theological, too messianic, too abstract, or not concrete enough. Yet clearly from Derrida’s point of view, any theory which presumes to label, identify or name a present politics, a determinate concept of the political, is being more messianic, in seeking to make some particular future arrive, to make something in particular happen. The other potential accusation would be that this is not radical at all, since it is not radical according to traditional political paths and codes. Certainly, if the degree of radicality of a theory were to be measured in term of the incomprehension and misunderstanding that have accrued to it then we would quite easily be able to prove that Derrida’s revolutionary politics is more radical than tradi­tional concepts of revolution. As Geoffrey Bennington comments: ‘the need to compromise, negotiate, with the most concrete detail of current arrange­ments of right: this is what defines deconstruction as radically political’.9 Deconstruction is an affirmation of what happens, and of the revolutionary reinvention at work in every political decision, and so clearly cannot be simply opposed to politics as it already exists. As I argued in the discussion of radical democracy in Chapter 3, this means thinking politics within the state as much as against the state; and as I emphasized in Chapter 6, deconstruction demands an intensive engagement with the law, both within and beyond the state.

#### Particularly true in the context of neoliberalism—totalizing perspectives that pit reform against revolution reify ivory tower exclusion. We should redirect governmental techniques for the good of the commons

Ferguson ’10 James Ferguson, “The Uses of Neoliberalism,” Antipode, vol. 41, issue supplement s1, pp. 166-184, January 2010, 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2009.00721.x

If we are seeking, as this special issue of Antipode aspires to do, to link our critical analyses to the world of grounded political struggle—not only to interpret the world in various ways, but also to change it—then there is much to be said for focusing, as I have here, on mundane, real- world debates around policy and politics, even if doing so inevitably puts us on the compromised and reformist terrain of the possible, rather than the seductive high ground of revolutionary ideals and utopian desires. But I would also insist that there is more at stake in the examples I have discussed here than simply a slightly better way to ameliorate the miseries of the chronically poor, or a technically superior method for relieving the suffering of famine victims. My point in discussing the South African BIG campaign, for instance, is not really to argue for its implementation. There is much in the campaign that is appealing, to be sure. But one can just as easily identify a series of worries that would bring the whole proposal into doubt. Does not, for instance, the decoupling of the question of assistance from the issue of labor, and the associated valorization of the “informal”, help provide a kind of alibi for the failures of the South African regime to pursue policies that would do more to create jobs? Would not the creation of a basic income benefit tied to national citizenship simply exacerbate the vicious xenophobia that already divides the South African poor, in a context where many of the poorest are not citizens, and would thus not be eligible for the BIG? Perhaps even more fundamentally, is the idea of basic income really capable of commanding the mass support that alone could make it a central pillar of a new approach to distribution? The record to date gives powerful reasons to doubt it. So far, the technocrats’ dreams of relieving poverty through efficient cash transfers have attracted little support from actual poor people, who seem to find that vision a bit pale and washed out, compared with the vivid (if vague) populist promises of jobs and personalistic social inclusion long offered by the ANC patronage machine, and lately personified by Jacob Zuma (Ferguson forthcoming). My real interest in the policy proposals discussed here, in fact, has little to do with the narrow policy questions to which they seek to provide answers. For what is most significant, for my purposes, is not whether or not these are good policies, but the way that they illustrate a process through which specific governmental devices and modes of reasoning that we have become used to associating with a very particular (and conservative) political agenda (“neoliberalism”) may be in the process of being peeled away from that agenda, and put to very different uses. Any progressive who takes seriously the challenge I pointed to at the start of this essay, the challenge of developing new progressive arts of government, ought to find this turn of events of considerable interest. As Steven Collier (2005) has recently pointed out, it is important to question the assumption that there is, or must be, a neat or automatic fit between a hegemonic “neoliberal” political-economic project (however that might be characterized), on the one hand, and specific “neoliberal” techniques, on the other. Close attention to particular techniques (such as the use of quantitative calculation, free choice, and price driven by supply and demand) in particular settings (in Collier’s case, fiscal and budgetary reform in post-Soviet Russia) shows that the relationship between the technical and the political-economic “is much more polymorphous and unstable than is assumed in much critical geographical work”, and that neoliberal technical mechanisms are in fact “deployed in relation to diverse political projects and social norms” (2005:2). As I suggested in referencing the role of statistics and techniques for pooling risk in the creation of social democratic welfare states, social technologies need not have any essential or eternal loyalty to the political formations within which they were first developed. Insurance rationality at the end of the nineteenth century had no essential vocation to provide security and solidarity to the working class; it was turned to that purpose (in some substantial measure) because it was available, in the right place at the right time, to be appropriated for that use. Specific ways of solving or posing governmental problems, specific institutional and intellectual mechanisms, can be combined in an almost infinite variety of ways, to accomplish different social ends. With social, as with any other sort of technology, it is not the machines or the mechanisms that decide what they will be used to do. Foucault (2008:94) concluded his discussion of socialist government- ality by insisting that the answers to the Left’s governmental problems require not yet another search through our sacred texts, but a process of conceptual and institutional innovation. “[I]f there is a really socialist governmentality, then it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. It must be invented”. But invention in the domain of governmental technique is rarely something worked up out of whole cloth. More often, it involves a kind of bricolage (Le ́vi- Strauss 1966), a piecing together of something new out of scavenged parts originally intended for some other purpose. As we pursue such a process of improvisatory invention, we might begin by making an inventory of the parts available for such tinkering, keeping all the while an open mind about how different mechanisms might be put to work, and what kinds of purposes they might serve. If we can go beyond seeing in “neoliberalism” an evil essence or an automatic unity, and instead learn to see a field of specific governmental techniques, we may be surprised to find that some of them can be repurposed, and put to work in the service of political projects very different from those usually associated with that word. If so, we may find that the cabinet of governmental arts available to us is a bit less bare than first appeared, and that some rather useful little mechanisms may be nearer to hand than we thought.

### OOO K

#### For the aff, our relations to the world are intermediated through fields of knowledge which we receive through educational institutions. This perspective is profoundly anthropocentric, omitting the lively influence held by material and non-discursive machines.

Bryant ’12 Levi Bryant, teaches philosophy at Collin College, “RSI, Discursivity, Critique, and Politics,” Larval Subjects, 7/18/2012, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/07/18/rsi-discursivity-critique-and-politics/

So in response to a previous post, a lot of folks gave me grief about the following passage: I do think, however, that OOO can problematize our current political thought and open new avenues of political engagement and theorization. As it stands, cultural studies is dominated by a focus on the discursive. We hear endless talk about signs, signifiers, “positions” or positionality, narratives, discourses, ideology, etc. Basically we see the world as a fetishized text to be decoded and debunked. None of this should, of course, be abandoned, but I do think we’re encountering its limitations. In the few years I’ve been writing on these issues, I’ve been surprised to discover just how hard it is to get people to sense that there is a non-discursive power of things; a form of power that is not about signs, ideology (as text), beliefs, positions, narratives, and so on. It’s as if these things aren’t on the radar for most social and political theorists. I get the sense that the reason for this has something to do with what Heidegger diagnosed in his analysis of the ready-to-hand. Heidegger argues that when the ready-to-hand is working it becomes invisible. We don’t notice it. It recedes into the background. Us academics live in worlds that work pretty well as far as material infrastructure goes. We are, for the most part, in a world where things work: food is available, electricity and water function, we have shelter, etc. As a consequence, all this disappears from view and we instead focus on cultural texts because often this is a place where things aren’t working. In response to these remarks, I was told that 1) of course no one has the naive belief that everything is text (what a relief! of course, the question is whether this belief registers itself in theoretical practice), and 2) that, in fact, these things are all the rage in the world of theory. I’m well aware that there is a tradition of theorists that don’t fit this mold, and perpetually refer to many of these theorists in my own work. Theorists that come to mind are figures such as Haraway, Stengers, Latour, Kittler, Ong, McLuhan, Elizabeth Grosz, Jane Bennett, Stacy Alaimo, Karen Barad, Kevin Sharpe, Jennifer Andersen et al, Cathy Davidson, Braudel, DeLanda, Pickering, etc. They exist. The point is not that they don’t exist, but that these forms of theory, I think, have been rather marginal in the academy; especially philosophy. In discussing these things, I’m not making some claim to being absolutely original or to be originating something full cloth. I’m more than happy to play some small role in bringing attention to these things; things that I believe to be neglected. I think, for example, that the new materialist feminists predate OOO/SR by 5-10 years, have many points of overlap with OOO, and have not nearly gotten the attention that they deserve. I think Latour and Stengers are almost entirely invisible in the world of philosophy conferences and departments; and I think that there are systematic reasons for this pertaining to the history of continental theory coming out of German idealism, the linguistic turn, and phenomenology. In German idealism you get a focus on spirit and the transcendental structure of mind. In the linguistic turn, you get a focus on how signifiers and signs inform our relation to reality (for example, Lacan’s famous observation that the difference between the men’s room and lady’s room results from the signifier in “The Agency of the Letter”, and Barthes’ claim that language is a primary modeling system in The Fashion System). In phenomenology you get a focus on the lived experience of the cogito, Dasein, or lived body and how it “constitutes” (Husserl’s language, not mine) the objects of its intentions. read on! In each instance we get a focus on the differences that humans are contributing, with a relative indifference to the differences that non-humans contribute. Material entities, as Alaimo observes in Bodily Natures, are treated as blank screens for human intentions, language, concepts, signs. The metaphor of the screen is here important, for a screen is that which contains no difference of its own beyond being a smooth and white surface, and is therefore susceptible to whatever we might wish to project upon it with a camera. This has been the dominant mode of theorizing that I’ve encountered in the last decade in my discipline of philosophy (and I have a fair background in rhetoric and literary theory as well). Phenomenology and the linguistic turn, I think, are the dominant positions represented at SPEP, for example, the main professional conference for continental philosophy (though thankfully things are beginning to change). When it is said that something is “dominant”, the claim is not that nothing different from it exists, but merely that a certain style of theorizing enjoys hegemony among that population. In media studies, I think, the situation is better. I think it’s better in geography as well. It depends on what population of theorists we’re looking at (a point entailed, incidentally, by my thesis that signifiers are material entities that must travel throughout populations).

#### Knowledge-centric correlationism is disastrous. It ignores that which isn’t like us, producing ethical oversights and political failures.

Bryant ’12 Levi Bryant, “Worries About OOO and Politics,” Larval Subjects, 5/29/2012, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/05/29/worries-about-ooo-and-politics/

2) Correlationism and its Discontents: For me, at least, the desire to overcome correlationism does not arise out of some pure speculative desire to “get at the things themselves”, but because I believe that correlationism has noxious political consequences that cultivate an attitude destructive to effective political practice or engagement. As Stacy Alaimo, who is not an OOO theorist but who is very close to my onticology in many respects puts it, Matter, the vast stuff of the world and of ourselves, has been subdivided into manageable “bits” or flattened into a “blank slate” for human inscription. The environment has been drained of its blood, its lively creatures, its interactions and relations– in short, all that is recognizable as “nature” –in order that it become a mere empty space, an “uncontested ground,” for human “development”. (Bodily Natures, 1 – 2) Correlationism trains us to see all other material things as alienated images of ourselves in a mirror. The question always becomes “what are things for us?”, and the thesis is that matter is merely a brute passive stuff awaiting our inscriptions. In other words, the basic gesture that become dominant in cultural theory beginning around the 60′s was to show that what we take to be objects are really our own significations that we fail to recognize as our own. A critical analysis– modeled on Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism but diverging quite significantly from hismaterialism –thus came to consist in revealing how these significations come from us, rather than from the things themselves. Now, as I have said, both here and elsewhere, I have no desire to abandon this form of analysis. As I argue, all entities translate other entities in particular ways and this is no less true of humans. However, the problem with this style of analysis is that it renders invisible the differences contributed by nonhuman objects to social assemblages. We come to think that it is just significations that structure social assemblages and that if we want to change social assemblages all we have to do is critique and debunk significations or ideologies. Clearly critiquing and debunking ideologies is a part of changing social assemblages, but it is not the only part. And because correlationism functions as a theoretical axiom where we don’t even recognize the existence of this other part– say rice –because it treats the only real difference as signifying difference, we find ourselves surprised when we’ve adequately critiqued and debunked signifying systems and the social system doesn’t change. Perhaps this would clue us into the possibility that perhaps there are other actors involved in these social assemblages, holding people in place in particular ways. The problem is that correlationism tends to render non-signifying differences in social assemblages invisible because it begins from the axiom that nonhuman things are just blank slates awaiting our inscription. Anyone who’s ever gardened knows that this can’t possibly be true. The diacritical nature of how I signify “tomato” will not make my tomatoes grow any better. No, to grow tomatoes I have to navigate soil conditions, sunlight and heat (which are quite substantial here in Texas), the gangs of roving rabbits that populate my back yard, insects, worms, water, etc. I am enmeshed in an entire network of actors that contribute to whether or not the tomatoes will grow and, more importantly, I must constantly attend to these nonhuman actors. The point here is not, as Berry suggests, to diminish human political interventions and promote a troubling conservatism, but to expand the sites of political intervention as well as our possibilities of acting. We cannot effectively act and change things if we don’t know how the assemblages within which we are enmeshed are put together, what actors are present in those assemblages, and how we might intervene on these actors to change our social possibilities. Correlationism tends to draw our attention to only one type of actor– the signifier –and while this is a real actor it is not the only one.

#### Text: Affirm alien phenomenology.

#### Becoming attentive to the activities of nonhuman objects is a prerequisite to the aff. This broadens our ethical perspectives and produces more effective political solutions.

Joy ’12 Eileen Joy, SIU-Edwardsville Dept. of English Language and Literature, response to “the object industry,” by Alex Reid, Digital Digs, 5/29/2012, http://www.alex-reid.net/2012/05/the-object-industry.html

I'd like to add a few "follow-on" comments to what Ian writes below; these are partly borrowed from an interview I was \*supposed\* to finish and never did [where someone posed questions to me and I wrote answers back], where the same critique was raised regarding posthumanism [I also want to add here that I don't see Alex and Berry on the same page here; indeed, I think Alex's position is much more nuanced with regard to the ethical promise of flat ontologies, even with his cautions, which, I just don't worry about as much, partly because my mantra these days is: "more thought," without too much worrying over where it will all lead]: Calling oneself a post/humanist or "new humanist" (as I do, btw) or turning one’s attention to objects (as Bennett, Bryant, Harman, and others are doing at present) or to animals (as Cary Wolfe, Karl Steel, Cora Diamond, Sarah Franklin, Julian Yates, Nicole Shukin, and others are doing), etc., is decidedly not about discarding the human altogether, nor even necessarily about de-specializing it, as some have argued. Rather, in my mind, it is more about re-tooling human mentality to stall, idle, and with an enhanced sensibility (with which the human is specially gifted) to pick up on "signals" it heretofore had not been listening for. I have written elsewhere about the human as a special listening device or slow recorder. It is not a rejection of “world,” either (as in: this world), although figures like Brassier and Meillassoux, of course, have pointed in that direction (I am personally not so enchanted with the eliminativist and “dark vitalist” positions, whether nihilist or culinary or materialist or whatever, although I think they're amazingly imaginative and I support and encourage that work because what we need now is more, and not less, thinking in the university). I get very worked up on this point because I have become distressed lately by how many people want to make the argument that post/humanism, as well as OOO work, isn’t attentive enough to the contexts in which so-called “real lives” unfold on the grounds of “real world” contexts, or that it somehow chooses dogs over people dying in Sudan, or spools of thread over migrant workers in textile factories, and so on and so forth. In other words, if we’re paying too much attention to objects or animals, we’ve somehow abdicated our attention to and responsibility for those -- who are human -- living alongside us and who might be suffering under oppressive regimes, who are disenfranchised, who are experiencing various forms of violence and deprivations, etc. We supposedly care more about popsicle sticks and less about poverty in America. I have this image in my mind of a big “you’re not political/human/ethical enough” factory and inside of this massive brick building with all sorts of discursive smoke-stacks there are all these people pulling on levers and pulleys and turning wheels and conveyer belts and one lever is marked “you forgot about the poverty in Calcutta” and another one is marked “but there are real people dying in Sudan” and another one is marked “people need jobs, then we’ll talk about the democracy of objects” and another one is marked “when we get beyond racism, then we’ll talk about animals” and another one (that seems to have been engineered just for critiques of Harman, especially) is marked “since you only want to pay attention to the singularity and autonomy and ‘mystery’ of objects, you must not care very much about the fact that the ‘real world’ is mainly shaped by relations, and uneven ones at that” and so on and so on ad infinitum. For me personally, turning one’s attention to animals, objects, post/humanism and so on is precisely about thickening our capacity to imagine more capacious forms of “living with”; it is precisely about developing more radical forms of welcoming and generosity to others, who include humans as well as trees, rocks, dogs, cornfields, ant colonies, pvc pipes, and sewer drains; it is precisely about amplifying the ability of our brains to pick up more communication signals from more “persons” (who might be a human or a cloud or a cave) whose movements, affects, and thoughts are trying to tell us something about our interconnectedness and co-implicated interdependence with absolutely everything (or perhaps even about a certain implicit alienation between everything in the world, which is nevertheless useful to understand better: take your pick); it is precisely about working toward a more capacious vision of what we mean by “well-being,” when we decide to attend to the well-being of humans and other “persons” (who might be economic markets or the weather or trash or homeless cats) who are always enmeshed with each other in various “vibrant” networks, assemblages, meshes, cascades, systems, whathaveyou. And just for me -- likely, just for me -- it is also about love, with love defined, not as something that goes in one direction from one person to another person or object (carrying with it various demands and expectations and self-centered desires), but rather, as a type of collective labor that works at creating “fields” for persons and objects to emerge into view that otherwise would remain hidden (and perhaps also remain abjectified), and which persons and objects could then be allowed the breathing/living room to unfold in various self-directed ways, even if that’s not what you could have predicted in advance nor supposedly what you “want” it to do (in other words: ethics as a form of attention that is directed toward the “for-itself” propulsions of other persons and objects, human and inhuman). So, for me, work in post/humanism, and in OOO, is attentive to the world, which includes and does not exile (or gleefully kill off) the human (although it certainly asks that we expand our angles of vision beyond just the human-centered ones); it is both political and ethical; and it is interested in what I would even call the “tender” attention to and care of things, human and inhuman (I think that the work of Bennett, Bogost, Morton, Harman, Steven Shaviro, Jeffrey Cohen, Stacy Alaimo, Julian Yates, Myra Hird, Freya Matthews, Karen Barad, Donna Haraway, and Levi Bryant, and many, many others who \*never\* get cited in these discussions, especially the women working in materialism, science/gender studies, queer ecology, environmental humanities, etc.) especially exemplifies this “tender” attention to and care of all of the "items" of the world. Any enlargement of our capacity to think about the agential, signaling, and other capacities of as many items/objects/persons, etc. of this world represents, in my mind, an enlargement, and not a shrinking, of our ethical attention. It's asking for a richer, thicker ontology, which gives is more to be responsible for (after all, that's partly where the specialness of humans comes in), but also: more to enjoy.

### Capitalism K

#### Their democratic pedagogy is weak localism in disguise, privileging feel-good ‘rethinking’ over radical materialism

Katz 2k Adam Katz, English Instructor at Onodaga Community College. 2000. Postmodernism and the Politics of “Culture.” Pg.189-190.

With such contradictions, Dirlik’s concluding affirmation of a politics of dialogue, coalition building and Henry Giroux’s “border pedagogy” are, ultimately, evasions of the question of how to theorize resistance to globalization without an affirmation of the local and cultural. Now, at this point, perhaps some readers will ask whether all resistance is not, on some level, local. Doesn’t one resist a specific assault on someone’s rights or some collective set of living conditions or some crucial condition of democracy? Doesn’t a revolution always overthrow a single state? Leaving aside for now the way in which postmodern articulations of the global and local serve to avoid questions of the state and sovereignty, I would concede this point in its obvious, banal sense. The question is whether the logic of resistance, the materials of resistance, and the legitimacy of resistant practices can be found in the local, cultural site. This is what postmodern cultural studies, even more forcefully in its international phase, insists upon, and this is what I do deny. Resistance, in global capi­talism, is, in the first instance, only resistance in any meaningful sense in­sofar as it theorizes (and provides occasions for other theorizations of) the articulation of the interlocking economic, political, and ideological forms constitutive of the globe. The most productive way of theorizing the local in these terms is by pri­oritizing politics, as I suggested in the introduction and first chapter in particular, as a space of accountability to the conditions of openness that make politics possible in the first place; such an accountability situates any political action and space in relation to an outside—i.e., the theoreti­cal struggles that are implicated in politics, before which politics “ap­pears,” and that come to meet or address political actions. Such a politics must secure its conditions of possibility in the name of the level and modes of world-responsibility that contemporary social conditions re­quire. These conditions of possibility point in several directions: toward the economic, in the first case interference with and ultimately suppres­sion of the logic of capital and private property; toward the reciprocally constitutive political and theoretical principles themselves, engaging polit­ical action as instances of theory and practicing theory as clarification of the articulation of the political and the economic; and toward the outside, seeking not a neutral judge but a surfaced polemic aimed at making visi­ble the relevant economic/political/ideological articulation. So, there is, of course, a “direct” antagonist, but it exists as this articulation, in oppo­sition to which political action pursues a different articulation via ideol­ogy critique. In other words, an antilocalist politics starts with the recipro­cal clarification of principles, concepts, and globally situated antipolitical violence (manifested always ideologically) —not in some remainder where traditional, modern and postmodern, and local and global collide and de­construct each other.

#### Emphasizing how knowledge is produced cedes politics by pushing theory into the idealist realm

Tumino ‘8 Stephen Tumino, professor of English at the University of Pittsburgh, "Materiality in Contemporary Cultural Theory," The Red Critique, Fall/Winter 2008, accessed 1/21/10 http://www.redcritique.org/FallWinter2008/materialityincontemporaryculturaltheory.htm

One of the mainstays of contemporary cultural theory is the argument that the social is primarily shaped by culture. Culture, that is, not as a collection of artifacts or an archive of progress, but, rather, following the writings of Antonio Gramsci, as "an arena of consent and resistance" (Stuart Hall, "Deconstructing" 239) over the shape of the social. Contemporary cultural theory has extended the understanding of culture beyond universalist, and, therefore, supposedly elitist assumptions and normative hegemonic conclusions about culture and instead focused on culture as "the articulation and activation of meaning" (Storey xiii) on the grounds that it is primarily discourse that possesses "the power and the authority to define social reality" (xii). The meaning(s) in a culture that secure and contest the dominant social arrangements are thought to lie in what Michel de Certeau calls "secondary production" (xiii), the sphere of consumption, rather than the economic sphere of production. In these terms, it is the "consumer who in effect 'produces in use'" (xiii) the meaning(s) of the culture that determines social reality. So much has such a focus on the daily practices of consumption and identification been "central to the project of cultural studies" (xi) that some have simply argued that "cultural studies could be described ... perhaps more accurately as ideological studies" (James Carey qtd. in Storey xii). The focus in cultural theory on the constitutive power of discourse to define social reality has shifted the attention of cultural studies from the wider social relations of production which shape ideology and consumption and in fact determine the social real, toward a market theory of culture which valorizes the excessive "uses" and "resignifications" of cultural commodities and in doing so transforms the subject of labor into the subject of consumption who, far from intervening into global capital, supports it through "resistant" desires and "rebellious" acts of consumption. Cultural theory, in other words, rests on the assumption that consumption determines production rather than the other way around. People's "lifestyles" (which is another way of referring to the commodities they consume and how they consume them) are thus assumed to be more significant, in these terms, than the labor relations they must enter into as a necessary precondition of consumption. Such an assumption concludes that the markers and beliefs that position individuals in culture as men and women, black, latino, gay,… are more important than the fact that they are wage workers that must first sell themselves daily to capital before they can acquire the cultural markers of identity. Such an understanding of the priority of the economic is seen on the cultural left as "left conservatism" (Butler, Bové, et. al.) because it forecloses on differences. But as Teresa Ebert has explained, "differences in class societies are always exploitative" (169) because they serve to divide and segment the working class and foster competition between the workers. At the core of the labor theory of culture is the explanation of how culturalism itself has an economic basis in the division of labor – and more specifically, in the crisis of overproduction that is endemic to capitalism since the 1970s—and reflects the interests of those who having had their material needs already met from the labor of the other can afford to focus on their desires in the market.

#### Capital reduces staggeringly large populations to servility at the whim of multinational corporations, formenting widespread social instability—the only hope for the world is fundamental economic change

Foster and McChesney ’12 John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at University of Oregon, and Robert W. McChesney, Gutgsell Endowed Professor of Communication, University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign, “The Endless Crisis,” Monthly Review, May 2012, vol. 64, issue 1, pp. 1-28

The biggest question mark generated by this new phase of accumulation today is the rapid growth of a few large emerging economies, particularly China and India. The vagaries of an accumulation system in these countries based on the exploitation of massive reserve armies of workers (in China a “floating population” of peasants) in the hundreds of millions, which cannot be absorbed internally through the standard industrialization process, makes the future of the new Asia uncertain. The imperial rent exacted by multinationals, who also control the global supply chains, means that emerging economies face what may appear to be an open door to the world market, but must proceed along paths controlled from outside.74 The vast inequality built into a model of export-oriented development based on low-wage labor creates internal fault lines for emerging economies. China is now the site of continual mass protests, occurring on a scale of hundreds of thousands annually. In an article entitled “Is China Ripe for Revolution?” in the February 12, 2012 New York Times, Stephen R. Platt wrote that the Taiping Rebellion of the nineteenth century might stand as a historical reminder of the possibility of another major “revolution from within” in that country (in which case, he notes, Washington would mostly likely find itself “hoping for that revolution to fail”).75 In many ways the world situation, with minor modifications, conforms to the diagnosis provided by Che Guevara at the Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria in 1965: “Ever since monopoly capital took over the world, it has kept the greater part of humanity in poverty, dividing all the profits among the group of the most powerful countries…. There should be no more talk about developing mutually beneficial trade based on prices forced on the backward countries by the law of value and the international relations of unequal exchange that result from the law of value.”76 If some emerging economies are now developing rapidly, the dominant reality is the global labor arbitrage that is increasing the level of exploitation worldwide, the greatest burden of which is falling on the global South. An underlying premise throughout our analysis is that imperialist divisions within the world remain and are even deepening, enforcing wide disparities in living conditions. Still, in the age of global monopoly-finance capital working people everywhere are increasingly suffering—a phenomenon that Michael Yates has referred to as “The Great Inequality.”77 Entrenched and expanding monopolies of wealth, income, and power are aimed at serving the interests of a miniscule portion of the world population, now known as the 1%—or the global ruling classes of contemporary monopoly-finance capital. The world is being subjected to a process of monopolistic capital accumulation so extreme and distorted that not only has it produced the Great Inequality and conditions of stagnation and financial instability, but also the entire planet as a place of human habitation is being put in peril in order to sustain this very system.78 Hence, the future of humanity—if there is to be one at all—now lies with the 99%. “If the system itself is at fault,” Gar Alperovitz observes in his America Beyond Capitalism, “then self evidently—indeed, by definition—a solution would ultimately require the development of a new system.”79

#### Vote negative to affirm the historical necessity of communism.

#### Evaluate the debate as a dialectical materialist—you are a historian inquiring into the determinant factors behind the 1AC—Marx’s labor theory of value is the best possible description

Tumino ‘1 Stephen Tumino, professor of English at the University of Pittsburgh, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before,” Red Critique, Spring 2001, http://redcritique.org/spring2001/whatisorthodoxmarxism.htm

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory. Finally, it is only Orthodox Marxism that recognizes the inevitability and also the necessity of communism—the necessity, that is, of a society in which "from each according to their ability to each according to their needs" (Marx) is the rule.

### Case

#### Focus on how knowledge production is oriented leads to nihilism

Connolly ’2 William Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, Identity/Difference, revised edition, 2002, pp. 49-51

As I "read" the combination that emerges from placing these two in conjunction, Nietzsche and Foucault do not ask "Why be ethical?" or "What is the transcendental ground of ethics?" But neither do these refusals disengage them from ethics. Together, Nietzsche and Foucault expose a persistent paradox of ethicality as it operates in a variety of settings. In a world where hegemonic claims to identity are always already permeated by ethical dispositions and marked by proclivities toward moral self-righteousness, they devise strategies for cultivating care for identity and difference in their relations of discordant interdependence. Not why be ethical, then, for if someone really (rather than hypothetically) poses that as the question to be answered first, he or she is probably beyond the effective reach of ethical concern. Not what is the epistemic ground of ethics, for the unrelenting demand for an answer to that question fosters either a passive nihilism in which one becomes immobilized from action or an aggressive nihilism in which cracks or fissures in the answer endorsed are suppressed to preserve its sanctity. The primary quest is not for a command that answers "why" or a ground that establishes "what" but for ways to cultivate care for identity and difference in a world already permeated by ethical proclivities and predispositions to identity. They oppose to the authoritarianism of the various command ethics that have populated western thought an ethic of cultivation. 7

#### Radically rejecting the system fetishizes it and makes resistance the obverse of the same project it tries to escape

Rella ’94 Franco Rella, The Myth of the Other, trans. Nelson Moe, Maisonneuve Press: Washington, DC, 1994, p. 19

3. The idealization of the negative that is also within our space, the constellation that we have sketched out above, becomes the struggle for those margins “incomprehensible” to the dominant regime of reason to affirm themselves qua spaces of marginalization and exclusion. The ill that this society expels can only be our good, our value. Yet however much struggle and violence are organized around this “value,” it ends up positing itself as the confirmation of that regime of exclusive reason and power; the desert of marginalization is the desert of a violence without a name or, better, of a violence that can only speak through the “names” offered it by the mythology of the dominant. This, then, is not only one of the most extreme developments of “neo—classical,” “plural” reason; it is also the “site” in which it seeks to reconvert itself into “truth,” to refound itself on “true" values. Dispersion becomes a kind of "guarantee" of a complete word which lies elsewhere, of a natural subjectivity that is other from the society and the contradictions which traverse and produce it. In a field quite opposed to this constellation, yet curiously convergent with it, seems to me the appeal (precisely contra Marx and Freud) to the certainty of facts that one finds in the epistemology of Lakatos18 or in Kuhn’s attempt to establish a “normality” of science even within its revolutions.19

#### Empirical academic discourse is essential to democratic politics—the alt isolates its political relevance which decimates its utility—prefer accessible specificity over theoretical abstraction

Walt ’12 Stephen M. Walt, professor of international affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “Theory and Policy in International Relations: Some Personal Reflections,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, September 2012, http://yalejournal.org/2012/09/theory-and-policy-in-international-relations-some-personal-reflections-by-stephen-m-walt/

Despite these limitations, academic scholars -- including IR theorists -- have at least three useful roles to play in the broader public discourse on international affairs. First, those who have thought longest and hardest about the nature of modern world politics can help their fellow citizens make sense out of our "globalized" world. Ordinary people often know a great deal about local affairs, but understanding what is happening overseas generally requires relying on the knowledge of specialists. For this reason alone, university-based academics should be actively encouraged to write for and speak to broader audiences, instead of engaging solely in a dialogue with each other. Second, an engaged academic community is an essential counterweight to governmental efforts to manipulate public perceptions. Governments have vastly greater access to information than most (all?) citizens do, especially when it comes to foreign and defense policy, and public officials routinely exploit these information asymmetries to advance their own agendas. Because government officials are fallible, society needs alternative voices to challenge their rationales and suggest different solutions. Academic scholars are protected by tenure and not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, so they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and conventional wisdoms. For these reasons, a diverse and engaged academic community is integral to healthy democratic politics. Third, the scholarly community also offers a useful model of constructive debate. Although scholarly disputes are sometimes heated, they rarely descend to the level of ad hominem attack and character assassination that increasingly characterizes political discourse today. Indeed, academics who use these tactics in a scholarly article would probably discredit themselves rather than their targets. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in contemporary public life.

#### Individual level strategies fail and make global violence inevitable

Monbiot ‘4 George Monbiot, journalist, academic, and political and environmental activist, 2004, Manifesto for a New World Order, p. 11-13

The quest for global solutions is difficult and divisive. Some members of this movement are deeply suspicious of all institutional power at the global level, fearing that it could never be held to account by the world’s people. Others are concerned that a single set of universal prescriptions would threaten the diversity of dissent. A smaller faction has argued that all political programmes are oppressive: our task should not be to replace one form of power with another, but to replace all power with a magical essence called ‘anti-power’. But most of the members of this movement are coming to recognize that if we propose solutions which can be effected only at the local or the national level, we remove ourselves from any meaningful role in solving precisely those problems which most concern us. Issues such as cli­mate change, international debt, nuclear proliferation, war, peace and the balance of trade between nations can be addressed only globally or internationally. Without global measures and global institutions, it is impossible to see how we might distribute wealth from rich nations to poor ones, tax the mobile rich and their even more mobile money, control the shipment of toxic waste, sustain the ban on landmines, prevent the use of nuclear weapons, broker peace between nations or prevent powerful states from forcing weaker ones to trade on their terms. If we were to work only at the local level, we would leave these, the most critical of issues, for other people to tackle. Global governance will take place whether we participate in it or not. Indeed, it must take place if the issues which concern us are not to be resolved by the brute force of the powerful. That the international institutions have been designed or captured by the dictatorship of vested interests is not an argument against the existence of international institutions, but a reason for overthrowing them and re­placing them with our own. It is an argument for a global political system which holds power to account. In the absence of an effective global politics, moreover, local solutions will always be undermined by communities of interest which do not share our vision. We might, for example, manage to persuade the people of the street in which we live to give up their cars in the hope of preventing climate change, but unless everyone, in all communities, either shares our politics or is bound by the same rules, we simply open new road space into which the neighbouring communities can expand. We might declare our neighbour­hood nuclear-free, but unless we are simultaneously work­ing, at the international level, for the abandonment of nuclear weapons, we can do nothing to prevent ourselves and everyone else from being threatened by people who are not as nice as we are. We would deprive ourselves, in other words, of the power of restraint. By first rebuilding the global politics, we establish the political space in which our local alternatives can flourish. If, by contrast, we were to leave the governance of the necessary global institutions to others, then those institutions will pick off our local, even our national, solutions one by one. There is little point in devising an alternative economic policy for your nation, as Luis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva, now president of Brazil, once advocated, if the International Monetary Fund and the financial speculators have not first been overthrown. There is little point in fighting to protect a coral reef from local pollution, if nothing has been done to prevent climate change from destroying the conditions it requires for its survival.

#### Knowledge production isn’t relevant—prefer materiality

Taft-Kaufman ’95 Jill Taft-Kaufman, Speech prof @ CMU, 1995, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, “Other Ways”, p pq

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

#### Arguments of co-option reproduce marginalization

Zizek ’98 Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana and Codirector of the Center for Humanities at Birkbeck College, Law and the Postmodern Mind, 1998, pp. 91-92

Finally, the point about inherent transgression is not that every opposition, ever attempt at subversion, is automatically “coopted.” On the contrary, the very fear of being coopted that makes us search for more and more “radical,” “pure” attitudes, is the supreme strategy of suspension or marginalization. The point is rather that true subversion is not always where it seems to be. Sometimes, as small distance is much more explosive for the system than an ineffective radical rejection. In religion, a small heresy can be more threatening than out-right atheism or passage to another religion; for a. hard-line Stalinist, a Troskyite is infinitely more threatening than a bourgeois liberal or social democrat. As le Carre put it, one true revisionist in the Central Committee is worth more than thousand dissidents outside it. It was easy to dismiss Gorbachev for aiming only at improving the system, making it more efficient — he nonetheless set in motion its disintegration. So one should also bear in mind the obverse of the inherent transgression: one is tempted to paraphrase Freud’s claim from The Ego and the Id that man is not only much more immoral than he believes, but also much more moral than he knows —the System is not only infinitely more resistant and invulnerable than it may appear (it can coopt apparently subversive strategies, they can serve as its support), it is also infinitely more vulnerable (a small revision etc, can have large unforeseen catastrophic consequences.)

#### We should employ state sovereignty when the particulars of a situation demands it

Derrida ‘4 Jacques Derrida, Directeur d’Etudes at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, and Professor of Philosophy, French and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Irvine, 2004, For What Tomorrow? A Dialogue With Elisabeth Roudinesco, p. 91-92

J.D.: A moment ago you spoke of regicide as the necessity of an ex­ception, in sum. Well, yes, one can refer provisionally to Carl Schmitt (whatever one may think of him, his arguments are always useful for prob­lematizing the “political” or the “juridical”; I examined this question in Pol­itics of Friendship). He says in effect that a sovereign is defined by his capacity to decide the exception. Sovereign is he who effectively decides the exception. The revolutionaries decided that at that moment that it was nec­essary to suspend justice and—in order to establish the law [droit] and to give the Revolution its rights—to suspend the rule of law [l’Etat de droit]. Schmitt also gives this definition of sovereignty: to have the right to sus­pend the law, or the rule of law, the constitutional state. Without this cate­gory of exception, we cannot understand the concept of sovereignty. Today, the great question is indeed, everywhere, that of sovereignty. Omnipresent in our discourses and in our axioms, under its own name or another, liter­ally or figuratively, this concept has a theological origin: the true sovereign is God. The concept of this authority or of this power was transferred to the monarch, said to have a “divine right.” Sovereignty was then delegated to the people, in the form of democracy, or to the nation, with the same the­ological attributes as those attributed to the king and to God. Today, wher­ever the word “sovereignty” is spoken, this heritage remains undeniable, whatever internal differentiation one may recognize in it. How do we deal with this? Here we return to the question of heritage with which we began. It is necessary to deconstruct the concept of sover­eignty, never to forget its theological filiation and to be ready to call this fil­iation into question wherever we discern its effects. This supposes an in­flexible critique of the logic of the state and of the nation-state. And yet—hence the enormous responsibility of the citizen and of the heir in general, in certain situations—the state, in its actual form, can resist certain forces that I consider the most threatening. What I here call “responsibility” is what dictates the decision to be sometimes for the sovereign state and sometimes against it, for its deconstruction (“theoretical and practical,” as one used to say) according to the singularity of the contexts and the stakes. There is no relativism in this, no renunciation of the injunction to “think” and to deconstruct the heritage. This aporia is in truth the very condition of decision and responsibility—if there is any. I am thinking for example of the incoherent but organized coalition of international capitalist forces that, in the name of neoliberalism or the market,31 are taking hold of the world in conditions such as the “state” form; this is what can still resist the most. For the moment. But it is neces­sary to reinvent the conditions of resistance. Once again, I would say that according to the situations, I am an antisovereignist or a sovereignist—and I vindicate the right to be antisovereignist at certain times and a sovereignist at others. No one can make me respond to this question as though it were a matter of pressing a button on some old-fashioned machine. There are cases in which I would support a logic of the state, but I ask to examine each situation before making any statement. It is also necessary to recognize that by requiring someone to be not unconditionally sovereignist but rather soyvereignist only under certain conditions, one is already calling into question the principle of sovereignty. Deconstruction begins there. It demands a dif­ficult dissociation, almost impossible but indispensable, between uncondi­tionality (justice without power) and sovereignty (right, power, or potency). Deconstruction is on the side of unconditionaliry, even when it seems im­possible, and not sovereignty, even when it seems possible.

#### Aff cedes the political—turns the advantage

Connolly ’12 William E. Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, “Steps toward an Ecology of Late Capitalism,” Theory & Event, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2012, Muse

6. The democratic state, while it certainly cannot alone tame capital or reconstitute the ethos of consumption, must play a significant role in reconstituting our lived relations to climate, weather, resource use, ocean currents, tectonic instability, glacier flows, species diversity, work, local life, consumption, and investment, as it responds favorably to pressures to forge a new ethos. A New, new democratic Left will thus experimentally enact new intersections between role performance and political activity, outgrow its old disgust with the very idea of the state, and remain alert to the dangers states can pose. It will do so because, as already suggested, the fragile ecology of late capital requires state interventions of several sorts. A refusal to participate in the state today cedes too much hegemony to neoliberal markets, either explicitly or by implication. Some drives to fascism, remember, emerged the last time around in capitalist states after a total market meltdown. Most of those movements failed. But a couple became consolidated through a series of resonances (vibrations) back and forth between industrialists, state officials, and vigilante groups in neighborhoods, clubs, churches, the police, the media and pubs. You do not fight the danger of a new kind of neofascism by withdrawing from either micropolitics or state politics. You do so through a multi-sited politics designed to shift systemic interactions and to infuse a new ethos into the fabric of everyday life. Changes in ethos can sometimes open doors to new possibilities of state and interstate action, so that an advance in one domain seeds that in the other. And vice versa. A positive dynamic of mutual amplification might be generated here. Could a series of significant shifts in the routines of state and global capitalism even press the fractured system to a point where it hovers on the edge of capitalism itself? We don’t know. That is one reason it is important to focus on interim goals. Another is that in a world of becoming, replete with periodic and surprising shifts in the course of events, you cannot project far beyond an interim period. Another yet is that activism needs to project concrete, interim possibilities to gain support and propel itself forward. That being said, it does seem unlikely to me, at least, that a positive interim future includes either socialist productivism or the world projected by proponents of deep ecology.23

#### Extend the Derrida evidence – four reasons why their state bad args are dumb:

#### We can be for and against sovereignty – advocating one state action doesn’t mean we reject everything else

#### Totalizing the state as violent is a formalist impasse – it presumes we’re just robots pressing buttons and obscures the moment of aporia in decisionmaking

#### Responsibility means we have to use the state sometimes—if ethics are incalculable then we have to combat suffering through the state against our own intellectual misgivings

#### Capitalism is a DA to the alt – complete rejection of sovereignty means it’s replaced by unrestricted corporations motivated by absolute profit which makes their offense inevitable

## 2NC

### OOO K

#### Abstracting neoliberalism as something out there which pervades all possible energy production conveniently justifies inaction. And of course Giroux thinks academia has a key role to play in the revolution—he’s an academic! Read the aff as an autopoetic system, designed never to escape its comfy theoretical armchair, and vote negative to unsettle this in an objective anarchy.

Bryant ’12 Levi Bryant, “McKenzie Wark: How Do You Occupy an Abstraction?” Larval Subjects, 8/4/2012, <http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/mckenzie-wark-how-do-you-occupy-an-abstraction/> spelling errors fixed in brackets

Here I’m also inclined to say that we need to be clear about system references in our political theorizing and action. We think a lot about the content of our political theorizing and positions, but I don’t think we think a lot about how our political theories are supposed to actually act in the world. As a result, much contemporary leftist political theory ends up in a performative contradiction. It claims, following Marx, that [its] aim is not to represent the world but to change it, yet it never escapes the burrows of academic journals, conferences, and presses to actually do so. Like the Rat-Man’s obsessional neurosis where his actions in returning the glasses were actually designed to fail, there seems to be a built in tendency in these forms of theorization to unconsciously organize their own failure. And here I can’t resist suggesting that this comes as no surprise given that, in Lacanian terms, the left is the position of the hysteric and as such has “a desire for an unsatisfied desire”. In such circumstances the worst thing consists in getting what you want. We on the left need to traverse our fantasy so as to avoid this sterile and self-defeating repetition; and this entails shifting from the position of political critique (hysterical protest), to political construction– actually envisioning and building alternatives. So what’s the issue with system-reference? The great autopoietic sociological systems theorist, Niklas Luhmann, makes this point nicely. For Luhmann, there are intra-systemic references and inter-systemic references. Intra-systemic references refer to processes that are strictly for the sake of reproducing or maintaining the system in question. Take the example of a cell. A cell, for-itself, is not for anything beyond itself. The processes that take place within the cell are simply for continuing the existence of the cell across time. While the cell might certainly emit various chemicals and hormones as a result of these processes, from its own intra-systemic perspective, it is not for the sake of affecting these other cells with those hormones. They’re simply by-products. Capitalism or economy is similar. Capitalists talk a good game about benefiting the rest of the world through the technologies they produce, the medicines they create (though usually it’s government and universities that invent these medicines), the jobs they create, etc., but really the sole aim of any corporation is identical to that of a cell: to endure through time or reproduce itself through the production of capital. This production of capital is not for anything and does not refer to anything outside itself. These operations of capital production are intra-systemic. By contrast, inter-systemic operations would refer to something outside the system and its auto-reproduction. They would be for something else. Luhmann argues that every autopoietic system has this sort of intra-systemic dimension. Autopoietic systems are, above all, organized around maintaining themselves or enduring. This raises serious questions about academic political theory. Academia is an autopoietic system. As an autopoietic system, it aims to endure, reproduce itself, etc. It must engage in operations or procedures from moment to moment to do so. These operations consist in the production of students that eventually become scholars or professors, the writing of articles, the giving of conferences, the production of books and classes, etc. All of these are operations through which the academic system maintains itself across time. The horrifying consequence of this is that the reasons we might give for why we do what we do might (and often) have little to do with what’s actually taking place in system continuance. We say that our articles are designed to demolish capital, inequality, sexism, homophobia, climate disaster, etc., but if we look at how this system actually functions we suspect that the references here are only intra-systemic, that they are only addressing the choir [of] other academics, that they are only about maintaining that system, and that they never proliferate through the broader world. Indeed, our very style is often a big fuck you to the rest of the world as it requires expert knowledge to be comprehended, thereby insuring that it can have no impact on broader collectives to produce change. Seen in this light, it becomes clear that our talk about changing the world is a sort of alibi, a sort of rationalization, for a very different set of operations that are taking place. Just as the capitalist says he’s trying to benefit the world, the academic tries to say he’s trying to change the world when all he’s really doing is maintaining a particular operationally closed autopoietic system. How to break this closure is a key question for any truly engaged political theory. And part of breaking that closure will entail eating some humble pie. Adam Kotsko wrote a wonderful and hilarious post on the absurdities of some political theorizing and its self-importance today. We’ve failed horribly with university politics and defending the humanities, yet in our holier-than-thou attitudes we call for a direct move to communism. Perhaps we need to reflect a bit on ourselves and our strategies and what political theory should be about. Setting all this aside, I think there’s a danger in Wark’s claims about abstraction (though I think he’s asking the right sort of question). The danger in treating hyperobjects like capitalism as being everywhere and nowhere is that our ability to act becomes paralyzed. As a materialist, I’m committed to the thesis that everything is ultimately material and requires some sort of material embodiment. If that’s true, it follows that there are points of purchase on every object, even where that object is a hyperobject. This is why, given the current form that power takes or the age of hyperobjects, I believe that forms of theory such as new materialism, object-oriented ontology, and actor-network theory are more important than ever (clearly the Whiteheadians are out as they see everything as internally related, as an organism, and therefore have no way of theorizing change and political engagement; they’re quasi-Hegelian, justifying even the discord in the world as a part of “god’s” selection and harmonization of intensities). The important thing to remember is that hyperobjects like capitalism are unable to function without a material base. They require highways, shipping routes, trains and railroads, fiber optic cables for communication, and a host of other things besides. Without what Shannon Mattern calls “infrastructure”, it’s impossible for this particular hyperobject exists. Every hyperobject requires its arteries. Information, markets, trade, require the paths along which they travel and capitalism as we know it today would not be possible without its paths. The problem with so much political theory today is that it focuses on the semiosphere in the form of ideologies, discourses, narratives, laws, etc., ignoring the arteries required for the semiosphere to exercise its power. For example, we get OWS standing in front of Wall Street protesting– engaging in a speech act –yet one wonders if speech is an adequate way of addressing the sort of system we exist in. Returning to system’s theory, is the system of capital based on individual decisions of bankers and CEO’s, or does the system itself have its own cognition, it’s own mode of action, that they’re ineluctably trapped in? Isn’t there a sort of humanist prejudice embodied in this form of political engagement? It has value in that it might create larger collectives of people to fight these intelligent aliens that live amongst us (markets, corporations, etc), but it doesn’t address these aliens themselves because it doesn’t even acknowledge their existence. What we need is a politics adequate to hyperobjects, and that is above all a politics that targets arteries. OOO, new materialism, and actor-network theory are often criticized for being “apolitical” by people who are fascinated with political declarations, who are obsessed with showing that your papers are in order, that you’ve chosen the right team, and that see critique and protest as the real mode of political engagement. But it is not clear what difference these theorists are making and how they are escaping intra-systemic self-reference and auto-reproduction. But the message of these orientations is “to the things themselves!”, “to the assemblages themselves!” “Quit your macho blather about where you stand, and actually map power and how it exercises itself!” And part of this re-orientation of politics, if it exists, consists in rendering deconstruction far more concrete. Deconstruction would no longer show merely the leaks in any system and its diacritical oppositions, it would go to the things themselves. What does that mean? It means that deconstruction would practice onto-cartography or identify the arteries by which capitalism perpetuates itself and find ways to block them. You want to topple the 1% and get their attention? Don’t stand in front of Wall Street and bitch at bankers and brokers, occupy a highway. Hack a satellite and shut down communications. Block a port. Erase data banks, etc. Block the arteries; block the paths that this hyperobject requires to sustain itself. This is the only way you will tilt the hands of power and create bargaining power with government organs of capital and corporations. You have to hit them where they live, in their arteries. Did anyone ever change their diet without being told that they would die? Your critique is an important and indispensable step, but if you really wish to produce change you need to find ways to create heart attacks and aneurysms. Short of that, your activity is just masturbation. But this requires coming to discern where the arteries are and doing a little less critique of cultural artifacts and ideologies. Yet choose your targets carefully. The problem with the Seattle protests was that they chose idiotic targets and simply acted on impotent rage. A window is not an artery. It doesn’t organize a flow of communication and capital. It’s the arteries that you need to locate. I guess this post will get Homeland Security after me.

#### Asking how knowledge produced is a secondary question to the fundamental problem of the object, which necessarily exceeds our descriptions and evades our theoretical registers. This makes the pedagogical consequences of the aff doomed to failure.

Bryant ’11 Levi Bryant, “Introduction: Towards a Finally Subjectless Object,” The Democracy of Objects, 2011, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/o/ohp/9750134.0001.001/1:4/~-~-democracy-of-objects?rgn=div1;view=fulltext

As always, the battles that swirl around epistemology are ultimately questions of ethics and politics. As Bacon noted, knowledge is power. And knowledge is not simply power in the sense that it allows us to control or master the world around us, but rather knowledge is also power in the sense that it determines who is authorized to speak, who is authorized to govern, and is the power to determine what place persons and other entities should, by right, occupy within the social order. No, questions of knowledge are not innocent questions. Rather, they are questions intimately related to life, governance, and freedom. A person's epistemology very much reflects their idea of what the social order ought to be, even if this is not immediately apparent in the arid speculations of epistemology. Yet in all of the heated debates surrounding epistemology that have cast nearly every discipline in turmoil, we nonetheless seem to miss the point that the question of the object is not an epistemological question, not a question of how we know the object, but a question of what objects are. The being of objects is an issue distinct from the question of our knowledge of objects. Here, of course, it seems obvious that in order to discuss the being of objects we must first know objects. And if this is the case, it follows as a matter of course that epistemology or questions of knowledge must precede ontology. However, I hope to show in what follows that questions of ontology are both irreducible to questions of epistemology and that questions of ontology must precede questions of epistemology or questions of our access to objects. What an object is cannot be reduced to our access to objects. And as we will see in what follows, that access is highly limited. Nonetheless, while our access to objects is highly limited, we can still say a great deal about the being of objects. However, despite the limitations of access, we must avoid, at all costs, the thesis that objects are what our access to objects gives us. As Graham Harman has argued, objects are not the given. Not at all. As such, this book defends a robust realism. Yet, and this is crucial to everything that follows, the realism defended here is not an epistemological realism, but an ontological realism. Epistemological realism argues that our representations and language are accurate mirrors of the world as it actually is, regardless of whether or not we exist. It seeks to distinguish between true representations and phantasms. Ontological realism, by contrast, is not a thesis about our knowledge of objects, but about the being of objects themselves, whether or not we exist to represent them. It is the thesis that the world is composed of objects, that these objects are varied and include entities as diverse as mind, language, cultural and social entities, and objects independent of humans such as galaxies, stones, quarks, tardigrades and so on. Above all, ontological realisms refuse to treat objects as constructions of humans. While it is true, I will argue, that all objects translate one another, the objects that are translated are irreducible to their translations. As we will see, ontological realism thoroughly refutes epistemological realism or what ordinarily goes by the pejorative title of “naïve realism”. Initially it might sound as if the distinction between ontological and epistemological realism is a difference that makes no difference but, as I hope to show, this distinction has far ranging consequences for how we pose a number of questions and theorize a variety of phenomena. One of the problematic consequences that follows from the hegemony that epistemology currently enjoys in philosophy is that it condemns philosophy to a thoroughly anthropocentric reference. Because the ontological question of substance is elided into the epistemological question of our knowledge of substance, all discussions of substance necessarily contain a human reference. The subtext or fine print surrounding our discussions of substance always contain reference to an implicit “for-us”. This is true even of the anti-humanist structuralists and post-structuralists who purport to dispense with the subject in favor of various impersonal and anonymous social forces like language and structure that exceed the intentions of individuals. Here we still remain in the orbit of an anthropocentric universe insofar as society and culture are human phenomena, and all of being is subordinated to these forces. Being is thereby reduced to what being is for us.

#### Their fetishization for ‘rethinking’ overwhelms perm solvency—the entire reason they employ these shifty strategies is to critique, critique, critique, and avoid the material difficulties of change. The aff and the perm beget more ‘thinking’—the alt opens this debate to praxis.

Bryant ’12 Levi Bryant, teaches philosophy at Collin College, “RSI, Discursivity, Critique, and Politics,” Larval Subjects, 7/18/2012, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/07/18/rsi-discursivity-critique-and-politics/

If I get worked up about these issues, then this is because I think they’ve created serious lacuna in our political theory and practice. Suppose I focus on norms, for example. Great, I’ve developed a theory of norms and how they contribute to the social fabric. Yet while Kant claims that “ought implies can”, I’m not so sure. You’ve shown that something is unjust or that this would be the reasonable way to proceed. But at the real-material level people are caught in sticky networks that suck them into life in particular ways. They ought, for example, to drive an electric car, but what if it’s not available where they are or what if they can’t afford it? Well they should do whatever they can to get it? But what of their other obligations such as eating, sheltering themselves, taking care of their children, paying their medical bills, etc? It would be so nice if we just had mistaken beliefs or failed to recognize the right norms. Things would be so easy then. But there’s life, there’s the power of things. Sometimes the issues aren’t ones of ideology– and yes, of course, I recognize that ideology is probably involved in making electric cars expensive and hard to obtain, but not for them always –sometimes they’re simply issues of the power of things. And if we treat things as blank screens we’ll have difficulty seeing this and we’ll miss out on other opportunities for engagement. Long ago I used to keep track of my blog. I had a map that showed me where all my visits were coming from about the world. I noticed that the interior portions of the United States were largely dark with no visits and that the coasts and cities had a high volume of traffic. Given that my blog talks about all sorts of things ranging from weather patterns to beavers to mantis shrimps to octopi (I get all these random visits from folks searching for these things), it followed that the absence of traffic from these regions of the country couldn’t be explained in terms of a lack of interest in French and continental philosophy (yes, I recognize that there are also cultural reasons folks from these reasons might shy away from such things). What then was it? I think the answer must be that there’s a lack easy and inexpensive internet access from these portions of the country. Notice also that these regions of the country are also the most conservative regions of the country. Could there be a relation between lack of access and conservatism? I am not suggesting that lack of access is the cause of conservatism and fundamentalism. Clearly there’s a whole history in these regions and an entire set of institutions that exercise a particular inertia. I’m saying that if the only voices you hear are those in your immediate community, how much opportunity is there to think and imagine otherwise? You’re only exposed to the orthodoxy of your community and their sanctions. I am also not saying that if you give people the internet they’ll suddenly become radical leftists. Minimally, however, they’ll have a vector of deterritorialization that allows them to escape the constraints of their local social field. All of this begs the question of who critique is for. If it can’t get to the audience that you want to change, what’s it actually doing? Who’s it addressed to? Sometimes you get the sense that the practice of radical political philosophy and critical theory is a bit like the Underpants Gnomes depicted in South Park: The Underpants Gnomes have a plan for success: collect underwear —>; ? [question mark] —->; profit. This is like our critical theorists: debunk/decipher —>; ? [question mark] —->; revolution! The problem is the question mark. We’re never quite sure what’s supposed to come between collecting the underwear and profit, between debunking and revolution. This suggests an additional form of political engagement. Sometimes the more radical gesture is not to debunk and critique, but to find ways to lay fiber optic cables, roads, plumbing, etc. How, for example, can a people rise up and overturn their fundamentalist dictators if they’re suffering from typhoid and cholera as a result of bad plumbing and waste disposal? How can people overturn capitalism when they have to support families and need places to live and have no alternative? Perhaps, at this point, we need a little less critique and a little more analysis of the things that are keeping people in place, the sticky networks or regimes of attraction. Perhaps we need a little more carpentry. This has real theoretical consequences. For example, we can imagine someone writing about sovereignty, believing they’re making a blow against nationalism by critiquing Schmitt and by discussing Agamben, all the while ignoring media of communication or paths of relation between geographically diverse people as if these things were irrelevant to nationalism occurring. Ever read Anderson on print culture and nationalism? Such a person should. Yet they seem to believe nationalism is merely an incorporeal belief that requires no discussion of material channels or media. They thereby deny themselves of all sorts of modes of intervention, hitching everything on psychology, attachment, and identification. Well done!

#### Their departure from policy proposals is conservative binarism. The 1AC forecloses the possibility of thinking the political in non-absolute terms, where the USFG is encountered as a legitimate object among peers equal in kind.

Tampio ‘9 Nicholas Tampio, Fordham University, “Assemblages and the Multitude: Deleuze, Hardt, Negri, and the Postmodern Left,” European Journal of Political Theory 8 (3), 2009, 383-400, Sage

In his 1990 interview with Negri, Deleuze refutes the Leninist assumptions embedded in Negri’s political imagination. First, ‘there’s no longer any image of proletarians around of which it’s just a matter of becoming conscious’.49 Deleuze’s point is not that the proletariat as a class has vanished, nor that the left should ignore workers’ struggles, but that the concept of the proletariat determines too many issues in advance. In a rare occurrence of the term ‘proletariat’ in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari remark that ‘as long as the working class defines itself by an acquired status’ it ‘does not leave the plan(e) of capital’.50 For Deleuze, the concept of proletariat works within a dichotomy – capitalism or communism – that the left should elude. The challenge for the left is to envision ‘landscapes, characters, and behavior that are different from those to which traditional history, even of the Marxist variety, has made us accustomed’.51 Second, Deleuze demystifies the concept of revolution. Historical revolutions, Deleuze observes, almost always end up badly: the English Revolution led to Cromwell, the French Revolution gave us Napoleon, and the Bolshevik Revolution bolstered Stalin. Deleuze, like Kant, thinks that revolutions are dangerous and almost never change people’s minds in a positive way.52 Men’s only hope,’ Deleuze explains, ‘lies in a revolutionary becoming’.53 ‘Becoming revolutionary’ is a much more cautious form of political change than Lenin’s ‘experience of revolution’. Becoming revolutionary entails surveying the political landscape, attaining a certain degree of political power, **inside or outside of the** state, testing out **new** laws, **policies**, and rhetorics, **and preserving the admirable elements of the society in which one** **lives**.54 ‘**As a rule immanent to experimentation’**, Deleuze explains, ‘**injections of caution’**.55 The best available option for the left in capitalist societies is to invent axioms and theorems that can steer economic forces in positive directions.56 Third, Deleuze does not think that communism, as a social condition after sovereignty, is desirable or viable. Deleuze responds to Negri, and the MarxistLeninist tradition in general, in the discussion of the state and the war machine in A Thousand Plateaus. A state is defined by ‘the perpetuation or conservation of organs of power’; it is the sovereign power that undertakes large-scale projects, constitutes surpluses, and accomplishes public functions.57 A war machine, by contrast, ‘exists only in its own metamorphoses’, as a scientific, technological, industrial, commercial, religious, or philosophical force that flees or punctures the containment of the state.58 Negri, we have seen, interprets Deleuze’s political project of simply siding with the war machines against the state. For Deleuze, however, states and war machines coexist and compete ‘in a perpetual field of interaction’.59 The great political question, for Deleuze, is how to draw the line between the state and the war machine, to strike the optimum balance between chaos and order, to take advantage of the life-affirming forces of metamorphosis without risking one’s individual or collective life.60 For Deleuze, eliminating sovereignty, the political form of interiority, is suicidal, akin to injecting heroin to become a body without organs. It is far better to use a ‘very fine file’ to open up the political body to new possibilities than to wield a sledgehammer to obliterate its contours.61 In the next section, we examine in more detail Deleuze’s positive contribution to contemporary political thought. Now, we can observe how Deleuze’s critique of Leninist political thought continues to strike a nerve. Peter Hallward has recently argued that Deleuze prefers to investigate the mechanics of disembodiment and de-materialization than to promote concrete political change.62 Hallward justifies his claim that Deleuze is an ‘extra-worldly’ philosopher by highlighting affinities between Deleuze’s philosophy and Neoplatonism, mysticism, pantheism, and theophanism. According to these traditions, the ethical task is to transcend oneself, not necessarily to reach a higher realm of being, but to access a greater creative force, whether one calls it God or a conceptual equivalent (energy, life, pure potential, the plane of immanence, etc.). Politics, for these philosophies, is beside the point. According to Hallward, Deleuze’s work offers an ‘immaterial and evanescent grip’ on the mechanisms of capitalist exploitation.63 The politics of the future, instead, depends on ‘more resilient forms of cohesion’, ‘more principled forms of commitment’, and ‘more integrated forms of coordination’. 64 For Hallward, the contemporary left should turn to Lenin, not Deleuze, to theorize political subjectivity. Deleuze would protest Hallward’s reading of his philosophy as well as the framing of the problem of left-wing thought. Hallward accentuates the moment in Deleuze’s thought in which he presses us to loosen the limitations that close us off from the virtual, but Hallward minimizes the complementary moment in Deleuze’s thought in which he invites us to embrace what has been created. In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze utilizes Nietzsche’s image of the dicethrow to depict these two moments: ‘The dice which are thrown once are the affirmation of chance, the combination which they form on falling is the affirmation of necessity’. 65 Hallward furthermore accuses Deleuze of favoring contemplation over action based upon his conception of philosophy as the ‘creation of concepts’. Paul Patton raises a simple, but powerful objection to this line of argument: ‘Philosophy is not politics’.66 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze consistently juxtaposes two sets of principles, the first pressing us to open our individual and social bodies to new ideas and experiences, the second to incorporate those ideas and experiences into our personal and political identities. A Thousand Plateaus insists that politics is about transforming the material world: ‘molecular escapes and movements would be nothing if they did not return to the molar organizations to reshuffle their segments, their binary distributions of sexes, classes, and parties’.67 For Deleuze, philosophy may be about exploring the higher and lower reaches of this world – what he calls the virtual – but politics is about bringing these insights to bear on the actual world. Deleuze and Guattari had leftist critics such as Hardt, Negri, Zizek, and Hallward in mind when A Thousand Plateaus declares: ‘We’re tired of trees.’68 Hardt and Negri claim that the multitude is not a dogmatic concept because it does not have a transcendent organ. The problem with trees, however, is not that they have a head, but that they have a trunk. The trunk, in this case, is the postulate that a left political body should organize the proletariat, to enact a revolution, to surpass sovereignty. Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of arborescent leftism resonates with John Stuart Mill’s and Alexis de Tocqueville’s fears in On Liberty and Democracy in America about the ‘tyranny of the majority’. ‘A king’, Tocqueville observes, ‘has only a material power that acts on actions and cannot reach wills; but the majority is vested with a force, at once material and moral, that acts on the will as much as on actions’.69 Deleuze, like Mill and Tocqueville, would not be comforted by Hardt and Negri’s claim that they renounce Lenin’s belief that the proletariat must be led by a vanguard. A vanguard may strike the body, but a multitude ‘draws a formidable circle around thought’.70 For Deleuze, the left needs a new conceptual armory that is not tied to the Marxist-Leninist image of politics.

#### This totalizing pessimism is unfortunate. The topic, too, is alive with activity, and you don’t even have to ignore the “resolved: the usfg should” part to find it.

Connolly ’12 William E. Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, “Steps toward an Ecology of Late Capitalism,” Theory & Event, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2012, Muse

3. Today, perhaps the initial target should be on reconstituting established patterns of consumption by a combination of direct citizen actions in consumption choices, publicity of such actions, and social movements to reconstitute the state/market supported infrastructure of consumption. By the infrastructure of consumption I mean state support for market subsystems such as a national highway system, a system of airports, medical care through private insurance, etc., etc., that enable some modes of consumption in the zones of travel, education, diet, retirement, medical care, energy use, health, and education and render others more difficult or expensive to procure.21 To shift several of these in the correct direction would already reduce extant inequalities. To change the infrastructure is also to affect the types of work and investment available. Social movements that work upon the infrastructure and ethos in tandem can make a real difference directly, encourage more people to extend their critical perspectives, and thereby open more people to a militant politics if and as a new disruptive event emerges. Perhaps a cross-state citizen goal should be to construct a pluralist assemblage by moving back and forth between shifts in role performance, revisions in political ideology, and adjustments in political sensibility, doing so to generate enough collective energy to launch a general strike simultaneously in several countries in the near future. Its aim would be to reduce inequality and to reverse the deadly future created by established patterns of climate change by fomenting significant shifts in patterns of consumption, corporate policies, state law and the priorities of interstate organizations. Again, the dilemma of today is that the fragility of things demands shifting and slowing down intrusions into several aspects of nature as we speed up shifts in identity, role performance, cultural ethos, market regulation, and citizen activism.

## 1NR

### Framework

#### We are always already role-playing—every new context makes us a new subject because it affectively modifies our internal logics—theirs is a disastrous conservativism that tries to entrench identity before difference

Connolly ’2 William Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, Identity/Difference, revised edition, 2002, pp. 64-66

An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and solidity. Entrenched in this indispensable relation is a second set of tendencies, themselves in need of exploration, to congeal established identities into fixed forms, thought and lived as if their structure expressed the true order of things. When these pressures prevail, the maintenance of one identity (or field of identities) involves the conversion of some differences into otherness, into evil, or one of its numerous surrogates. Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty. Identity is thus a slippery, insecure experience, dependent on its ability to define difference and vulnerable to the tendency of entities it would so define to counter, resist, overturn, or subvert definitions applied to them. Identity stands in a complex, political relation to the differences it seeks to fix. This complexity is intimated by variations in the degree to which differences from self identity are treated as complementary identities, contending identities, negative identities, or nonidentities; variations in the extent to which the voice of difference is heard as that with which one should remain engaged or as a symptom of sickness, inferiority, or evil; variations in the degree to which self-choice or cultural determination is attributed to alter-identities; variations in the degree to which one's own claim to identity is blocked by the power of opposing claimants or they are blocked by one's own power; and so on. The sensualist, the slut, the homosexual, the transvestite, the child abuser, and madness may merely suggest a few of these multifarious gradations at the level of the individual; the foreign, the terrorist organization, the dark continent, and the barbarian do so at the level of culture. Such complexities suggest political dimensions in these relations. The bearer of difference may be one open to your appreciation or worthy of your tolerance, or an other whose claim to identity you strive to invert, or one who incorporates some of its own dispositions into her positive identity while you insist upon defining them as part of her negative identity, or one who internalizes the negative identity imposed upon it by others, or an impoverished mode of existence (e.g. "madness") you refuse to recognize as an identity, or an anonymous self who resists the pressure to crystallize a public identity in order to savor the freedom of anonymity, and so on. Power plays a prominent role in this endless play of definition, counter-definition, and counters to counterdefinitions. What if the human is not predesigned to coalesce smoothly with any single, coherent set of identities, if life without the drive to identity is an impossibility, while the claim to a natural or true identity is always an exaggeration? And what if there are powerful drives, overdetermined by the very inertia of language, psychic instabilities in the human mode of being, and social pressures to mobilize energy for collective action, to fix the truth of identity by grounding it in the commands of a god or the dictates of nature or the requirements of reason or a free consensus? If and when this combination occurs, then a powerful identity will strive to constitute a range of differences as intrinsically evil, irrational, abnormal, mad, sick, primitive, monstrous, dangerous, or anarchical-as other. It does so in order to secure itself as intrinsically good, coherent, complete or rational and in order to protect itself from the other that would unravel its self-certainty and capacity for collective mobilization if it established its legitimacy. This constellation of constructed others now becomes both essential to the truth of the powerful identity and a threat to it. The threat is posed not merely by actions the other might take to injure or defeat the true identity but by the very visibility of its mode of being as other. If there is no natural or intrinsic identity, power is always inscribed in the relation an exclusive identity bears to the differences it constitutes. If there is always a discrepancy between the identities a society makes available and that in human being which exceeds, resists, or denies those possibilities, then the claim to a true identity is perpetually plagued by the shadow of the other it constitutes. These "ifs" are big and contestable-big in their implications and contestable in their standing. Anyone who thinks within their orbit, as I do, should periodically reconsider the strictness with which they apply and the status endowed upon them. So, too, should anyone who forsakes them in pursuit of more harmonious, teleological conceptions of identity and difference.

#### Single debates don’t change anything—no one cares

Atchison and Panetta ‘9 Jarrod Atchison, PhD in Rhetoric from the University of Georgia, Assistant Professor and Director of Debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Director of Debate and Professor in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of Georgia, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, ed. Andrea Lunsford, Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2009, p. 317-334

This section will address the "debate as activism perspective that argues that the appropriate site for addressing community problems in individual debates. In contrast to the "debate as innovation" perspective, which assumes that the activity is an isolated game with educational benefits, proponents of the "debate as activism" perspective argue that individual debates have the potential to create change in the debate community and society at large. If the first approach assumed that debate was completely insulated, this perspective assumes that there is no substantive insulation between individual debates and the community at large. From our perspective, using individual debates to create community change is an insufficient strategy for three reasons. First, individual debates are, for the most part, insulated from the community at large. Second, individual debates limit the conversation to the immediate participants and the judge, excluding many important contributors to the debate community. Third, locating the discussion within the confines of a competition diminishes the additional potential for collaboration, consensus, and coalition building. The first problem that we isolate is the difficulty of any individual debate to generate community change. Although any debate has the potential to create problems for the community (videotapes of objectionable behavior, etc.), rarely does any one debate have the power to create communitywide change. We attribute this ineffectiveness to the structural problems inherent in individual debates and the collective forgetfulness of the debate community. The structural problems stem from the current tournament format that has remained relatively consistent for the past 30 years. Debaters engage in preliminary debates in rooms that are rarely populated by anyone other than the judge. Judges are instructed to vote for the team that does the best debating, but the ballot is rarely seen by anyone outside the tabulation room. Given the limited number of debates in which a judge actually writes meaningful comments, there is little documentation of what actually transpired during the debate round. During the period when judges interact with the debaters, there are often external pressures (filing evidence, preparing for the next debate, etc.) that restrict the ability of anyone outside the debate to pay attention to the judges' justification for their decision. Elimination debates do not provide for a much better audience because debates still occur simultaneously, and travel schedules dictate that most of the participants have left by the later elimination rounds. It is difficult for anyone to substantiate the claim that asking a judge to vote to solve a community problem in an individual debate with so few participants is the best strategy for addressing important problems.

#### Aff cedes the political—turns the advantage

Connolly ’12 William E. Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, “Steps toward an Ecology of Late Capitalism,” Theory & Event, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2012, Muse

6. The democratic state, while it certainly cannot alone tame capital or reconstitute the ethos of consumption, must play a significant role in reconstituting our lived relations to climate, weather, resource use, ocean currents, tectonic instability, glacier flows, species diversity, work, local life, consumption, and investment, as it responds favorably to pressures to forge a new ethos. A New, new democratic Left will thus experimentally enact new intersections between role performance and political activity, outgrow its old disgust with the very idea of the state, and remain alert to the dangers states can pose. It will do so because, as already suggested, the fragile ecology of late capital requires state interventions of several sorts. A refusal to participate in the state today cedes too much hegemony to neoliberal markets, either explicitly or by implication. Some drives to fascism, remember, emerged the last time around in capitalist states after a total market meltdown. Most of those movements failed. But a couple became consolidated through a series of resonances (vibrations) back and forth between industrialists, state officials, and vigilante groups in neighborhoods, clubs, churches, the police, the media and pubs. You do not fight the danger of a new kind of neofascism by withdrawing from either micropolitics or state politics. You do so through a multi-sited politics designed to shift systemic interactions and to infuse a new ethos into the fabric of everyday life. Changes in ethos can sometimes open doors to new possibilities of state and interstate action, so that an advance in one domain seeds that in the other. And vice versa. A positive dynamic of mutual amplification might be generated here. Could a series of significant shifts in the routines of state and global capitalism even press the fractured system to a point where it hovers on the edge of capitalism itself? We don’t know. That is one reason it is important to focus on interim goals. Another is that in a world of becoming, replete with periodic and surprising shifts in the course of events, you cannot project far beyond an interim period. Another yet is that activism needs to project concrete, interim possibilities to gain support and propel itself forward. That being said, it does seem unlikely to me, at least, that a positive interim future includes either socialist productivism or the world projected by proponents of deep ecology.23

#### Limits are key to functioning public discourse—your arg mirrors the fallacies of market fundamentalists—there might be risks to imposing topicality, but they’re worth taking

Bauman ’99 Zygmunt Bauman, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at University of Leeds, In Search of Politics, 1999, p. 4-5

The art of politics, if it happens to be democratic politics, is about dismantling the limits to citizen’s freedom; but it is also about self-limitation: about making citizens free in order to enable them to set, individually and collectively, their own, individual and collective, limits. That second point has been all but lost. All limits are off-limits. Any attempt at self-limitation is taken to be the first step on the road leading straight to the gulag, as if there was nothing but the choice between the market’s and the government’s dictatorship over needs—as if there was no room for the citizenship in other form than the consumerist one. It is this form (and only this form) which financial and commodity markets would tolerate. And it is this form which is promoted and cultivated by the governments of the day. The sole grand narrative left in the field is that of (to quote Castoriadis again) the accumulation of junk and more junk. To that accumulation, there must be no limits (that is, all limits are seen as anathema and no limits would be tolerated). But it is that accumulation from which the self-limitation has to start, if it is to start at all. But the aversion to self-limitation, generalized conformity and the resulting insignificance of politics have their price—a steep price, as it happens. The price is paid in the currency in which the price of wrong politics is usually paid—that of human sufferings. The sufferings come in many shapes and colours, but they may be traced to the same root. And these sufferings have a self-perpetuating quality. They are the kind of sufferings which stem from the malfeasance of politics, but also the kind which are the paramount obstacle to its sanity. The most sinister and painful of contemporary problems can be best collected under the rubric of Unsicherheit—the German term which blends together experiences which need three English terms—uncertainty, insecurity and unsafety—to be conveyed. The curious thing is that the nature of these troubles is itself a most powerful impediment to collective remedies: people feeling insecure, people wary of what the future might hold in store and fearing for their safety, are not truly free to take the risks which collective action demands. They lack the courage to dare and the time to imagine alternative ways of living together; and they are too preoccupied with tasks they cannot share to think of, let alone to devote their energy to, such tasks can be undertaken only in common.

#### Focus on policy analysis key to reinvigorate democratic culture. Politics is dominated by unsupported ideological claims—critical thought via educational debate is key to make it not terrible

Hoppe ’99 Robert Hoppe, Professor of Policy and Knowledge at University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands, “Policy analysis, science, and politics: from ‘speaking truth to power’ to ‘making sense together’,” Science and Public Policy 26.3 (1999), pp. 201-210, available at http://works.bepress.com/robert\_hoppe1/1

According to Lasswell (1971), policy science is about the production and application of knowledge of and in policy. Policymakers who desire to successfully tackle problems on the political agenda, should be able to mobilize the best available knowledge. This requires high-quality knowledge in policy. Policymakers and, in a democracy, citizens, also need to know how policy processes really evolve. This demands precise knowledge of policy. There is an obvious link between the two: the more and better knowledge of policy, the easier it is to mobilize knowledge in policy. Lasswell expresses this interdependence by defining the policy scientist’s operational task as eliciting the maximum rational judgment of all those involved in policymaking For the applied policy scientist or policy analyst this implies the development of two skills. First, for the sake of mobilizing the best available knowledge in policy, s/he should be able to mediate between different scientific disciplines. Second, for the sake of optimizing the interdependence between science in and of policy, s/he should be able to mediate between science and politics. Hence Dunn’s (1994:84) formal definition of policy analysis as an applied social science discipline that uses multiple research methods in a context of argumentation, public debate (and political struggle, rh) in order to create, critically evaluate, and communicate policy-relevant knowledge. Historically, the differentiation and successful institutionalization of policy science can be interpreted as the scientization of the functions of knowledge organization, storage, dissemination and application in the knowledge system (Dunn & Holzner, 1988; Van de Graaf & Hoppe, 1989:29). Moreover, this scientization of hitherto ‘un-scientized’ functions, by expressly including science of policy, aimed to gear them to the political system. In that sense, Lasswell and Lerner’s (1951) call for policy sciences anticipated, and probably helped bring about the scientization of politics. Peter Weingart (this issue) claims that the development of the science-policy nexus can be analyzed as a dialectical process of the scientization of politics/policy and the politicization of science. Science Technology and Society (STS) studies can claim particular credit for showing the latter tendency (Cozzens & Woodhouse, 1995:551). Applying critical sociology, symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology to the innermost workings of the laboratories, STS-scholars have shown that the idealist image of science as producer of privileged, authoritative knowledge claims, supported by an ascetic practice of Mertonian norms for proper scientific conduct (commonality or communism, universalism, disinterestedness, organized skepticism - CUDO’s) is just the outside, legitimizing veneer of scientific practices and successes. Using interpretive frames from Marxist science studies, conflict theory, interest theory, and social constructivism, a much more realistic perspective on science has been developed. Instead of Mertonian CUDO-norms, contemporary scientists de facto behave as if science were proprietary, local, authoritarian, commissioned, and expert (Ziman, 1990 - PLACE). From Olympian heights of abstraction, curiosity-driven speculation, innovative but stringent experiments, and Humboldtian institutional autonomy, small-s science came down to earth as a social movement (Yearley, 1988:44ff) driven by local and practical, sometimes openly political interests, entrepreneurial, fiercely competitive, speculative, with an ‘anything goes’ methodology, and selling itself to government and big business in the race for financial resources. Thus, the politics of science extended into the political domain. But it would be wrong to attribute this just to science’s institutional self interest. To the extent scientists were successful in producing authoritative cosmopolitan knowledge claims, and upholding them in their translation into successful large technological projects, they were invited by politicians and administrators as useful advisers. Thereby politics paradoxically contributed to its own scientization. At first, till the early seventies, it looked like the science-politics nexus would be just mutually beneficial. The institutional ‘convenant’ between the two spheres, aptly named "Science, the Endless Frontier" meant a high degree of institutional autonomy, lots of resources, and privileged access to political decisionmaking through advisory positions for science. Politics, impressed by and grateful for science’s contribution to the war effort and to large infrastructural projects, rested content in expecting more of the same high pay-offs. As these promises turned out empty or merely disappointing, sciences’ cognitive authority waned, and politics gradually revised the convenant by tightening its conditions for financial support and scientific autonomy. The new inter-institutional contract has been relabeled "Strategic Science". On the one hand, politics forces criteria of relevance on scientists, which clearly indicates the politicization of science. On the other hand, "(s)cientists have internalized the pressure for relevance, but at the same time have captured it for their own purposes by claiming a division of labour. Typical stories emphasize strategic research as the hero at the core of one or more ‘innovation chains’ where the switch from open-ended research to implementation would occur" (Rip,1997:631). This, of course, points to the continued scientization of politics. Even though numerous studies of political controversies showed that science-advisors behave pretty much like any other self-interested actor (Nelkin, 1995), science somehow managed to maintain its functional cognitive authority for politics. This may be due to its changing shape, which has been characterized as the diffusion of the authoritative allocation of values by the state, or the emergence of a postparliamentary and postnational network democracy (Andersen & Burns, 1996: 227-251). National political developments are backgrounded by a pulp of ideas about uncontollable, but apparently inevitable international developments; and, in Europe, national state authority and power in public policymaking is leaking away to a new political and administrative élite, situated in the institutional ensemble of the European Union. National representation is in the hands of political parties who no longer control ideological debate but remain intact as venues to national governmental power. The authority and policymaking power of national governments is also leaking away towards increasingly powerful policy subsystems or policy issue networks, dominated by functional representation by interest groups and functional experts. In this situation, public debate has become even more fragile than it has been before. It has become diluted by the predominance of purely pragmatic, managerial and administrative argument, and underarticulated due to an explosion of numerous new political schemata that crowd out the more conventional ideologies. To wit, the new schemata do feed upon the conventional ideologies; but in larger part they consist of a random and unarticulated ‘mish-mash’ of attitudes and images derived from ethnic, local-cultural, professional, religious, social movement, and personal political experiences. On the one hand, the marketplace of political ideas and arguments is thriving; on the other, politicians and citizens are at a loss in judging its nature and quality. Neither political parties, nor public officials, nor interest groups, nor social movements and citizen groups, nor even the public media show any inclination, let alone competency, in ordering this inchoate field. In such conditions, scientific debate provides a much needed minimal amount of order and articulation of concepts, arguments, and ideas. Although frequently more in rhetoric than substance, reference to scientific ‘validation’ does provide politicians, public officials, and citizens alike with some sort of compass in an ideological universe in disarray. For policy analysis to have any political impact under such conditions, it should be able to somehow continue ‘speaking truth’ to political élites who are ideologically uprooted, but cling to power; to the élites of administrators, managers, professionals and experts who vie for power in the jungle of organizations populating the functional policy domains of postparliamentary democracy; and to a broader audience of an ideologically disoriented and politically disenchanted citizenry. But what does it mean to ‘speak truth to power’ in contemporary society and politics? To answer this question, first, I turn to the megatrends in epistemological debate in the second half of the twentieth century. On that basis, second, I will try to delineate its implcations for the actual and future development of policy analysis.

# R3 vs Kentucky GS

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### Capitalism K

#### Energy production is inseparable from capitalist growth—quick tech fixes to scarcity are temporary at best and exclude radical historical critique

Clark and York ‘8 Brett Clark, assistant professor of sociology at North Carolina State University, and Richard York, coeditor of Organization & Environment and associate professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, “Rifts and Shifts: Getting to the Root of Environmental Crises,” Monthly Review, Vol. 60, Issue 06, November 2008

The development of energy production technologies provides one of the best examples of rifts and shifts, as technological fixes to energy problems create new ecological crises in the attempt to alleviate old ones. Biomass, particularly wood, has, of course, been one of the primary energy sources humans have depended on throughout their history. The development of more energy intensive processes, such as the smelting of metals, was, therefore, connected with greater pressure on forests, as trees were fed to the fires. By the time the Industrial Revolution began to emerge in Europe, vast regions of the continent had already been deforested, particularly in areas close to major sites of production, and much of this deforestation was driven by the demand for fuel. As industrialization advanced, new sources of power were desired to fuel the machines that allowed for production to take place on a growing scale. Whole forests could be devoured at an unprecedented rate, making wood ever more scarce. The tension between the desire of the capitalist owners of the new industrial technologies for expanding the accumulation of capital and the biophysical limits of Earth were apparent from the start of the Industrial Revolution. However, capitalists did not concern themselves with the internal contradictions of capitalism, except insofar as they were barriers to be transcended. Thus, efforts to achieve what we would today call sustainability were not even considered by the elite. Rather, coal (and subsequently other fossil fuels) quickly became the standard fuel of industry, temporarily sidestepping the fuelwood crisis (although forests continued to fall due to the many demands placed on them) but laying the foundations for our current global climate change crisis by dramatically increasing the emission of carbon dioxide.16 The pattern has remained similar to how it was in the early years of the Industrial Revolution. Oil was quickly added to coal as a fuel source and a variety of other energy sources were increasingly exploited. Among these was hydropower, the generation of which requires damming rivers, and thus destroying aquatic ecosystems. For example, the expansion of hydropower over the twentieth century in the U.S. Pacific Northwest was the primary force leading to the widespread depletion and extinction of salmon runs. Nuclear power was, of course, the most controversial addition to the power mix. Despite initial claims that it would provide clean, unlimited power that would be too cheap to meter, it proved to be an expensive, risky power source that produced long-lived highly radioactive waste for which safe long-term storage sites have been nearly impossible to develop. Now, in the twenty-first century, with global climate change finally being recognized by the elite as a serious problem, the proposed solutions are, as we would expect, to shift the problem from one form of energy to a new form of energy. Nuclear power, despite its drop in popularity toward the end of the last century, due to high costs and widespread public opposition, is now very much back on the agenda, with new promises of how the new nuclear plants are safer—never mind the issue of radioactive waste. We are also regaled with promises of agrofuels, ironically bringing us back to the pre-coal energy crisis. Recent scientific reports note that growing crops for agrofuel to feed cars may actually increase the carbon emitted into the atmosphere.17 But even this ignores the fact that the production of agrofuel would be based on unsustainable agricultural practices that demand massive inputs of fertilizers and would only further the depletion of soil nutrients, bringing us back to the metabolic rift that Marx originally addressed. Two recent examples of technical approaches to mitigating climate change are particularly illustrative of how technological optimism distracts us from the political-economic sources of our environmental problems. Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen, who admirably played a central role in identifying and analyzing human-generated ozone depletion in the stratosphere, recently argued that climate change can be avoided by injecting sulfur particles into the stratosphere to increase the albedo of the Earth, and thus reflect more of the sun’s energy back into space, which would counter the warming stemming from rising concentrations of greenhouse gases. Although no doubt offered sincerely and out of desperation stemming from the failure of those in power adequately to address the mounting climate crisis, the technical framing of the climate change issue makes it easy for political and business leaders to avoid addressing greenhouse gas emissions, since they can claim that technical fixes make it unnecessary to take action to preserve forests and curtail the burning of fossil fuels. Engineering the atmosphere on this scale is likely to have many far-reaching consequences (acid rain being only the most obvious), many of which have not been anticipated. In a similar vein, well-known physicist Freeman Dyson recently suggested that we can avoid global climate change by replacing one-quarter of the world’s forests with genetically engineered carbon-eating trees. The ecological consequences of such an action would likely be extraordinary. Both of these so-called solutions avoid addressing the dynamics of an economic system that is largely structured around burning fossil fuels, that must constantly renew itself on a larger scale, and that runs roughshod over nature. Often techno-solutions are proposed in a manner that suggests they are completely removed from the world as it operates. The irony is that such narrowly conceived “solutions” would only serve as a means to prop up the very forces driving ecological degradation, allowing those forces to continue to operate, as they create additional ecological rifts.18

#### International trade is an inherently biased system that allows hegemonic capitalist states to consolidate power even further.

Kovel ‘2 Joel Kovel, Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, 2002, The Enemy of Nature, p. 70-71

This induces new modes of organization among existing states. It gen­erates great regional blocks across Europe, Asia and the Western Hemi­sphere, and creates, so to speak, an office of Hegemon, presently occupied by the USA as that state strong enough to claim the role of global gendarme. But it also brings into existence new trans-statal formations to regulate the now expanded ecumene, in particular, through the supervision of trade. A threefold trans-statal structure ensues. First, trade itself achieves a scale requiring direct supervision. Second, lending institutions are needed to inject requisite funds into the dependent ‘periphery’ so that trade and other instruments of capital can become stimulated and circulate properly Finally, an agency is needed to police the debts and other financial irregu­larities that inevitably arise under this arrangement, and to keep all the parts of the gigantic machine in good working order — a financial cop to go out in advance of the flesh-and-blood, bullet-dealing police and armies. In sum: a trade organization, a global bank and a financial enforcer — a World Trade Organization, a World Bank and an International Monetary Fund — fused into an iron triangle of transnational accumulation, and serving the transnational bourgeoisie.24 There are, of course, important distinctions within this apparatus, and between different elements of the state system, just as there always are with any ruling class. The USA has largely called the shots (in the Clinton administration, from the Department of the Treasury, along with the Federal Reserve Bank), and has been in essential charge since the ‘American Cen­tury’ began with the close of the Second World War. It was Richard Nixon who unilaterally took the world off the gold standard in 1971 and allowed exchange rates to float, which is to say, kept them pegged to the value of the dollar, the strongest currency In this way the USA, which had become a debtor society thanks to imperial exertions in Vietnam, was allowed to remain so without penalty, indeed, became enabled to finance its expansion as the debtor in charge of the show. Not for it the ‘structural adjustment programmes’ applied to lesser debtor nations by the IMF, that hammer that breaks down civil society and the local economy by selling off public assets, cutting back governmental expenditures and, by orienting the economy towards export, submitting peripheral societies to the WTO-sponsored regime of trade. One law for the lion and another for the ox remains in effect. So much for the simple-minded notion that globalization signifies the decline of the nation-state. Which nation-state, it has to be asked: the boss and enforcer, or the subaltern and provider?

#### Efficiency increases accelerate rising consumption—Jevons’s Paradox proves

Foster et al. ’10 John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at University of Oregon, Brett Clark, assistant professor of sociology at North Carolina State University, and Richard York, associate professor of sociology at University of Oregon, “Capitalism and the Curse of Energy Efficiency,” Monthly Review, November 2010, Vol. 62, Issue 6, pp. 1-12

But there is one aspect of Jevons’s argument—the Jevons Paradox itself—that continues to be considered one of the pioneering insights in ecological economics.8 In chapter 7 of The Coal Question, entitled “Of the Economy of Fuel,” Jevons responded to the common notion that, since “the falling supply of coal will be met by new modes of using it efficiently and economically,” there was no problem of supply, and that, indeed, “the amount of useful work got out of coal may be made to increase manifold, while the amount of coal consumed is stationary or diminishing.” In sharp opposition to this, Jevons contended that increased efficiency in the use of coal as an energy source only generated increased demand for that resource, not decreased demand, as one might expect. This was because improvement in efficiency led to further economic expansion. “It is wholly a confusion of ideas,” he wrote, “to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to a diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth. As a rule, new modes of economy will lead to an increase of consumption according to a principle recognised in many parallel instances….The same principles apply, with even greater force and distinctness, to the use of such a general agent as coal. It is the very economy of its use which leads to its extensive consumption.”9 “Nor is it difficult,” Jevons wrote, “to see how this paradox arises.” Every new technological innovation in the production of steam engines, he pointed out in a detailed description of the steam engine’s evolution, had resulted in a more thermodynamically efficient engine. And each new, improved engine had resulted in an increased use of coal. The Savery engine, one of the earlier steam engines, he pointed out, was so inefficient that “practically, the cost of working kept it from coming into use; it consumed no coal, because its rate of consumption was too high.”10 Succeeding models that were more efficient, such as Watt’s famous engine, led to higher and higher demand for coal with each successive improvement. “Every such improvement of the engine, when effected, does but accelerate anew the consumption of coal. Every branch of manufacture receives a fresh impulse—hand labour is still further replaced by mechanical labour, and greatly extended works can be undertaken which were not commercially possible by the use of the more costly steam-power.”11 Although Jevons thought that this paradox was one that applied to numerous cases, his focus in The Coal Question was entirely on coal as a “general agent” of industrialization and a spur to investment goods industries. The power of coal to stimulate economic advance, its accelerated use, despite advances in efficiency, and the severity of the effects to be expected from the decline in its availability, were all due to its dual role as the necessary fuel for the modern steam engine and as the basis for blast furnace technology. In the mid-nineteenth century, coal was the key material input for blast furnaces in the smelting of iron—the crucial industrial product and the foundation of industrial dominance.12 It was by virtue of its greater development in this area, as “the workshop of the world,” that Britain accounted for about half of world output of iron in 1870.13 Greater efficiency in the use of coal thus translated into a greater capacity to produce iron and expand industry in general, leading to spiraling demand for coal. As Jevons put it: If the quantity of coal used in a blast-furnace, for instance, be diminished in comparison with the yield, the profits of the trade will increase, new capital will be attracted, the price of pig-iron will fall, but the demand for it [will] increase; and eventually the greater number of furnaces will more than make up for the diminished consumption of each. And if such is not always the result within a single branch, it must be remembered that the progress of any branch of manufacture excites a new activity in most other branches, and leads indirectly, if not directly, to increased inroads upon our seams of coal.14 What made this argument so powerful at the time was that it seemed immediately obvious to everyone in Jevons’s day that industrial development depended on the capacity to expand iron production cheaply. This meant that a reduction in the quantity of coal needed in a blast furnace would immediately translate into an expansion of industrial production, industrial capacity, and the ability to capture more of the world market—hence more demand for coal. The tonnage of coal consumption by the iron and steel industries of Britain in 1869, 32 million tons, exceeded the combined amount used in both general manufactures, 28 million tons, and railroads, 2 million tons.15 This was the age of capital and the age of industry, in which industrial power was measured in terms of coal and pig iron production. Output of coal and iron in Britain increased basically in tandem in this period, both tripling between 1830 and 1860.16 As Jevons himself put it: “Next after coal…iron is the material basis of our power. It is the bone and sinews of our laboring system. Political writers have correctly treated the invention of the coal-blast furnace as that which has most contributed to our material wealth….The production of iron, the material of all our machinery, is the best measure of our wealth and power.”17 Hence none of Jevons’s readers could fail to perceive the multiplier effects on industry of an improvement in efficiency in the use of coal, or the “increased inroads” upon “seams of coal” that this would tend to generate. “Economy,” he concluded, “multiplies the value and efficiency of our chief material; it indefinitely increases our wealth and means of subsistence, and leads to an extension of our population, works, and commerce, which is gratifying to the present, but must lead to an earlier end.”18

#### Monopoly capitalism’s tendancy towards short-term growth leads to long-run stagnation—wealth centralization in corporations and finance restricts macro-level liquidity and intellectual innovation

Foster and McChesney ’12 John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at University of Oregon, and Robert W. McChesney, Gutgsell Endowed Professor of Communication, University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign, “The Endless Crisis,” Monthly Review, May 2012, vol. 64, issue 1, pp. 1-28

Our own analysis in this book begins in many ways where Sweezy (and Harry Magdoff) left off, and carries forward as well the analysis of John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff in The Great Financial Crisis: Causes and Consequences (2009).40 What Sweezy called the “intricately related” aspects of monopolization, stagnation, financialization, and globalization have produced a new historical phase, which we refer to as “monopoly- finance capital.” In this period the Triad economies are locked in a stagnation-financialization trap, while linked to the growth in the emerging economies via the global labor arbitrage—whereby multinational corporations exploit the differences in wage levels in the world in order to extract surplus profits. The result is the worsening of the overall problem of surplus capital absorption and financial instability in the center of the world economy. In this book we are particularly concerned with how this is working out at the global level, with considerable focus (in the later chapters) on how this is related to the Chinese economy. Yet, the central problem remains overaccumulation within the Triad, where the United States, despite its declining hegemony, still constitutes the trend-setting force in the world system of accumulation. The deepening effects of stagnation in the U.S. economy can be seen in Chart 2, showing the long-run downward trend in the growth rate of industrial production in the United States. Nor is the United States alone in this respect. Since the 1960s West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan have all seen even larger declines, when compared to the United States, in their trend-rates of growth of industrial production. In the case of Japan industrial production rose by 16.7 percent in 1960–70 and by a mere 0.04 percent in 1990–2010.41 The story shown in Chart 2 is one of deepening stagnation of production— already emphasized by Sweezy and Magdoff in the 1970s and ‘80s. Chart 3, in contrast, reveals that this led—especially from the 1980s on—to a shift in the economy from production to speculative finance as the main stimulus to growth. Thus the FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) portion of national income expanded from 35 percent of the goods-production share in the early 1980s to over 65 percent in recent years. The so-called economic booms of the 1980s and ‘90s were powered by the rapid growth of financial speculation leveraged by increasing debt, primarily in the private sector. The dramatic rise in the share of income associated with finance relative to goods production industries has not, however, been accompanied by an equally dramatic rise of the share of jobs in financial services as opposed to industrial production. Thus employment in FIRE as a percentage of employment in goods production over the last two decades has remained flat at about 22 percent. This suggests that the big increase in income associated with finance when compared to production has resulted in outsized gains for a relatively few income recipients rather than a corresponding increase in jobs.42 The rapid expansion of FIRE in relation to goods production in the U.S. economy is a manifestation of the long-run financialization of the economy, i.e., the shift of the center of gravity of economic activity increasingly from production (and production-related services) to speculative finance. In the face of market saturation and vanishing profitable investment opportunities in the “real economy,” capital formation or real investment gave way before the increased speculative use of the economic surplus of society in pursuit of capital gains through asset inflation. As Magdoff and Sweezy explained as early as the 1970s, this could have an indirect effect in stimulating the economy, primarily by spurring luxury consumption. This has become known as the “wealth effect,” whereby a portion of the capital gains associated with asset appreciation in the stock market, real estate market, etc. is spent on goods and services for the well-to-do, adding to the effective demand in the economy.43 Yet, the stimulus provided by financialization has not prevented a multi-decade decline in the role of investment in the U.S. economy. Thus net private nonresidential fixed investment dropped from 4 percent of GDP in the 1970s to 3.8 percent in the ‘80s, 3 percent in the ‘90s, and 2.4 percent in 2000–2010.44 At the heart of the matter is the declining long-term growth rate of investment in manufacturing, and more particularly in manufacturing structures (construction of new or refurbished manufacturing plants and facilities), as shown in Chart 4.45 Even with declining rates of investment growth, productivity increases in industry have continued, leading to the expansion of excess productive capacity (an indication of the overaccumulation of capital). This can be seen in Chart 5 showing the long-term slide in capacity utilization in manufacturing. High and rising levels of unused (or excess) capacity have a negative effect on investment since corporations are naturally reluctant to invest in industries where a large portion of the existing capacity is standing idle. The U.S. automobile industry leading up to and during the Great Recession (like the worldwide industry) was faced with huge amounts of unused capacity—equal to approximately onethird of its total capacity. A 2008 Businessweek article underscored the global auto glut: “With sales tanking from Beijing to Boston, automakers find themselves in an embarrassing position. Having indulged in a global orgy of factory-building in recent years, the industry has the capacity to make an astounding 94 million vehicles each year. That’s about 34 million too many based on current sales, according to researcher CSM Worldwide, or the output of about 100 plants.”46 The decreasing utilization of productive capacity is paralleled by what we referred to in 2004 as “The Stagnation of Employment,” or the growing unemployment and underemployment that characterizes both the U.S. economy and the economies of the Triad in general. According to the alternative labor underutilization measure, U6, of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a full 14.9 percent of the civilian work force (plus marginally attached workers) were unemployed or underemployed on a seasonally adjusted basis in the United States in February 2012.47 In these circumstances, the U.S. economy, as we have seen, has become chronically dependent on the ballooning of the financial superstructure to keep things going. Industrial corporations themselves have became financialized entities, operating more like banks in financing sales of their products, and often engaging in speculation on commodities and currencies. Today they are more inclined to pursue the immediate, surefire gains available through merger, acquisition, and enhanced monopoly power than to commit their capital to the uncertain exigencies associated with the expansion of productive activity. Political-economic power has followed the financial growth curve of the economy, with the economic base of political hegemony shifting from the real economy of production to the financial world, and increasingly serving the interests of the latter, in what became known as the neoliberal age.48 The main key to understanding these developments, however, remains the Sweezy Normal State. The long-term trends associated with economic growth, industrial production, investment, financialization, and capacity utilization (as shown in Charts 1–5 above) all point to the same phenomenon of a long-term economic slowdown in the U.S. and the other advanced industrial economies. A central cause of this stagnation tendency is the high, and today rapidly increasing, price markups of monopolistic corporations, giving rise to growing problems of surplus capital absorption. Taking the nonfarm business sector as a whole, the price markup on unit labor costs (the ratio of prices to unit labor costs) for the U.S. economy over the entire post-Second World War period averaged 1.57, with a low of around 1.50 in the late 1940s. However, from the late 1990s to the present the markup on unit labor costs—what the great Polish economist Michal Kalecki referred to as the “degree of monopoly”— has climbed sharply, to 1.75 in the final quarter of 2011. As stated in The Economic Report of the President, 2012: “The markup has now risen to its highest level in post-World War II history, with much of that increase taking place over the past four years. Because the markup of prices over unit labor costs is the inverse of the labor share of output, saying that an increase in the price markup is the highest in postwar history is equivalent to saying that the labor share of output has fallen to its lowest level.”49

#### Capitalism generates internal contradictions erupting in imperialism, nuclear war, and ecocide

Foster ‘5 John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, "Naked Imperialism," Monthly Review, Vol. 57 No. 4, 2005

From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable for the system. Yet, ill-fated attempts by individual states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic. In present world circumstances, when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible. As the noted Marxian philosopher István Mészáros observed in Socialism or Barbarism? (2001)—written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: “[W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal.” The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction. These are symbolized by the Bush administration’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled “Apocalypse Soon” in the May–June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: “The United States has never endorsed the policy of ‘no first use,’ not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so.” The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fit—setting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other (representing approximately a quarter of the world’s total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the world’s growing environmental problems—raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue.

#### Try or die—the growth imperative risks total planetary destruction and social breakdown

Foster et al. ’10 John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at University of Oregon, Brett Clark, assistant professor of sociology at North Carolina State University, and Richard York, associate professor of sociology at University of Oregon, “Capitalism and the Curse of Energy Efficiency,” Monthly Review, November 2010, Vol. 62, Issue 6, pp. 1-12

The result is the production of mountains upon mountains of commodities, cheapening unit costs and leading to greater squandering of material resources. Under monopoly capitalism, moreover, such commodities increasingly take the form of artificial use values, promoted by a vast marketing system and designed to instill ever more demand for commodities and the exchange values they represent—as a substitute for the fulfillment of genuine human needs. Unnecessary, wasteful goods are produced by useless toil to enhance purely economic values at the expense of the environment. Any slowdown in this process of ecological destruction, under the present system, spells economic disaster. In Jevons’s eyes, the “momentous choice” raised by a continuation of business as usual was simply “between brief but true [national] greatness and longer continued mediocrity.” He opted for the former—the maximum energy flux. A century and a half later, in our much bigger, more global—but no less expansive—economy, it is no longer simply national supremacy that is at stake, but the fate of the planet itself. To be sure, there are those who maintain that we should “live high now and let the future take care of itself.” To choose this course, though, is to court planetary disaster. The only real answer for humanity (including future generations) and the earth as a whole is to alter the social relations of production, to create a system in which efficiency is no longer a curse—a higher system in which equality, human development, community, and sustainability are the explicit goals.

#### Vote negative in favor of classist politics

#### Revolutionary theory is a prior question—the aff is irrelevant in the grand scheme of capitalism—we should instead affirm the historical necessity of communism

Tumino ’12 Stephen Tumino, more marxist than Marx himself, “Is Occupy Wall Street Communist,” Red Critique 14, Winter/Spring 2012, http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/isoccupywallstreetcommunist.htm

Leaving aside that the purpose of Wolff's speech was to popularize a messianic vision of a more just society based on workplace democracy, he is right about one thing: Marx's original contribution to the idea of communism is that it is an historical and material movement produced by the failure of capitalism not a moral crusade to reform it. Today we are confronted with the fact that capitalism has failed in exactly the way that Marx explained was inevitable.[4] It has "simplified the class antagonism" (The Communist Manifesto); by concentrating wealth and centralizing power in the hands of a few it has succeeded in dispossessing the masses of people of everything except their labor power. As a result it has revealed that the ruling class "is unfit to rule," as The Communist Manifesto concludes, "because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him." And the slaves are thus compelled to fight back. Capitalism makes communism necessary because it has brought into being an international working class whose common conditions of life give them not only the need but also the economic power to establish a society in which the rule is "from each according to their ability, to each according to their need" (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme). Until and unless we confront the fact that capitalism has once again brought the world to the point of taking sides for or against the system as a whole, communism will continue to be just a bogey-man or a nursery-tale to frighten and soothe the conscience of the owners rather than what it is—the materialist theory that is an absolute requirement for our emancipation from exploitation and a new society freed from necessity! As Lenin said, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement" (What Is To Be Done?). We are confronted with an historic crisis of global proportions that demands of us that we take Marxism seriously as something that needs to be studied to find solutions to the problems of today. Perhaps then we can even begin to understand communism in the way that The Communist Manifesto presents it as "the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority" to end inequality forever.

#### Dialectical materialism is of primary importance in intellectual discussions—this debate should be a historical inquiry into the material determinants of social life behind the 1AC

Lukács ’67 György Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone, MIT Press: Cambridge, 1967, p. 1-3

If the question were really to be formulated in terms of such a crude antithesis it would deserve at best a pitying smile. But in fact it is not (and never has been) quite so straightforward. Let us assume for the sake of argument that recent research had disproved once and for all every one of Marx's individual theses. Even if this were to be proved, every serious 'orthodox' Marxist would still be able to accept all such modern findings without reservation and hence dismiss all of Marx's theses in toto-without having to renounce his orthodoxy for a single moment. Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx's investigations. It is not the 'belief' in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of a 'sacred' book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to method. It is the scientific conviction that dialectical materialism is the road to truth and that its methods can be developed, expanded and deepened only along the lines laid down by its founders. It is the conviction, moreover, that all attempts to surpass or 'improve' it have led and must lead to over-simplification, triviality and eclecticism. Materialist dialectic is a revolutionary dialectic. This definition is so important and altogether so crucial for an understanding of its nature that if the problem is to be approached in the right way this must be fully grasped before we venture upon a discussion of the dialectical method itself. The issue turns on the question of theory and practice. And this not merely in the sense given it by Marx when he says in his first critique of Hegel that "theory becomes a material force when it grips the masses". 1 Even more to the point is the need to discover those features and definitions both of the theory and the ways of gripping the masses which convert the theory, the dialectical method, into a vehicle of revolution. We must extract the practical essence of the theory from the method and its relation to its object. If this is not done that 'gripping the masses' could well turn out to be a will o' the wisp. It might turn out that the masses were in the grip of quite different forces, that they were in pursuit of quite different ends. In that event, there would be no necessary connection between the theory and their activity, it would be a form that enables the masses to become conscious of their socially necessary or fortuitous actions, without ensuring a genuine and necessary bond between consciousness and action. In the same essay2 Marx clearly defined the conditions in which a relation between theory and practice becomes possible. "It is not enough that thought should seek to realise itself; reality must also strive towards thought." Or, as he expresses it in an earlier work:3 "It will then be realised that the world has long since possessed something in the form of a dream which it need only take possession of consciously, in order to possess it in reality." Only when consciousness stands in such a relation to reality can theory and practice be united. But for this to happen the emergence of consciousness must become the decisive step which the historical process must take towards its proper end (an end constituted by the wills of men, but neither dependent on human whim, nor the product of human invention). The historical function of theory is to make this step a practical possibility. Only when a historical situation has arisen in which a class must understand society if it is to assert itself; only when the fact that a class understands itself means that it understands society as a whole and when, in consequence, the class becomes both the subject and the object of knowledge; in short, only when these conditions are all satisfied will the unity of theory and practice, the precondition of the revolutionary function of the theory, become possible. Such a situation has in fact arisen with the entry of the proletariat into history. "When the proletariat proclaims the dissolution of the existing social order," Marx declares, "it does no more than disclose the secret of its own existence, for it is the effective dissolution of that order." 4 The links between the theory that affirms this and the revolution are not just arbitrary, nor are they particularly tortuous or open to misunderstanding. On the contrary, the theory is essentially the intellectual expression of the revolutionary process itself. In it every stage of the process becomes fixed so that it may be generalised, communicated, utilised and developed. Because the theory does nothing but arrest and make conscious each necessary step, it becomes at the same time the necessary premise of the following one.

#### Alternative social theories make NO sense and destroy politics

Tumino ‘1 Stephen Tumino, professor of English at the University of Pittsburgh, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before,” Red Critique, Spring 2001, http://redcritique.org/spring2001/whatisorthodoxmarxism.htm

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory. Finally, it is only Orthodox Marxism that recognizes the inevitability and also the necessity of communism—the necessity, that is, of a society in which "from each according to their ability to each according to their needs" (Marx) is the rule.

#### Particular facts are irrelevant without totalizing historical theory—the aff makes universal what is particular to capitalism—methodological inquiry is prior to action

Lukács ’67 György Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone, MIT Press: Cambridge, 1967, p. 7-10

Thus we perceive that there is something highly problematic in the fact that capitalist society is predisposed to harmonise with scientific method, to constitute indeed the social premises of its exactness. If the internal structure of the 'facts' of their interconnections is essentially historical, if, that is to say, they are caught up in a process of continuous transformation, then we may indeed question when the greater scientific inaccuracy occurs. It is when I conceive of the 'facts' as existing in a form and as subject to laws concerning which I have a methodological certainty (or at least probability) that they no longer apply to these facts? Or is it when I consciously take this situation into account, cast a critical eye at the 'exactitude' attainable by such a method and concentrate instead on those points where this historical aspect, this decisive fact of change really manifests itself? The historical character of the 'facts' which science seems to have grasped with such 'purity' makes itself felt in an even more devastating manner. As the products of historical evolution they are involved in continuous change. But in addition they are also precisely in their objective structure the products of a definite historical epoch, namely capitalism. Thus when 'science' maintains that the manner in which data immediately present themselves is an adequate foundation of scientific conceptualisation and that the actual form of these data is the appropriate starting point for the formation of scientific concepts, it thereby takes its stand simply and dogmatically on the basis of capitalist society. It uncritically accepts the nature of the object as it is given and the laws of that society as the unalterable foundation of 'science'. In order to progress from these 'facts' to facts in the true meaning of the word it is necessary to perceive their historical conditioning as such and to abandon the point of view that would see them as immediately given: they must themselves be subjected to a historical and dialectical examination. For as Marx says:8 "The finished pattern of economic relations as seen on the surface in their real existence and consequently in the ideas with which the agents and bearers of these relations seek to understand them, is very different from, and indeed quite the reverse of and antagonistic to their inner, essential but concealed core and the concepts corresponding to it." If the facts are to be understood, this distinction between their real existence and their inner core must be grasped clearly and precisely. This distinction is the first premise of a truly scientific study which in Marx's words, "would be superfluous if the outward appearance of things coincided with their essence" .10 Thus we must detach the phenomena from the form in which they are immediately given and discover the intervening links which connect them to their core, their essence. In so doing, we shall arrive at an understanding of their apparent form and see it as the form in which the inner core necessarily appears. It is necessary because of the historical character of the facts, because they have grown in the soil of capitalist society. This twofold character, the simultaneous recognition and transcendence of immediate appearances is precisely the dialectical nexus. In this respect, superficial readers imprisoned in the modes of thought created by capitalism, experienced the gravest difficulties in comprehending the structure of thought in Capital. For on the one hand, Marx's account pushes the capitalist nature of all economic forms to their furthest limits, he creates an intellectual milieu where they can exist in their purest form by positing a society 'corresponding to the theory', i.e. capitalist through and through, consisting of none but capitalists and proletarians. But conversely, no sooner does this strategy produce results, no sooner does this world of phenomena seem to be on the point of crystallising out into theory than it dissolves into a mere illusion, a distorted situation appears as in a distorting mirror which is, however, "only the conscious expression of an imaginary movement". Only in this context which sees the isolated facts of social life as aspects of the historical process and integrates them in a totality, can knowledge of the facts hope to become knowledge of reality. This knowledge starts from the simple (and to the capitalist world), pure, immediate, natural determinants described above. It progresses from them to the knowledge of the concrete totality, i.e. to the conceptual reproduction of reality. This concrete totality is by no means an unmediated datum for thought. "The concrete is concrete," Marx says,11 "because it is a synthesis of many particular determinants, i.e. a unity of diverse elements." Idealism succumbs here to the delusion of confusing the intellectual reproduction of reality with the actual structure of reality itself. For "in thought, reality appears as the process of synthesis, not as starting-point, but as outcome, although it is the real starting-point and hence the starting-point for perception and ideas." Conversely, the vulgar materialists, even in the modem guise donned by Bernstein and others, do not go beyond the reproduction of the immediate, simple determinants of social life. They imagine that they are being quite extraordinarily 'exact' when they simply take over these determinants without either analysing them further or welding them into a concrete totality. They take the facts in abstract isolation, explaining them only in terms of abstract laws unrelated to the concrete totality. As Marx observes: "Crudeness and conceptual nullity consist in the tendency to forge arbitrary unmediated connections between things that belong together in an organic union." 12 The crudeness and conceptual nullity of such thought lies primarily in the fact that it obscures the historical, transitory nature of capitalist society. Its determinants take on the appearance of timeless, eternal categories valid for all social formations. This could be seen at its crassest in the vulgar bourgeois economists, but the vulgar Marxists soon followed in their footsteps. The dialectical method was overthrown and with it the methodological supremacy of the totality over the individual aspects; the parts were prevented from finding their definition within the whole and, instead, the whole was dismissed as unscientific or else it degenerated into the mere 'idea' or 'sum' of the parts. With the totality out of the way, the fetishistic relations of the isolated parts appeared as a timeless law valid for every human society. Marx's dictum: "The relations of production of every society form a whole" 13 is the methodological point of departure and the key to the historical understanding of social relations. All the isolated partial categories can be thought of and treated-in isolation-as something that is always present in every society. (If it cannot be found in a given society this is put down to 'chance as the exception that proves the rule.) But the changes to which these individual aspects are subject give no clear and unambiguous picture of the real differences in the various stages of the evolution of society. These can really only be discerned in the context of the total historical process of their relation to society as a whole.

### China Relations Adv

#### No cyberattacks—safeguards protect

Zenko and Cohen ’12 Micah Zenko, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Michael A. Cohen, Fellow at the Century Foundation, “Clear and Present Safety,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety

A more recent bogeyman in national security debates is the threat of so-called cyberwar. Policymakers and pundits have been warning for more than a decade about an imminent “cyber–Pearl Harbor” or “cyber-9/11.” In June 2011, then Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn said that “bits and bytes can be as threatening as bullets and bombs.” And in September 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described cyberattacks as an “existential” threat that “actually can bring us to our knees.” Although the potential vulnerability of private businesses and government agencies to cyberattacks has increased, the alleged threat of cyberwarfare crumbles under scrutiny. No cyberattack has resulted in the loss of a single U.S. citizen’s life. Reports of “kinetic-like” cyberattacks, such as one on an Illinois water plant and a North Korean attack on U.S. government servers, have proved baseless. Pentagon networks are attacked thousands of times a day by individuals and foreign intelligence agencies; so, too, are servers in the private sector. But the vast majority of these attacks fail wherever adequate safeguards have been put in place. Certainly, none is even vaguely comparable to Pearl Harbor or 9/11, and most can be offset by commonsense prevention and mitigation efforts.

#### Tense conflicts with China are unavoidable – Ambitions and opposing worldviews

Robert Kagan, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Ambition and Anxiety,” in The Rise Of China, ed. Schmitt, 2009, pp. 2-3

The struggle between China and the United States that will dominate the 21st Century is about both power and belief. Two rising, ambitious powers are contesting for leadership in East Asia. As the world’s strongest democracy and the world’s strongest autocracy, however, they are also engaged in a contest about ideas, about definitions of justice, morality, and legitimacy, about order and liberalism. Today, neither China nor the United States wants war, and wise statesmanship on both sides may avoid it for years and even decades to come, perhaps long enough for circumstances to change and the confrontation to dissipate. Neither Americans nor Chinese should delude themselves, however. All the classic conditions for conflict are already in place; they merely await the right sequence of events to provide a spark. Nor is this Sino-American confrontation a product of misunderstandings or errors that just need to be cleared up. It is not an anomaly. It is normal, the unavoidable consequence of two powerful nations with clashing ambitions and colliding worldviews, and also with much in common. It is on the subject of power that America and China have the most in common. Both seek power and believe power is necessary to defend and promote their interests and beliefs. Both deny this, of course, because the 21st-century world recoils at discussions of power. Yet the United States spent more on its military than the next dozen powers combined even before September it, 2001. Nor has it been shy about using it, with ten military interventions in the past two decades alone. In the same two decades, China has been increasing military spending by more than ten percent per year. It will soon spend as much on defense as all the nations of the European Union combined. Power changes nations. It expands their wants and desires, in- creases their sense of entitlement, their need for deference and respect. It also makes them more ambitious. It lessens their tolerance to obstacles, their willingness to take no for an answer.

#### Cooperation is impossible—but deterrence checks outright conflict

Harding ’11 Harry Harding, founding dean of the School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, “Are China and the U.S. on a collision course?” paper presented to the 25th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, held in Kuala Lumpur on May 30 - June 1, 2011, http://thinkingaboutasia.blogspot.com/2011/06/are-china-and-us-on-collision-course.html

In my judgment, it is highly unlikely for the relationship between the US and China to be primarily cooperative, at least in the short to medium term. The differences in values, political systems, interests, levels of development, and perceptions of the existing international order are simply too great for the two countries to find common ground on all issues, or even to find a mutually agreeable allocation of costs and benefits when they try to pursue common interests. Only a common interest that was massively compelling – say a widespread pandemic, another financial crisis, a global outbreak of terrorist activity targeted at both countries, or increasingly severe consequences of climate change – might produce a predominantly cooperative relationship. Fortunately, an essentially confrontational relationship is also unlikely, especially if one is primarily concerned with the risks of military conflict. The high degree of economic interdependence between the two countries has already created a relatively resilient relationship. The cost of military conflict, especially given the fact that both China and the US are nuclear powers, will be a significant deterrent against military conflict. Equally important, the probability of the most worrying of the trigger events identified above– a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan – is presently quite low, as is the risk that China would try to compel unification through the use of force.

#### Relations resilient—dissident crisis proves

Drezner ’12 Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, PhD in Political Science from Stanford University, “The big dogs that have not barked in the Chen Guangcheng case,” Foreign Policy, 5/4/2012, http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/04/thoughts\_on\_the\_chen\_guangcheng\_case

My Big Thought: contrary to just about every headline I've seen in the past three days, I think Chen's case demonstrates the surprising resilience of the Sino-American relationship. Recall what I wrote earlier in the week: The fact that both Beijing and Washington have kept their mouths shut on Chen is a pretty surprising but positive sign about the overall stability/resilience of Sino-American relations. Bear in mind that according to the latest reports, much of the leadership in Beijing takesan increasingly conspiratorial view of the United States. As for the mood in Washington, well, let's just call it unfriendly towards China. Both sides are in the middle of big leadership decisions, making the incentive to cater to nationalist domestic interests even stronger than normal. With the rest of the Pacific Rim trying to latch themselves onto the U.S. security umbrella, this could have been the perfect match to set off a G-2 powderkeg. Despite all of these incentives for escalating the dispute, however, it hasn't happened. Kurt Campbell was dispatched to Beijing, talks are ongoing, and neither side appears to be interested in ramping up domestic audience costs. That escalation hasn't happened despite massive political incentives on both sides to let it happen suggests that, contrary to press fears about Chen blowing up the bilateral relationship, there are powerful pressures in Washington and Beijing to find a solution that saves as much face as humanly possible for both sides. Now, in the three days since I wrote that post, Chen has been released, calling every Chinese dissident, U.S. congressman and international reporter with a phone/recording device/Twitter account and is loudly and frantically describing the intimidation he and his family have experienced. The man has asked to be flown out on Hillary Clinton's plane as she departs from the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. In other words, everything that has transpired in the past three days has given a black eye to both the Chinese and American governments' handling of this case. Despite the near-overwhelming incentive to ramp up bilateral tensions, however, it really hasn't happened. China's Foreign Mnistry has issued a couple of garden-variety press statements demanding a U.S. apology that won't be forthcoming. There have been no leaks or anonymous criticisms of the United States otherwise, despite the fact that this entire case is a burr in China's saddle at veery awkward moment. None of the U.S. State Department statements or press leaks have been terribly critical of the Chinese side either. Indeed, as the Washington Post observes: Neither Clinton nor her Chinese counterparts mentioned Chen in their formal remarks at the end of their two-day meeting, saying instead that U.S.-Sino differences on human rights issues must not disrupt the broader relationship between the two world powers. State Councilor Dai Bingguo, China’s top foreign policy expert, said his country and the United States still have “fundamental differences” on human rights issues. “Human rights should not be a disturbance in state-to-state relations,” Dai said. “It should not be used to interfere in another country’s internal affairs.” Clinton promised to “continue engaging with the Chinese government at the highest levels” on the “human rights and aspirations” of all people. This is pretty extraordinary. Even more extraordinary is the possiblity that despite Chen's outspokenness, he actually could be able to leave the country with his family.

#### Massive alt causes to foreign investment

DiBenedetto ‘12 Bill DiBenedetto, president of Lampin Corp. of Uxbridge, an engineering and manufacturing firm; graduate of Worcester Polytechnic Institute, "Tower Tariffs: The Winds of a Trade War with China?" 8/2/2012, http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/08/wind-tower-tarrifs/

Renewable energy trade conflicts with China are heating up and blowing strong. The latest action by the Commerce Department has set tariffs that could go as high as high as 73 percent on imports of utility-scale wind towers from China and as much as 60 percent on towers from Vietnam, adding further restrictions on clean-energy imports from Asia. The agency’s International Trade Administration issued a “preliminary determination of anti-dumping duties” on July 27; the duties are expected to be finalized in December. In the 4-page fact sheet announcing the decision, ITA says producers in the two nations, which exported $301 million in wind towers to the U.S. in 2011, sold the utility-scale towers below production costs. The agency acted on a complaint by the Wind Tower Trade Coalition, a group of U.S. manufacturers that includes Broadwind Towers Inc., DMI Industries, Katana Summit LLC and Trinity Structural Towers Inc. Among culprits named in the finding were, in China, Chengxi Shipyard Co., Ltd. and Titan Wind Energy (Suzhou) Co., Ltd. and in Vietnam, CS Wind Corporation and CS Wind Vietnam Co. Ltd. It’s just about the towers, however; excluded from the scope of the ITA finding are nacelles and rotor blades whether or not they are attached to the tower. “China has ramped up the wind-tower production and done it in a way that is not reflective of market forces,” said Scott Paul, the executive director for the Washington-based Alliance for American Manufacturing, quoted by Bloomberg. “I’m hopeful these tariffs will give the American wind-energy manufacturers the breathing space to compete for more market space in the U.S.” The U.S. has imposed duties on numerous types of renewable energy products from China in recent months, including solar panels (see TP of January 12). This has escalated trade tensions between the two nations. The Commerce Department on May 30 set duties as high as 26 percent on wind-tower imports from China to compensate for Chinese government subsidies, again siding with U.S. manufacturers. On May 17 the department set anti-dumping tariffs of 31 percent to 250 percent on imports of Chinese solar-energy products, after a complaint by manufacturers including the U.S. unit of SolarWorld AG. The agency in March announced duties of as much as 4.73 percent to offset subsidies received from China’s government, and last month determined that the country’s producers benefited from additional state support. A final ruling on those duties is scheduled for October. Not to be outdone, in a complaint on May 24 to the Geneva-based World Trade Organization, China’s Ministry of Commerce said renewable-energy programs in California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio and Washington State violate global trade policies. China also says it filed a complaint at the WTO alleging that U.S. anti-subsidy duties undercut $7.3 billion in Chinese products, including solar panels. A trade war in the renewable energy sector is unfortunate but it also illustrates just how important renewables are becoming on the world trade stage.

### China Natty Adv

#### Chinese economic decline inevitable – numerous risks like investment, overcapacity, underdevelopment, slow progress, bottlenecks, and structural impediments

Main Wire, 2-28-2006, “China NDRC,” p ln

China is still facing a risk of a big investment rebound, while and transformation of economic growth has been slow, said Ma Kai, head of the National Development and Reform Commission, the nation's economy planner. Ma was quoted by the official Xinhua news agency as warning the Communist Party in a report of six key problems facing the Chinese economy this year: a rebound in investment; overcapacity in certain industries; underdevelopment in rural areas; slow progress in rebalancing economic growth; bottlenecks in technology and expertise; and structural impediments to growth. The government must maintain stable and relatively fast economic growth this year and make marked progress in rural construction, rebalancing of economic growth, and energy savings, Ma said.

#### No China-India war

Malone and Mukherjee ’10 David M. Malone, former Canadian Ambassador to the UN and High Commissioner to India, is president of Canada's International Development Research Centre. He is completing a survey of Indian foreign policy called Does the Elephant Dance? (forthcoming in 2011 from Oxford University Press), and Rohan Mukherjee, senior research specialist at Princeton University. He has also worked with the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and the National Knowledge Commission, Government of India, “India and China: Conflict and Cooperation” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 1 February 2010, pp. 137 – 158

The Sino-Indian border dispute is long running and fairly intractable, despite shows of flexibility in the past. It periodically prompts both sides to rake up decades-old grievances. Yet India and China have taken meaningful steps towards an institutionalised process for its resolution. Since 1988 they have for the most part managed to separate border issues from the overall bilateral relationship. The long-standing relationship between China and Pakistan presents a further obstacle to closer ties between China and India. However, China has begun to adopt a more even-handed stance, evident during the Kargil War, the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, and the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. The underlying logic is that Pakistan's growing instability and India's growing power compel China to take a middle path. China's nuclear and missile-technology assistance to Pakistan is of particular concern to India. Future tensions between India and Pakistan could fuel a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. In light of the Mumbai attacks and setbacks for the Pakistani government's efforts to contain Islamist influence in the country, however, it would be surprising if Beijing were not becoming somewhat wary of Islamabad, given unrest in its own Xinjiang region and the country's persistent fear of terrorism.30 Moreover, the prospect of nuclear or military conflict between India and China is diminished by the sizeable gap in capabilities between the two.31 Tibet is a significant security concern. Indian parliamentarian and author Arun Shourie argues that 'India's security is inextricably intertwined with the existence and survival of Tibet as a buffer state and to the survival and strengthening of Tibetan culture and religion'.32 For India, the Chinese role in Tibet presents both a threat and a tactical opportunity. The presence of the Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetan refugees in India sometimes allows New Delhi to indirectly apply pressure on Beijing, just as China's policies toward Pakistan sometimes do to India.33 This lever is not often used, however. In 2008, the Indian government took great pains to ensure that Tibetan protestors did not cause any embarrassment to Beijing during the passage of the Olympic Torch through New Delhi.34 On the other hand, at the height of tensions between the two countries over border issues during autumn 2009, a visit by the Dalai Lama to the Buddhist temple community in the disputed Tawang, nestled in northwestern Arunachal Pradesh, can only have been perceived as provocative by Beijing.35 Perhaps the biggest challenge to Sino-Indian rapprochement, and a source of impetus, is the rapidly improving US-Indian relationship. While a much-improved relationship with Washington has helped India counter the traditional pro-Pakistan tilt in US foreign policy, it has also made Sino-Indian rapprochement a greater priority for Beijing.36 This echoes some of the history of Chinese overtures towards India in the 1970s, which were likely made in part with an eye to diminishing Indo-Soviet cooperation. As the global contest for influence between the United States and China intensifies, India is likely to become an important factor in this strategic triangle. US approaches to China oscillate between policies of containment and engagement. The former has given birth to a new triangle between the United States, India and China, whereby Washington cultivates closer ties with India, as an established democracy and as a regional bulwark against a potentially aggressive, communist China.37 On the other hand, the Obama administration's approach to China has reinvigorated engagement enthusiasts in Washington. Indian commentators have observed with some alarm the renewed cooperation between China and the United States in tackling the global economic crisis, as well as increased US-Chinese interdependence resulting from Chinese creditors holding large amounts of US Treasury Bills and US debtors providing the single largest market for Chinese manufactured goods. This has prompted some to question the logic of picking a side in the unpredictable Sino-US relationship.38 Ultimately, neither China nor India stands to gain from sparking a regional conflict. Both nations are deeply engaged in the domestic sphere, including generating economic reform, maintaining state legitimacy and juggling ethno-nationalism. Even the ostensible machinations of the United States have done little to hamper the current upswing in Sino-Indian relations. In some key international forums, including those addressing climate change, trade, labour laws, arms control and human rights, China and India have found common ground in countering Western positions, though their tactical alliances have often proved unstable in the heat of negotiation.

#### No CCP collapse

Kurlantzick ’11 Joshua Kurlantzick, fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Beijing has bought itself a respite from middle class revolt,” The National, 4/7/2011, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/beijing-has-bought-itself-a-respite-from-middle-class-revolt?pageCount=0

As governments across North Africa have been overthrown or are seemingly near the verge of collapse, some Chinese writers and activists are hopeful that this democratic wave might sweep over the world's largest and most powerful authoritarian state. Unknown Chinese activists have anonymously posted an online manifesto calling for their own "Jasmine Revolution". Groups of protesters - even joined by the American ambassador to China - have gathered in Beijing to heed the call for revolt. The Chinese authorities, taking no chances, quickly shut down protests and apparently jailed some of the demonstrators. They have also been blocking any internet discussion of activists' "Jasmine Manifesto". But despite Beijing's quick response, in reality China's leadership has far less to fear than Hosni Mubarak or Muammar Qaddafi. For one thing, unlike in many parts of the Middle East, China's urbanised centres haven't turned against the regime. Instead, most city residents essentially support, or at least tolerate, the regime. And why not? The government has been very, very good to them, as Minxin Pei, a professor at Claremont McKenna College, documented in his book China's Trapped Transition. After the 1989 Tiananmen protests, the Chinese Communist Party, recognising the power of educated urban protesters, delivered a raft of new incentives to co-opt the urban middle class. The government directed growth to urban areas, and launched other pro-middle class programmes. These included higher salaries for academics and other professionals; restrictions on rural people's housing and schools so that peasants cannot attend many of the best urban institutions; and opening the Party to membership for entrepreneurs, many of whom eagerly joined as a business networking opportunity. The Party reinforces the middle class content with the status quo by using speeches and state media to suggest that, in a democracy, total freedom of movement would allow rural peasants to swamp the cities, ruining the standard of living in wealthier urban areas. All these incentives are reasons why Chinese city residents in polls show high appreciation of the current state of affairs. In one recent survey, nearly 90 per cent of Chinese expressed satisfaction with the current station of their nation; since these polls, conducted by telephone, are focused on urban areas, they represent more closely the views of the urban middle class. China's leaders also are not as out of touch, isolated or brittle as some of those in the Middle East. The Communist Party may be an authoritarian regime and there is certainly plenty of corruption - one Chinese scholar estimates that corruption costs China more than $80 billion (Dh294 billion) in growth each year. Still, the leadership now is a collective one, and no single official amasses the type of enormous wealth of leaders like Tunisia's Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. China's collective leadership, unlike in Mao's time, also has some ability to listen to and respond to public opinion. In 2008, for example, protests in Tibet initially were met by a relatively moderate response from the central government. But angry online sentiment - the Chinese blogosphere is highly nationalist and often conservative - partly prompted a tougher crackdown, according to Chinese officials and scholars. Perhaps most importantly, unlike much of the Middle East, China's economy is booming, and not simply because of resource extraction. In Tunisia, and then in Egypt, protests erupted after immolations by young men and women who, although they had undergraduate degrees, were unable to find work in economies that could not keep pace with growing populations. Although Chinese university graduates certainly have a tougher time finding jobs than they did several years ago, the Chinese economy continues to boom: China grew by more than 9 per cent last year, during a global economic crisis, and will likely grow at least as much this year, a rate it has kept up for roughly three decades (the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, downgraded that to 7 per cent this week). Educated young men and women still can find high-paying jobs, particularly if they are willing to move to interior cities that have been prioritised by the central government. And, unlike in places like Egypt, foreign powers such as the United States - which has sold roughly $2 trillion in government debt to China - do not have much leverage over the People's Republic. In the early 1990s, when China remained a global pariah because of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, America had more leverage to push Beijing on human rights and democracy, and President Bill Clinton, during a visit to the country, publicly and harshly criticised China's record on rights. Today, the story is much different. Dependent on China not only to keep the American economy propped up but also for cooperation on global issues like trade and climate change, the Obama administration has taken a much softer approach to Beijing. When Barack Obama headed to China for the first time as president in the fall of 2009, he agreed to a "press conference" with the Chinese president Hu Jintao at which the two actually took no questions, and when the American president held a town forum with Chinese students, he delivered none of the broadsides against China's rights record that his predecessor had. Any change that happens in China in the future is going to come from domestic events, not from external pressure. But don't expect that change to happen anytime soon.

#### Rally around the flag effect is absurd

Jervis ’11 Robert Jervis, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2011, pp. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### No risk of Sino-Russian escalation—it’s empirically denied and all border disputes have been settled

Chicago Tribune, 10/15/04

China and Russia settled the last of their decades-old border disputes Thursday during a visit to Beijing by President Vladimir Putin, signing an agreement fixing their 2,700-mile-long border for the first time. The struggle over border areas resulted in violent clashes in the 1960s and 1970s, when strained Sino-Soviet relations were at their most acrimonious, feeding fears abroad that the conflict could erupt into nuclear war. Beijing and Moscow had reached agreements on individual border sections as relations warmed in the past decade. But a stretch of river and islands along China's northeastern border with Russia's Far East had remained in dispute.

#### No SCS conflict—common economic interests and legal commitments

Gupta ’11 Rukmani Gupta, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, “South China Sea Conflict? No Way,” The Diplomat, 23 October 2011, <http://the-diplomat.com/2011/10/23/south-china-sea-conflict-no-way/2/>

These suggestions to recalibrate Indian policy towards the South China Sea and its relationship with Vietnam are premature at best. Despite the rhetoric, conflict in the South China Sea may well not be inevitable. If the history of dialogue between the parties is any indication, then current tensions are likely to result in forward movement. In the aftermath of statements by the United States, and skirmishes over fishing vessels, ASEAN and China agreed upon the Guidelines on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea at the Bali Summit in July 2010. And recent tensions may well prod the parties towards a more binding code of conduct. This isn’t to suggest that territorial claims and sovereignty issues will be resolved, but certainly they can become more manageable to prevent military conflict. There’s a common interest in making the disputes more manageable, essentially because, nationalistic rhetoric notwithstanding, the parties to the dispute recognize that there are real material benefits at stake. A disruption of maritime trade through the South China Sea would entail economic losses – and not only for the littoral states. No party to the dispute, including China, has thus far challenged the principle of freedom of navigation for global trade through the South China Sea. The states of the region are signatories to the UNCLOS, which provides that ‘Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection’ but that ‘All other States have freedom of navigation and over flight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines.’ The prospect of threats to SLOCS thus seems somewhat exaggerated.

#### Natural gas is dirtier than coal

Chameides 12 (Bill, Dean, Duke U's Nicholas School of the Environment, "Natural Gas: A Bridge to a Low-Carbon Future or Not," Jul 20, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-chameides/-natural-gas-a-bridge-to\_b\_1690857.html], jam)

Cathles's point about the transient effects of methane fugitive emissions is well taken. But there is a potential catch and it relates to short-term climate effects. During the transition period, when fugitive methane from using natural gas would build up in the atmosphere, there is a possibility, depending upon the magnitude of the methane emissions, that we would experience more short-term warming than if we were to have stuck with coal and oil. We might think of this as the transient version of the Howarth argument. Now, as long as the fugitive emissions are small or the Earth system is "reversible," the transient Howarth scenario does not seem all that worrisome. But what if the emissions are large? And what if the disturbances from global warming are not reversible? Then we would have a problem. The transition to natural gas would lead to more warming for a period of time until natural gas is phased out and the excess methane is removed from the atmosphere. With the exit of the excess methane, the extra warming would also go away. Cathles seems to argue that all would be well: "Even when methane leakage is so large (L = 10% of consumption) that substituting gas for coal and oil increases global warming in the short term, the benefit of gas substitution returns in the long term." But it is not all that obvious that the impacts from global warming are reversible. If fragile ecosystems like coral reefs are decimated by a decade or two of extra methane-induced warming, can we be sure that they will recover once the methane is flushed from the atmosphere? Probably not. Now for this to be a concern, fugitive emissions would need to be large -- about 10 percent or more. That's' a very remote possibility. Even so, Cathles's interesting results notwithstanding, I don't think we can ignore fugitive emissions and just assume they're too small to care about. And in any event from an economic and environmental point of view, the less of that stuff the better.

#### Natty’s a dirty bridge—transition now is key to achieve essential emissions targets

Nordhaus and Shellenberger ’12 Ted Nordhaus, Chairman of the Breakthrough Institute, former polling consultant and political strategist for environmental groups, and and Michael Shellenberger, co-founder of Communication Works, a progressive public relations firm, has lobbied for Hugo Chavez which is awesome, the two of them published the best-selling Break Through, “Beyond Cap and Trade,

A New Path to Clean Energy,” Yale Environment 360, 2/27/2012, http://e360.yale.edu/feature/nordhaus\_shellenberger\_beyond\_cap\_and\_trade\_a\_new\_path\_to\_clean\_energy/2499/

A funny thing happened while environmentalists were trying and failing to cap carbon emissions in the U.S. Congress. U.S. carbon emissions started going down. The decline began in 2005 and accelerated after the financial crisis. The latest estimates from the U.S. Energy Information Administration now suggest that U.S. emissions will continue to decline for the next few years and remain flat for a decade or more after that. The proximate cause of the decline in recent years has been the recession and slow economic recovery. But the reason that EIA is projecting a long-term decline over the next decade or more is the glut of cheap natural gas, mostly from unconventional sources like shale, that has profoundly changed America’s energy outlook over the next several decades. Gas is no panacea. It still puts a lot of carbon into the atmosphere and has created a range of new pollution problems at the local level. Methane leakage resulting from the extraction and burning of natural gas threatens to undo much of the carbon benefit that gas holds over coal. And even were we to make a full transition from coal to gas, we would then need to transition from gas to renewables and nuclear in order to reduce U.S. emissions deeply enough to achieve the reductions that climate scientists believe will be necessary to avoid dangerous global warming.

### Solvency

#### Crisis periods are necessitated by capitalism—makes their impacts inevitable—but doesn’t resolve ours

Kovel ‘2 Joel Kovel, Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, 2002, The Enemy of Nature, p. 142-44

There are crises within capitalism, which both generates them and is dependent upon them. Crises are ruptures in the accumulation process, causing the wheel to slow, but also stimulating new turns; they take many shapes and have long or short cycles, and many intricate effects upon ecologies. A recession may reduce demand and so take some of the load off resources; recovery may increase this demand, but also occur with greater efficiency, hence also reduce the load. Thus economic crises con­dition the ecological crisis, but have no necessary effect on it. There is no singular generalization that covers all cases. James O’Connor summarizes the complexity: Capitalist accumulation normally causes ecological crisis of certain types; economic crisis is associated with partly different and partly similar eco­logical problems of different severity; external barriers to capital in the form of scarce resources, urban space, healthy and disciplined wage labour, and other conditions of production may have the effect of raising costs and threatening profits; and finally, environmental and other social movements defending conditions of life, forests, soil quality, amenities, health conditions urban space, and so on, may also raise costs and make capital less flexible.34 But capital gets nature whether on its way up or its way down. In the USA, the boom-boom Clinton years witnessed grotesque increases in matters such as the sowing of the ecosphere with toxic chemicals,35 while the sharp downturn that accompanied the George W Bush presidency was immedi­ately met by rejection of the Kyoto protocols. From the standpoint of ecosystems, the phase of the business cycle is considerably less relevant, then, than the fact of the business cycle, and the wanton economic system it expresses. Economic problems interact with ecological problems, while ecological problems (including the effects of ecological movements) interact with economic problems. This is all at the level of the trees. For the forest, meanwhile, we see the effects on the planetary ecology caused by the growth of the system as a whole. Here the dark angel is the thermodynamic lax where mounting entropy appears as ecosystemic decay. The immediate impacts of this on life are what energize the resistance embodied in the environmental and ecological movements. Meanwhile, the economy goes on along its growth-intoxicated way, immune to the effects of ecosystem breakdown on accumulation, and blindly careening toward the abyss. The conclusion must be that irrespective of the particulars of one eco­nomic interaction or another, the system as a whole is causing irreparable damage to its ecological foundations, and that it does so precisely as it grows. And since the one underlying feature of all aspects of capital is the relentless pressure to grow, we are obliged to bring down the capitalist system as a whole and replace it with an ecologically viable alternative, if we want to save our species along with numberless others.

## 2NC

### Econ Adv

#### Empirics prove

Fravel ’10 M. Taylor Fravel, associate professor of political science in the MIT Security Studies Program, “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict,” Security Studies 19:2, 2010, pp. 307-341

Yet despite two decades of renewed research, cumulative knowledge on diversion remains elusive. Quantitative studies contain mixed and often contradictory empirical results regarding the relationship between internal and external conflict. Some studies find a positive relationship between indicators of domestic dissatisfaction and threats or uses of force in analysis of u.s. behavior7 and in cross-national studies.8 By contrast, other research identifies a weak or nonexistent relationship between these same variables.9 Indeed, the gap between the intuition underlying diversion as a motive for conflict and existing quantitative research that Jack Levy noted in 1989 continues to characterize this research program today.10 Given the mixed empirical results in recent quantitative research, this article offers a different type of test of the diversionary hypothesis. In particular, I extend efforts to employ case study methods to test the hypothesis systematically and against alternative explanations in specific episodes of historical interest.11 Adopting a modified “most likely” approach to theory testing pioneered by Harry Eckstein, I examine two cases that should be easy for diversionary theory to explain: Argentina's 1982 seizure of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus. In these episodes, high levels of domestic political unrest preceded the escalation of salient disputes that leaders could manipulate to rally public support or demonstrate their competence as statesmen. These cases should be homeruns for the diversionary hypothesis, but they are in fact quite difficult for it to explain. In these cases, the relationship between domestic political conflict and dispute escalation is weak at best, as the onset and magnitude of social unrest was only linked loosely with decisions to use force. Leaders' statements and reasoning provide little evidence for diversion as a central motivation for escalation. Instead, a standard realist model of international politics and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy offer a more compelling explanation of Argentine and Turkish decision making.12 Leaders in both states chose force in response to external threats to national interests, not internal threats to their political survival.

#### No incentive to escalate

Fravel ’10 M. Taylor Fravel, associate professor of political science in the MIT Security Studies Program, “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict,” Security Studies 19:2, 2010, pp. 307-341

The lack of support for diversion raises a simple but important question: why is diversion less frequent than commonly believed, despite its plausible intuition? Although further research is required, several factors should be considered. First, the rally effect that leaders enjoy from an international crisis is generally brief in duration and unlikely to change permanently a public's overall satisfaction with its leaders.128 George H. W. Bush, for example, lost his reelection bid after successful prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War. Winston Churchill fared no better after the Allied victory in World War II.129 Leaders have little reason to conclude that a short-term rally will address what are usually structural sources of domestic dissatisfaction. Second, a selection effect may prevent embattled leaders from choosing diversion. Diversionary action should produce the largest rally effect against the most powerful target because such action would reflect a leader's skills through coercing a superior opponent. At the same time, leaders should often be deterred from challenging stronger targets, as the imbalance of military forces increases the risk of defeat and thus the probability of losing office at home. Although the odds of victory increase when targeting weaker states, success should have a much more muted effect on domestic support, if any, because victory would have been expected.130 Third, weak or embattled leaders can choose from a wide range of policy options to strengthen their standing at home. Although scholars such as Gelpi and Oakes have noted that embattled leaders can choose repression or economic development in addition to diversionary action, the range of options is even greater and carries less risk than the failure of diversion. Weak leaders can also seek to deepen cooperation with other states if they believe it will strengthen their position at home. Other studies, for example, have demonstrated that political unrest facilitated dtente among the superpowers in the early 1970s, China's concessions in its many territorial disputes, support for international financial liberalization, and the formation of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Gulf Cooperation Council.131

#### No diversion—economic decline creates political focus on regaining growth

Tira ’10 Jaroslav Tira, Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict,” The Journal of Politics, vol. 72, issue 2, April 2010, pp. 413-425, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609990879

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

#### World War 2 counterexample is wrong

Ferguson ‘6 Niall Ferguson, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, Issue 5, September/October 2006

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

### Natty Adv

#### Be skeptical of their impact framing: Social and political homogeneity mean that risk is PATHOLOGICALLY downplayed; culture of friendship means there’s no meaningful oversight.

Barsa and Dana 2011 (Michael, Sr. Lect., Northwestern School of Law, and David, Research Prof. Law, Northwestern U. School of Law, “LEARNING FROM DISASTER: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE FROM THE GULF OF MEXICO: SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING NEPA TO AVOID THE NEXT PREVENTABLE DISASTER,” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 219, Lexis)CJQ

This single-minded focus on drilling may also have led to a cognitive bias related to groupthink--group polarization. Put simply, group polarization is the "process whereby group discussion tends to intensify group opinion, producing more extreme judgments among group members than existed before discussion." n80 This process is either due to an informational mechanism, where group members hear more arguments [\*231] for a favored outcome, or a normative one, where group members compete to show they share an underlying value or norm. n81 In the case of offshore drilling, group polarization may have only exacerbated the faith in technology and the discounting of environmental risks, both of which were needed to assume that drilling was safe. Whether environmental risk was seen as a factual prediction, e.g., everyone knows that blowout protectors are safe, or an underlying value, e.g., oil drilling is good for the nation, this particular group dynamic may have led to a more extreme discounting of risk than would have been the case had the relevant personnel been working alone. This is especially true when group members share the same background, were trained in a similar manner, and work on similar projects. n82 In that case, due to the availability heuristic, n83 they are "apt to be facile at recalling the same types of events and therefore might all overestimate the probability for the occurrence of that type of event." n84 Given the common social background and ideology described above, it is no surprise that everyone involved in assessing environmental risks of offshore drilling underestimated those risks, and overestimated the extent to which technology could overcome any blowout that did occur. n85

### Capitalism K

#### If communism appears dead, we should rescesitate it in an affirmation of universality—orthodox critique decimates the structural support for capitalism

Žižek ‘9 Slavoj Žižek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, Verso: London, 2009, p. p. 6-7

What the book offers is not a neutral analysis but an engaged and extremely "partial" one-for truth is partial, accessible only when one takes sides, and is no less universal for this reason. The side taken here is, of course, that of communism. Adorno begins his Three Studies on Hegel with a rebuttal of the traditional question about Hegel exemplified by the title of Benedetto Croce's book What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel? Such a question presupposes, on the part of the author, the adoption of an arrogant position as judge of the past; but when we are dealing with a truly great philosopher the real question to be raised concerns not what this philosopher may still tell us, what he may still mean to us, but rather the opposite, namely, what we are, what our contemporary situation might be, in his eyes, how our epoch would appear to his thought. And the same should apply to communism-instead of asking the obvious question "Is the idea of communism still pertinent today, can it still be used as a tool of analysis and political practise? " one should ask the opposite question: "How does our predicament today look from the perspective of the communist idea?" Therein resides the dialectic of the Old and the New: it is those who propose the constant creation of new terms ("postmodern society:' "risk society:' "informational society:' "postindustrial society:' etc. ) in order to grasp what is going on today who miss the contours of what is actually New. The only way to grasp the true novelty of the New is to analyze the world through the lenses of what was "eternal" in the Old. If communism really is an "eternal" Idea, then it works as a Hegelian "concrete universality": it is eternal not in the sense of a series of abstract-universal features that may be applied everywhere, but in the sense that it has to be re-invented in each new historical situation. In the good old days of Really Existing Socialism, a joke popular among dissidents was used to illustrate the futility of their protests. In the fifteenth century, when Russia was occupied by Mongols, a peasant and his wife were walking along a dusty country road; a Mongol warrior on a horse stopped at their side and told the peasant he would now proceed to rape his wife; he then added: "But since there is a lot of dust on the ground, you must hold my testicles while I rape your wife, so that they will not get dirty!" Once the Mongol had done the deed and ridden away, the peasant started laughing and jumping with joy. His surprised wife asked: "How can you be jumping with joy when I was just brutally raped in your presence?" The farmer answered: "But I got him! His balls are covered with dust!" This sad joke reveals the predicament of the dissidents: they thought they were dealing serious blows to the party nomenklatura, but al they were doing was slightly soiling the nomenklatura's testicles, while the ruling elite carried on raping the people . .. Is today's critical Left not in a similar position? (Among the contemporary names for ever-so-slightly smearing those in power, we could list "deconstruction;' or the "protection of individual freedoms:') In a famous confrontation at the university of Salamanca in 1936, Miguel de Unamuno quipped at the Francoists: "Vencereis, pero no convencereis" ("You will win, but you will not convince")-is this all that today's Left can say to triumphant global capitalism? Is the Left predestined to continue to play the role of those who, on the contrary, convince but nevertheless still lose (and are especially convincing in retroactively explaining the reasons for their own failure)? Our task is to discover how to go a step further. Our Thesis 11 should be: in our societies, critical Leftists have hitherto only succeeded in soiling those in power, whereas the real point is to castrate them .. . But how can we do this? We should learn here from the failures of twentieth century Leftist politics. The task is not to conduct the castration in a direct climactic confrontation, but to undermine those in power with patient ideologico-critical work, so that although they are still in power, one all of a sudden notices that the powers-that-be are afflicted with unnaturally high-pitched voices. Back in the 1960s, Lacan named the irregular short-lived periodical of his school Scilicet-the message was not the word's predominant meaning today ("namely; "to wit;' "that is to say"), but literally "it is permitted to know.' (To know what?-what the Freudian School of Paris thinks about the unconscious . . .) Today, our message should be the same: it is permitted to know and to fully engage in communism, to again act in full fidelity to the communist Idea. Liberal permissiveness is of the order of videlicet-it is permitted to see, but the very fascination with the obscenity we are allowed to observe prevents us from knowing what it is that we see.

#### Foreign direct investment accelerates structural inequality and is unsustainable – challenging the logic of capitalism is key to preventing cyclical crises which turn case

Hart-Landsberg 6 (Martin, Professor of Economics and Director of the Political Economy Program at Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon, "Neoliberalism: Myths and Reality," Apr, [monthlyreview.org/2006/04/01/neoliberalism-myths-and-reality], jam)

Capitalism’s failure to deliver development is not due to its lack of dynamism; in fact quite the opposite is true. By intensifying the development and application of new production and exchange relationships within and between countries, this dynamism causes rapid shifts in the economic fortunes of nations, creating a constantly changing (and shrinking) group of “winners” and (an ever larger) group of “losers,” and masking the connection between the two. Even East Asia has been subject to the instabilities of capitalist dynamics, as the East Asian crisis of 1997–98 devastated such past “star performers” as South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. After quickly distancing themselves from these countries (and their past praise for their growth), most neoliberals have now eagerly embraced a new champion, China.23 According to the conventional wisdom, China has become the third world’s biggest recipient of foreign direct investment, exporter of manufactures, and fastest growing economy, largely because its government adopted a growth strategy based on privileging private enterprise and international market forces. In response to this new strategy, net FDI in China grew from $3.5 billion in 1990 to $60.6 billion in 2004. Foreign manufacturing affiliates now account for approximately one-third of China’s total manufacturing sales. They also produce 55 percent of the country’s exports and a significantly higher percentage of its higher technology exports. As a consequence of these trends, the country’s ratio of exports to GDP has climbed steadily, from 16 percent in 1990 to 36 percent in 2003.24 Thus, China’s growth has become increasingly dependent on transnational corporate organized export activity. Foreign investment has indeed transformed China into a fast growing export platform, with some significant domestic production capacity. At the same time, many of the limitations of this growth strategy, which were highlighted above, are also visible in China. For example, foreign dominated export activity has done little to support the development of nationally integrated production or technology supply networks.25 Moreover, as the Chinese state continues to lose its planning and directing capability, and the country’s resources are increasingly incorporated into foreign networks largely for the purpose of satisfying external market demands, the country’s autonomous development potential is being lost. China’s growth has enriched a relatively small but numerically significant upper income group of Chinese, who enjoy greatly expanded consumption opportunities. However, these gains have been largely underwritten by the exploitation of the great majority of Chinese working people. For example, as a consequence of Chinese state liberalization policies, state owned enterprises laid off 30 million workers over the period 1998 to 2004. With urban unemployment rates in double digits, few of these former state workers were able to find adequate re-employment. In fact, over 21.8 million of them currently depend on the government’s “average minimum living allowance” for their survival. As of June 2005, this allowance was equal to approximately $19 a month; by comparison, the average monthly income of an urban worker was approximately $165 dollars.26 While the new foreign dominated export production has generated new employment opportunities, most of these jobs are extremely low paid. A consultant for the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has estimated that Chinese factory workers earn an average of sixty-four cents an hour (including benefits).27 In Guangdong, where approximately one-third of China’s exports are produced, base manufacturing wages have been frozen for the past decade. Moreover, few if any of these workers have access to affordable housing, health care, pensions, or education.28 China’s economic transformation has not only come at high cost for Chinese working people, it has also intensified (as well as benefited from) the contradictions of capitalist development in other countries, including in East Asia. For example, China’s export successes in advanced capitalist markets, in particular that of the United States, have forced other East Asian producers out of those markets. Out of necessity, they have reoriented their export activity to the production of parts and components for use by export-oriented transnational corporations operating in China. Thus, all of East Asia is being knitted together into a regional accumulation regime that crosses many borders and in so doing restructures national activity and resources away from meeting domestic needs. Instead, activity and resources are being organized to serve export markets out of the region under the direction of transnational corporations whose interests are largely in cost reduction regardless of the social or environmental consequences.29 The much slower post-crisis growth of East Asian countries, and the heightened competitiveness pressures that are squeezing living standards throughout the region, provide strong proof that this new arrangement of regional economic relations is incapable of promoting a stable process of long-term development. Meanwhile, China’s export explosion has also accelerated the industrial hollowing out of the Japanese and U.S. economies as well as the unsustainable U.S. trade deficit. At some point the (economic and political) imbalances generated by this accumulation process will become too great, and corrections will have to take place. Insofar as the logic of capitalist competition goes unchallenged, governments can be expected to manage the adjustment process with policies that will likely worsen conditions for workers in both third world and developed capitalist countries. Neoliberal advocates can also be expected to embrace this process of adjustment as the means to “discover” their next success story, whose experience will then be cited as proof of the superiority of market forces.

#### This round is key – exposing the flaws of free trade and neoliberalism is critical to winning the “battle of ideas” in the fight against capitalism

Hart-Landsberg 6 (Martin, Professor of Economics and Director of the Political Economy Program at Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon, "Neoliberalism: Myths and Reality," Apr, [monthlyreview.org/2006/04/01/neoliberalism-myths-and-reality], jam)

Agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have enhanced transnational capitalist power and profits at the cost of growing economic instability and deteriorating working and living conditions. Despite this reality, neoliberal claims that liberalization, deregulation, and privatization produce unrivaled benefits have been repeated so often that many working people accept them as unchallengeable truths. Thus, business and political leaders in the United States and other developed capitalist countries routinely defend their efforts to expand the WTO and secure new agreements like the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) as necessary to ensure a brighter future for the world’s people, especially those living in poverty. For example, Renato Ruggiero, the first Director-General of the WTO, declared that WTO liberalization efforts have “the potential for eradicating global poverty in the early part of the next [twenty-first] century—a utopian notion even a few decades ago, but a real possibility today.”1 Similarly, writing shortly before the December 2005 WTO ministerial meeting in Hong Kong, William Cline, a senior fellow for the Institute for International Economics, claimed that “if all global trade barriers were eliminated, approximately 500 million people could be lifted out of poverty over 15 years….The current Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization provides the best single chance for the international community to achieve these gains.”2 Therefore, if we are going to mount an effective challenge to the neoliberal globalization project, we must redouble our efforts to win the “battle of ideas.” Winning this battle requires, among other things, demonstrating that neoliberalism functions as an ideological cover for the promotion of capitalist interests, not as a scientific framework for illuminating the economic and social consequences of capitalist dynamics. It also requires showing the processes by which capitalism, as an international system, undermines rather than promotes working class interests in both third world and developed capitalist countries.

#### Their stubborn pragmatism conceals a fetish for the system—universalism shatters this

Johnston ‘4 Adrian Johnston, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory University, December 2004, Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture & Society, v9 i3 p259

Furthermore, Zizek claims, the fetishist, by clinging to some object endowed with an excessive, disproportionate significance, is able to appear to others, not as a delusional pervert adrift upon the clouds of his/her peculiar fantasies, but, rather, as a hardened, pragmatic realist. The fetishist is someone who can, whether through stoicism or sarcasm, tolerate the harshness and difficulty of daily existence--"fetishists are not dreamers lost in their private worlds, they are thoroughly "realists," able to accept the way things effectively are--since they have their fetish to which they can cling in order to cancel the full impact of reality" (Zizek, 2001c, p 14). However, if the fetish-object is taken away from the fetishist, this cynical facade of pragmatic resignation disintegrates, plunging the subject into depression, despair, or even psychosis (in other words, the fetishist, bereft of his/her fetish, undergoes what Lacan calls "subjective destitution"; see Zizek, 2001c, p 14). The upshot of all this is the proposal of a specific guideline for a hermeneutics of suspicion to be exercised with respect to the manifest, fashionable attitudes of cynical resignation and pessimistic realism prevalent amongst the denizens of today's capitalist polis--"So, when we are bombarded by claims that in our post-ideological cynical era nobody believes in the proclaimed ideals, when we encounter a person who claims he is cured of any beliefs, accepting social reality the way it is, one should always counter such claims with the question: OK, but where is the fetish that enables you to (pretend to) accept reality "the way it is?"" (Zizek, 2001c, p 15). Naturally, Zizek reminds readers that Marx himself already understood the essentially fetishistic nature of money and commodities (Marx's descriptions of these entities make reference to "magic," "mystification," and "perversion," to the obfuscation of the actual conditions of material reality by pathological fantasies condensed into the form of objects circulating within the socio-economic process of exchange; see Marx, 1906, pp 81, 105; 1967b, pp 826-827). The implication is hence that if the small salaries and various little techno-gadget toys of today's late-capitalist subjects were to be taken away from them, their pretense to being realistically accepting of the status quo would be dropped immediately (Zizek, 1999b, p 68). In the Zizekian contemporary world, fetishism isn't an aberrant, deviant phenomenon, but, instead, a virtually innate structural feature of social reality, a necessary coping technique for the subjects of reigning ideologies. Although one might have the distinct impression that these concepts are meant to be specific to the historical conditions of late-capitalist societies, Zizek speaks of the dynamic involving cynicism, fetishism, and the displacement of belief as an ahistorical necessity, a universal feature of the human condition--"the phenomenon of the "subject supposed to believe" is ... universal and structurally necessary" (Zizek, 1997, p 106). He then proceeds to stipulate that, "by means of a fetish, the subject "believes through the other"" (Zizek, 1997, p 120). So, fetishism and the "subject supposed to believe" are inherent to any and every human reality. At this level, Zizek alights upon an answer to the question as to why capitalism in particular appears to have become so triumphantly successful in ideologically marketing itself as the only tenable socio-economic option around. As Zizek himself remarks, the contemporary political imagination has reached a point of debilitating closure; barring a cataclysmic breakdown prompted by an internal economic implosion or an externally imposed catastrophe (whether imposed by nature or "terror"), capitalism appears, in the social imaginary, as the new "thousand year Reich," as capable of enduring indefinitely in the absence of any contingent traumatic disruptions. Predominant collective fantasies concerning contemporary politics thus terminate with the forced choice of "capitalism or nothing": either the positive socio-economic program of capitalist, liberal-democratic ideology, or the negative alternative of an anarchic, apocalyptic lack of any system whatsoever (rather than, for example, the choice between competing ideological visions such as capitalism versus communism). According to this pervasive mindset, capitalism may very well be rotten, but it's the only viable alternative going (Zizek, 1999b, p 55; 2000c, p 10). One cannot help but hear echoes of this dilemma summed up in the title of Lacan's nineteenth seminar: "... ou pire" ("... or worse") (see Zizek, 1989, p 18; 1996, p 4; 1997, p 105, 120; 2001b, p 166). One is similarly reminded of Winston Churchill's comments regarding democracy (made during his November 11th, 1947 speech to the British House of Commons)--"No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."

#### History is not over. We represent the global majority who are oppressed by capital. The failure of revolutionary politics is not a historical necessity—we can still win

Murphy et al. ‘4 John Murphy, Professor of Sociology at the University of Miami, Manuel Caro Associate Professor of Sociology at Barry University, and Jung Min Choi, Professor of Sociology at San Diego State Universty, “Globalization With A Human Face,” 2004 p2-3

What is diabolical is that the market is touted to hold everyone’s future. Because persons no longer direct history, but are simply products of this process, there appears to be no alternative to the spread of markets and their worldwide integration. And anyone who chooses another approach to conceptualizing order—an alternative social or economic logic—is simply obstinate and denying reality. The logic of the market is deemed irrefutable. Furthermore, the image that is emanating from most political leaders in Europe and North America is that utopian thought is passé. The days of what Marcuse called the “Great Refusal” are long past.4 For many observers, history has delivered the best of possible worlds—an economic windfall to select groups that will eventually enhance everyone. What persons need now are patience and perseverance, and the magic of the market will do the rest. But many groups are becoming restless. In their opinion, the ideology of the market has become stale and an impediment to achieving a better life. Stated simply, they have not abandoned their utopian ideals of fairness and justice, and are looking for ways to realize these aims. In some cases, revolutionary fervor persists. But in general, they have decided to challenge the inherent ability of history to deliver a more propitious future. They are saying “enough,” and are searching for alternative models of economic regulation and social order. As a result, large numbers of persons have been protesting in most major cities over the spread and costs of neoliberalism. Although most mainstream politicians have been deaf to these calls for a more responsible order, the chants for a new direction continue. And contrary to the claims made by many pundits, these protesters have not abandoned their utopian impulse and have decided to make a different history. In other words, they have recognized that only ideology can bring history to an end, and that the recent picture created by this political device is an illusion. They have understood, accordingly, that history ends only when no more persons are left to decide their own fate. The invitation extended to join the globalized world is thus considered by many to be a ruse to get persons to jettison their own perspectives on the future. To prosper, all they have to do is assimilate to specific political mandates that have been cloaked in historical necessity. But critics of globalization have decided to change the rules of history and defy this view of progress. Their refusal, however, will not necessarily destroy civilization, as some conservative critics claim, but merely expose how the newly globalized world has been rigged in favor of the rich and ignores the needs and desires of most persons. The powerful and their supporters scream that these challenges are irrational and doomed to fail. Without a doubt, if these powerful forces continue to meddle in the social experiments of others, defeats will likely occur. But these failures have nothing to do with flaunting the laws of history or human nature. They occur most often because the rich and powerful want to discredit alternatives to their worldview and thus undermine any threats to their social or economic privileges.

## 1NR

### Capitalism K

Jack read some shit

# R6 vs Stanford LS

## 1NC

### FW

#### Interpretation: The aff should win if hypothetical enactment of a topical plan would be better than the status quo or competitive negative advocacies.

#### Resolved before a colon indicates a legislative forum

Army Officer School ’4 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### The “United States federal government” is the national government.

Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, 1999, 703

Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over small political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national political matters. – Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. The U.S. government. – Also termed national government.

#### The resolution is the most accessible, researchable, and rigorously developed baseline for debating. You should affirm it. Voting issue for fairness and education.

Galloway ‘7 Ryan Galloway, assistant professor of communication studies and director of debate at Samford University, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco

The central claim to this essay is that debate works best when it is dialogic and the topic is an invitation to participate. There are three pedagogical benefits to conceptualizing the resolution as an invitation. First, all teams have equal access to the resolution. Second, teams spend the entire year preparing approaches for and against the resolution. Finally, the resolution represents a community consensus of worthwhile and equitably debatable topics rooted in a collective history and experience of debate. First, teams have equal access to the resolution. The problem with relying upon prior disclosure, case lists, and word of mouth is that access is often tied to opportunity and resources. While it is true that there has been a phenomenal upsurge in the availability of case list access through technology, it is still the case that the resolution provides the most equal and fair access for all teams concerned. Each school in the community knows the wording of the resolution, even if they are not aware of the modifications made to any particular case. The notion that the negative team can rely upon the benevolence of the affirmative to provide strategic options radically tilts the argumentative table in favor of the affirmative. Providing the resolution as a baseline test operates as a demand for the negative’s approach to the topic to be heard. Instead of leaving the affirmative in complete control of what approaches to the topic the negative is allowed to argue, debate as a dialogue uses the resolution as a centerpiece of a demand to be heard. Second, teams spend the entire year preparing approaches for and against the resolution. The best debates often come from in-depth clash over a core area of the topic. It is not uncommon for debaters to spend between forty and sixty hours a week on debate, carefully refining their approaches to the topic. A common rejoinder is that debaters should think on their feet, and be prepared to debate against unusual affirmative cases and plans. While thinking on one’s feet is certainly valuable, allowing one side to think on their feet with the benefit of research, prior preparation, coaching, and thinking through arguments in advance, while depriving the other side of all such benefits hardly seems like a strategy that will result in a productive dialogue. Thinking on one’s feet is always framed by one’s past thoughts, arguments, and research base. Instead, debates are best when both sides have the opportunity to think ahead to the range of choices that the affirmative team can provide to the resolution. While there may always be some ground for the negative to respond to the affirmative team, that ground should stem from the resolution in order to maximize the benefits of the dialogical exchange which competitive debate allows. Finally, there has been a concerted community effort to ensure that the resolution provides subjects of controversy that are controversial, balanced, and anticipate a nuanced approach. Ross Smith notes, “Affirmative teams try to find what they think might be a slam dunk case, but in crafting resolutions the idea is to find a controversial area with ground for both sides” (2000). The resolution is the result of a painstaking process; it is thoroughly discussed, debated, and ultimately submitted to the debate community for a vote. It is framed, ultimately, as an issue about which reasonable minds could differ. Reliance upon alternative systems, such as germaneness, lists of ground provided by the other side in the debate, or the fact that a team has run a case in the past, betrays the central point of having a dialogue about the resolution and undermines the consensus upon which the whole enterprise depends. And while there are obviously some valid complaints about individual topics, as a whole, resolutions allow for a wide range of approaches to issues of the day. It is striking on the 20082009 resolution that conservative groups like the Heritage Foundation and the CATO Institute as well as Oxfam and the Sierra Club oppose agricultural subsidies, if for very different reasons. Teams could easily find evidence that subsidies go down a rat-hole, are counter-productive to free market economics, as well as arguing that subsidies entrench racism both domestically and globally, and prevent an ethic of care toward the global environment. Those that argue that the topic does not access issues relevant to a wide variety of special interests and minority groups may simply be asking for too much. Establishing the resolution as the bright line standard for evaluation of equity at the argumentative table allows all sides to the controversy access to formulating their approach to both sides of the topic question.

#### Role playing is essential to teaching responsible political practice

Esberg and Sagan ’12 Jane Esberg, special assistant to the director at NYU’s Center on International Cooperation, and Scott Sagan, professor of political science and director of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 19, issue 1, 2012, pp. 95-108, taylor & francis

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Role-playing is a productive venture for green politics—combining environmental critique with practical reform invigorates citizen activism and reclaims the political from technocratic elites—fears of cooption are fundamentalist blackmail

Hager ’92 Carol J. Hager, professor of political science at Bryn Mawr College, “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990,” Polity, Vol. 24 No. 1, 1992, pp. 45-70

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an institutional lever with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list. These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48 Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishmento f a temporary parliamentaryco mmissiont o studye nergyp olicy,w hichf or the first time would draw all concernedp articipantst ogetheri n a discussiono f both short-termc hoicesa nd long-termg oals of energyp olicy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49T hese commissionsg ave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernizationa nd technicali nnovation in energy policy. Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurizationd evices. With proddingf rom the energyc ommission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and by producing a modernization plan itself, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection. III. Conclusion The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general. One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic. Parliamentary Politics In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry. Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program. This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda. Technical Debate In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, activists engaged in technical debate. They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators. The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria. Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic. In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56 In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

#### Switch-side debate bolsters the value of personal convictions and subjects them to scrutiny by opponents tasked with employing the best possible responses to them—this best augments and develops individual beliefs

Galloway ‘7 Ryan Galloway, assistant professor of communication studies and director of debate at Samford University, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco

The argument that debaters should not argue in favor of ideas that they do not believe treats debate as with a normal public speaking event. This controversy was discussed thoroughly in various speech journals throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with most authors coming to the conclusion that debate is a unique public speaking event, where participants and observers disassociate the debater from their role. Richard Murphy lays out the case that students should not be forced to say something they do not believe, a concept quite similar to modern-day advocates of the notion that affirmatives should not have to defend the topic (1957; 1963). Murphy contends, “The argument against debating both sides is very simple and consistent. Debate…is a form of public speaking. A public statement is a public commitment” (1957, p. 2). Murphy believed students should discuss and research an issue until they understood their position on the issue and then take the stand and defend only that side of the proposition. Murphy’s fear was that students risk becoming a “weather vane,” having “character only when the wind is not blowing” (1963, p. 246). In contrast, Nicholas Cripe distinguished between speaking and debating (1957, p. 210). Cripe contended that, unlike a public speaker, a debater is “not trying to convince the judges, or his opponents” of the argument but merely to illustrate that their team has done the superior debating (p. 211). Debating in this sense exists with an obligation to give each position its best defense, in much the way an attorney does for a client. Here, the process of defending a position for the purposes of debate is distinct from their advocacy for a cause in a larger sense. As such, they are like Socrates in the Phaedrus, speaking with their heads covered so as not to anger the gods (Murphy 1957, p. 3). Additionally, debate is unlike public speaking since it happens almost always in a private setting. There are several distinctions. First, very few people watch individual contest rounds. The vast majority of such rounds take place with five people in the room—the four debaters, and the lone judge. Even elimination rounds with the largest audiences have no more than approximately one hundred observers, almost all of whom are debaters. Rarely do people outside the community watch debates. Also, debate has developed a set of norms and procedures quite unlike public speaking. While some indict these norms (Warner 2003), the rapid rate of speed and heavy reliance on evidence distinguishes debate from public speaking. Our activity is more like the closed debating society that Murphy admits can be judged by “pedagogical, rather than ethical, standards” (1957, p. 7). When debates do occur that target the general public (public debates on campus for example), moderators are careful to explain that debaters may be playing devil’s advocate. Such statements prevent confusion regarding whether or not a debater speaks in a role or from personal conviction. While speaking from conviction is a political act, speaking in accordance with a role is a pedagogical one (Klopf & McCroskey, 1964, p. 37). However, this does not mean that debaters are victims. The sophistication of modern argument and the range of strategic choices available to modern debaters allow them to choose positions that are consistent with their belief structures. The rise of plan-inclusive counterplans, kritiks, and other strategies allow negative teams to largely align themselves with agreeable affirmative cases while distinguishing away narrow slivers of arguments that allow debaters to rarely argue completely against their convictions. While some contend that this undermines the value of switch-side debate (Ellis, 2008b; Shanahan, 2004), in fact, the notion that debaters employ nuanced answers to debate topics illustrates the complexity of modern debate resolutions. Those who worry that competitive academic debate will cause debaters to lose their convictions, as Greene and Hicks do in their 2005 article, confuse the cart with the horse. Conviction is not a priori to discussion, it flows from it. A. Craig Baird argued, “Sound conviction depends upon a thorough understanding of the controversial problem under consideration (1955, p. 5). Debate encourages rigorous training and scrutiny of arguments before debaters declare themselves an advocate for a given cause. Debate creates an ethical obligation to interrogate ideas from a neutral position so that they may be freely chosen subsequently.

#### Sovereignty might get a bad rap from the aff but it isn’t nearly as bad as they make it out to be. Discourses of the law’s violent underside obscures its potential to get stuff done. Making the trains run on time is how we get to go to debate tournaments. Recognition of this fact means that we don’t have to resist—we can see rules as strategic.

Jacques Derrida, Directeur d’Etudes at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, and Professor of Philosophy, French and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Irvine, 2004, For What Tomorrow? A Dialogue With Elisabeth Roudinesco, p. 91-92

J.D.: A moment ago you spoke of regicide as the necessity of an ex­ception, in sum. Well, yes, one can refer provisionally to Carl Schmitt (whatever one may think of him, his arguments are always useful for prob­lematizing the “political” or the “juridical”; I examined this question in Pol­itics of Friendship). He says in effect that a sovereign is defined by his capacity to decide the exception. Sovereign is he who effectively decides the exception. The revolutionaries decided that at that moment that it was nec­essary to suspend justice and—in order to establish the law [droit] and to give the Revolution its rights—to suspend the rule of law [l’Etat de droit]. Schmitt also gives this definition of sovereignty: to have the right to sus­pend the law, or the rule of law, the constitutional state. Without this cate­gory of exception, we cannot understand the concept of sovereignty. Today, the great question is indeed, everywhere, that of sovereignty. Omnipresent in our discourses and in our axioms, under its own name or another, liter­ally or figuratively, this concept has a theological origin: the true sovereign is God. The concept of this authority or of this power was transferred to the monarch, said to have a “divine right.” Sovereignty was then delegated to the people, in the form of democracy, or to the nation, with the same the­ological attributes as those attributed to the king and to God. Today, wher­ever the word “sovereignty” is spoken, this heritage remains undeniable, whatever internal differentiation one may recognize in it. How do we deal with this? Here we return to the question of heritage with which we began. It is necessary to deconstruct the concept of sover­eignty, never to forget its theological filiation and to be ready to call this fil­iation into question wherever we discern its effects. This supposes an in­flexible critique of the logic of the state and of the nation-state. And yet—hence the enormous responsibility of the citizen and of the heir in general, in certain situations—the state, in its actual form, can resist cer­tain forces that I consider the most threatening. What I here call “responsibility” is what dictates the decision to be sometimes for the sovereign state and sometimes against it, for its deconstruction (“theoretical and practical,” as one used to say) according to the singularity of the contexts and the stakes. There is no relativism in this, no renunciation of the injunction to “think” and to deconstruct the heritage. This aporia is in truth the very condition of decision and responsibility—if there is any. I am thinking for example of the incoherent but organized coalition of international capitalist forces that, in the name of neoliberalism or the market,31 are taking hold of the world in conditions such as the “state” form; this is what can still resist the most. For the moment. But it is neces­sary to reinvent the conditions of resistance. Once again, I would say that according to the situations, I am an antisovereignist or a sovereignist—and I vindicate the right to be antisovereignist at certain times and a sovereignist at others. No one can make me respond to this question as though it were a matter of pressing a button on some old-fashioned machine. There are cases in which I would support a logic of the state, but I ask to examine each situation before making any statement. It is also necessary to recognize that by requiring someone to be not unconditionally sovereignist but rather soyvereignist only under certain conditions, one is already calling into question the principle of sovereignty. Deconstruction begins there. It demands a dif­ficult dissociation, almost impossible but indispensable, between uncondi­tionality (justice without power) and sovereignty (right, power, or potency). Deconstruction is on the side of unconditionaliry, even when it seems im­possible, and not sovereignty, even when it seems possible.

#### Our contest should be over demands on the state. Legal institutions allow us to enforce our will while demands and right claims are the ultimate act of agonism. This is the best way to affirm human living

Lawrence J. Hatab [philosophy prof somewhere] “Prospects For A Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147, on muse

Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent. As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. So I should not only will the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contest. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants. 25 In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work. Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors [End Page 142] in public discourse. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing, refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. 26 An agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights, not as something "natural" possessed by an original self, but as an epiphenomenal, procedural notion conferred upon citizens in order to sustain viable political practice. Constraints on speech, association, access, and so on, simply insure lopsided political contests. We can avoid metaphysical models of rights and construe them as simply social and political phenomena: social in the sense of entailing reciprocal recognition and obligation; political in the sense of being guaranteed and enforced by the state. We can even defend so-called positive rights, such as a right to an adequate education, as requisite for fair competition in political discourse. Rights themselves can be understood as agonistic in that a right-holder has a claim against some treatment by others or for some provision that might be denied by others. In this way rights can be construed as balancing power relations in social milieus, as a partial recession of one's own power on behalf of the power of others—which in fact is precisely how Nietzsche in an early work described fairness and rights (D 112). And, as is well known, the array of rights often issues conflicts of different and differing rights, and political life must engage in the ongoing balancing act of negotiating these tensions, a negotiation facilitated by precisely not defining rights as discrete entities inviolably possessed by an originating self. Beyond political rights, a broader conception of rights, often designated as human rights as distinct from political practice, can also be defended by way of the kind of nonfoundational, negative sense of selfhood inspired by Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, the self is a temporal openness infused with tragic limits, rather than some metaphysical essence, stable substance, or eternal entity. A via negativa can be utilized to account for rights as stemming not from what we are but from what we are not. So much of abusive or exclusionary treatment is animated by confident designations and reductions as to "natures" having to do with race, gender, class, role, character, and so on. [End Page 143] Nonfoundational challenges to "identity" may seem unsettling, but if we consider how identities figure in injustices, a good deal of work can be done to reconfigure rights as based in resistance. It is difficult to find some positive condition that can justify rights and do so without excluding or suppressing some other conditions. But a look at human history and experience can more readily understand rights and freedom as emerging out of the irrepressible tendency of human beings to resist and deny the adequacy of external attributions as to what or who they "are." It may be sufficient to defend rights simply in terms of the human capacity to say No.

### OOO K

#### Their standard of being topic-ish is hogwash; it’s the classic leftist trick to avoid committing to anything so they can stay in their philosophical armchairs. Totalizing rhetoric and reductive frameworks like ‘ideology’ are deployed to avoid confrontation with the lively activity of non-human objects and reinscribe an anthropocentric metaphysics of correlationism

Bryant ’12 Levi Bryant, teaches philosophy at Collin College, “RSI, Discursivity, Critique, and Politics,” Larval Subjects, 7/18/2012, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/07/18/rsi-discursivity-critique-and-politics/

If I get worked up about these issues, then this is because I think they’ve created serious lacuna in our political theory and practice. Suppose I focus on norms, for example. Great, I’ve developed a theory of norms and how they contribute to the social fabric. Yet while Kant claims that “ought implies can”, I’m not so sure. You’ve shown that something is unjust or that this would be the reasonable way to proceed. But at the real-material level people are caught in sticky networks that suck them into life in particular ways. They ought, for example, to drive an electric car, but what if it’s not available where they are or what if they can’t afford it? Well they should do whatever they can to get it? But what of their other obligations such as eating, sheltering themselves, taking care of their children, paying their medical bills, etc? It would be so nice if we just had mistaken beliefs or failed to recognize the right norms. Things would be so easy then. But there’s life, there’s the power of things. Sometimes the issues aren’t ones of ideology– and yes, of course, I recognize that ideology is probably involved in making electric cars expensive and hard to obtain, but not for them always –sometimes they’re simply issues of the power of things. And if we treat things as blank screens we’ll have difficulty seeing this and we’ll miss out on other opportunities for engagement. Long ago I used to keep track of my blog. I had a map that showed me where all my visits were coming from about the world. I noticed that the interior portions of the United States were largely dark with no visits and that the coasts and cities had a high volume of traffic. Given that my blog talks about all sorts of things ranging from weather patterns to beavers to mantis shrimps to octopi (I get all these random visits from folks searching for these things), it followed that the absence of traffic from these regions of the country couldn’t be explained in terms of a lack of interest in French and continental philosophy (yes, I recognize that there are also cultural reasons folks from these reasons might shy away from such things). What then was it? I think the answer must be that there’s a lack easy and inexpensive internet access from these portions of the country. Notice also that these regions of the country are also the most conservative regions of the country. Could there be a relation between lack of access and conservatism? I am not suggesting that lack of access is the cause of conservatism and fundamentalism. Clearly there’s a whole history in these regions and an entire set of institutions that exercise a particular inertia. I’m saying that if the only voices you hear are those in your immediate community, how much opportunity is there to think and imagine otherwise? You’re only exposed to the orthodoxy of your community and their sanctions. I am also not saying that if you give people the internet they’ll suddenly become radical leftists. Minimally, however, they’ll have a vector of deterritorialization that allows them to escape the constraints of their local social field. All of this begs the question of who critique is for. If it can’t get to the audience that you want to change, what’s it actually doing? Who’s it addressed to? Sometimes you get the sense that the practice of radical political philosophy and critical theory is a bit like the Underpants Gnomes depicted in South Park: The Underpants Gnomes have a plan for success: collect underwear —>; ? [question mark] —->; profit. This is like our critical theorists: debunk/decipher —>; ? [question mark] —->; revolution! The problem is the question mark. We’re never quite sure what’s supposed to come between collecting the underwear and profit, between debunking and revolution. This suggests an additional form of political engagement. Sometimes the more radical gesture is not to debunk and critique, but to find ways to lay fiber optic cables, roads, plumbing, etc. How, for example, can a people rise up and overturn their fundamentalist dictators if they’re suffering from typhoid and cholera as a result of bad plumbing and waste disposal? How can people overturn capitalism when they have to support families and need places to live and have no alternative? Perhaps, at this point, we need a little less critique and a little more analysis of the things that are keeping people in place, the sticky networks or regimes of attraction. Perhaps we need a little more carpentry. This has real theoretical consequences. For example, we can imagine someone writing about sovereignty, believing they’re making a blow against nationalism by critiquing Schmitt and by discussing Agamben, all the while ignoring media of communication or paths of relation between geographically diverse people as if these things were irrelevant to nationalism occurring. Ever read Anderson on print culture and nationalism? Such a person should. Yet they seem to believe nationalism is merely an incorporeal belief that requires no discussion of material channels or media. They thereby deny themselves of all sorts of modes of intervention, hitching everything on psychology, attachment, and identification. Well done!

#### Text: Affirm alien phenomenology.

#### Confronting the litany of objects in existence founds an ethic of care that produces the impetus for real political action

Joy ’12 Eileen Joy, SIU-Edwardsville Dept. of English Language and Literature, response to “the object industry,” by Alex Reid, Digital Digs, 5/29/2012, http://www.alex-reid.net/2012/05/the-object-industry.html

I'd like to add a few "follow-on" comments to what Ian writes below; these are partly borrowed from an interview I was \*supposed\* to finish and never did [where someone posed questions to me and I wrote answers back], where the same critique was raised regarding posthumanism [I also want to add here that I don't see Alex and Berry on the same page here; indeed, I think Alex's position is much more nuanced with regard to the ethical promise of flat ontologies, even with his cautions, which, I just don't worry about as much, partly because my mantra these days is: "more thought," without too much worrying over where it will all lead]: Calling oneself a post/humanist or "new humanist" (as I do, btw) or turning one’s attention to objects (as Bennett, Bryant, Harman, and others are doing at present) or to animals (as Cary Wolfe, Karl Steel, Cora Diamond, Sarah Franklin, Julian Yates, Nicole Shukin, and others are doing), etc., is decidedly not about discarding the human altogether, nor even necessarily about de-specializing it, as some have argued. Rather, in my mind, it is more about re-tooling human mentality to stall, idle, and with an enhanced sensibility (with which the human is specially gifted) to pick up on "signals" it heretofore had not been listening for. I have written elsewhere about the human as a special listening device or slow recorder. It is not a rejection of “world,” either (as in: this world), although figures like Brassier and Meillassoux, of course, have pointed in that direction (I am personally not so enchanted with the eliminativist and “dark vitalist” positions, whether nihilist or culinary or materialist or whatever, although I think they're amazingly imaginative and I support and encourage that work because what we need now is more, and not less, thinking in the university). I get very worked up on this point because I have become distressed lately by how many people want to make the argument that post/humanism, as well as OOO work, isn’t attentive enough to the contexts in which so-called “real lives” unfold on the grounds of “real world” contexts, or that it somehow chooses dogs over people dying in Sudan, or spools of thread over migrant workers in textile factories, and so on and so forth. In other words, if we’re paying too much attention to objects or animals, we’ve somehow abdicated our attention to and responsibility for those -- who are human -- living alongside us and who might be suffering under oppressive regimes, who are disenfranchised, who are experiencing various forms of violence and deprivations, etc. We supposedly care more about popsicle sticks and less about poverty in America. I have this image in my mind of a big “you’re not political/human/ethical enough” factory and inside of this massive brick building with all sorts of discursive smoke-stacks there are all these people pulling on levers and pulleys and turning wheels and conveyer belts and one lever is marked “you forgot about the poverty in Calcutta” and another one is marked “but there are real people dying in Sudan” and another one is marked “people need jobs, then we’ll talk about the democracy of objects” and another one is marked “when we get beyond racism, then we’ll talk about animals” and another one (that seems to have been engineered just for critiques of Harman, especially) is marked “since you only want to pay attention to the singularity and autonomy and ‘mystery’ of objects, you must not care very much about the fact that the ‘real world’ is mainly shaped by relations, and uneven ones at that” and so on and so on ad infinitum. For me personally, turning one’s attention to animals, objects, post/humanism and so on is precisely about thickening our capacity to imagine more capacious forms of “living with”; it is precisely about developing more radical forms of welcoming and generosity to others, who include humans as well as trees, rocks, dogs, cornfields, ant colonies, pvc pipes, and sewer drains; it is precisely about amplifying the ability of our brains to pick up more communication signals from more “persons” (who might be a human or a cloud or a cave) whose movements, affects, and thoughts are trying to tell us something about our interconnectedness and co-implicated interdependence with absolutely everything (or perhaps even about a certain implicit alienation between everything in the world, which is nevertheless useful to understand better: take your pick); it is precisely about working toward a more capacious vision of what we mean by “well-being,” when we decide to attend to the well-being of humans and other “persons” (who might be economic markets or the weather or trash or homeless cats) who are always enmeshed with each other in various “vibrant” networks, assemblages, meshes, cascades, systems, whathaveyou. And just for me -- likely, just for me -- it is also about love, with love defined, not as something that goes in one direction from one person to another person or object (carrying with it various demands and expectations and self-centered desires), but rather, as a type of collective labor that works at creating “fields” for persons and objects to emerge into view that otherwise would remain hidden (and perhaps also remain abjectified), and which persons and objects could then be allowed the breathing/living room to unfold in various self-directed ways, even if that’s not what you could have predicted in advance nor supposedly what you “want” it to do (in other words: ethics as a form of attention that is directed toward the “for-itself” propulsions of other persons and objects, human and inhuman). So, for me, work in post/humanism, and in OOO, is attentive to the world, which includes and does not exile (or gleefully kill off) the human (although it certainly asks that we expand our angles of vision beyond just the human-centered ones); it is both political and ethical; and it is interested in what I would even call the “tender” attention to and care of things, human and inhuman (I think that the work of Bennett, Bogost, Morton, Harman, Steven Shaviro, Jeffrey Cohen, Stacy Alaimo, Julian Yates, Myra Hird, Freya Matthews, Karen Barad, Donna Haraway, and Levi Bryant, and many, many others who \*never\* get cited in these discussions, especially the women working in materialism, science/gender studies, queer ecology, environmental humanities, etc.) especially exemplifies this “tender” attention to and care of all of the "items" of the world. Any enlargement of our capacity to think about the agential, signaling, and other capacities of as many items/objects/persons, etc. of this world represents, in my mind, an enlargement, and not a shrinking, of our ethical attention. It's asking for a richer, thicker ontology, which gives is more to be responsible for (after all, that's partly where the specialness of humans comes in), but also: more to enjoy.

#### Speciesism makes unspeakable violence banal and invisible

Kochi and Ordan ‘8 Tarik Kochi & Noam Ordan, “An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity,” borderlands, vol. 7 no. 3, 2008, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3\_2008/kochiordan\_argument.pdf

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity might comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are **not an aberration** and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750). Certainly many organisms use ‘force’ to survive and thrive at the expense of their others. Humans are not special in this regard. However humans, due a particular form of self-awareness and ability to plan for the future, have the capacity to carry out highly organised forms of violence and destruction (i.e. the Holocaust; the massacre and enslavement of indigenous peoples by Europeans) and the capacity to develop forms of social organisation and communal life in which harm and violence are organised and regulated. It is perhaps this capacity for reflection upon the merits of harm and violence (the moral reflection upon the good and bad of violence) which gives humans a ‘special’ place within the food chain. Nonetheless, with these capacities come responsibility and our proposal of global suicide is directed at bringing into full view the issue of human moral responsibility. When taking a wider view of history, one which focuses on the relationship of humans towards other species, it becomes clear that the human heritage – and the propagation of itself as a thing of value – has occurred on the back of seemingly endless acts of violence, destruction, killing and genocide. While this cannot be verified, perhaps ‘human’ history and progress begins with the genocide of the Neanderthals and never loses a step thereafter. It only takes a short glimpse at the list of all the sufferings caused by humanity for one to begin to question whether this species deserves to continue into the future. The list of human-made disasters is ever-growing after all: suffering caused to animals in the name of science or human health, not to mention the cosmetic, food and textile industries; damage to the environment by polluting the earth and its stratosphere; deforesting and overuse of natural resources; and of course, inflicting suffering on fellow human beings all over the globe, from killing to economic exploitation to abusing minorities, individually and collectively. In light of such a list it becomes difficult to hold onto any assumption that the human species possesses any special or higher value over other species. Indeed, if humans at any point did possess such a value, because of higher cognitive powers, or even because of a special status granted by God, then humanity has surely devalued itself through its actions and has forfeited its claim to any special place within the cosmos. In our development from higher predator to semi-conscious destroyer we have perhaps undermined all that is good in ourselves and have left behind a heritage best exemplified by the images of the gas chamber and the incinerator. We draw attention to this darker and pessimistic view of the human heritage not for dramatic reasons but to throw into question the stability of a modern humanism which sees itself as inherently ‘good’ and which presents the action of cosmic colonisation as a solution to environmental catastrophe. Rather than presenting a solution it would seem that an ideology of modern humanism is itself a greater part of the problem, and as part of the problem it cannot overcome itself purely with itself. If this is so, what perhaps needs to occur is the attempt to let go of any one-sided and privileged value of the ‘human’ as it relates to moral activity. That is, perhaps it is modern humanism itself that must be negated and supplemented by a utopian anti-humanism and moral action re-conceived through this relational or dialectical standpoint in thought.

### Zizek K

#### There is nothing subversive about the aff’s transgression of debate norms. Resistance to the rules serve to fetishize the very rules that are resisted—as we move further away from obedience, our desire to break free only grows.

Zizek ‘2k Slavoj Zizek, Professor of Sociology at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana University, 2000, The Fragile Absolute, p. 23-25

This example brings home the inherent link between three notions: that of Marxist surplus-value, that of the Lacanian objet petit a as surplus-enjoyment (the concept that Lacan elaborated with direct reference to Marxian surplus-value), and the paradox of the superego, perceived long ago by Freud: the more Coke you drink, the thirstier you are; the more profit you make, the more you want; the more you obey the superego command, the guiltier you are — in all three cases, the logic of balanced exchange is dis­turbed in favour of an excessive logic of ‘the more you give (the more you repay your debts), the more you owe’ (or ‘the more you have what you long for, the more you lack, the greater your crav­ing’; or — the consumerist version — ‘the more you buy, the more you have to spend’): that is to say, of the paradox which is the very opposite of the paradox of love where, as Juliet put it in her immortal words to Romeo, ‘the more I give, the more I have’. The key to this disturbance, of course, is the surplus-enjoyment, the object petit a, which exists (or, rather, persists) in a kind of curved space — the nearer you get to it, the more it eludes your grasp (or the more you possess it, the greater the lack).’2 Perhaps sexual difference comes in here in an unexpected way: the reason why the superego is stronger in men than in women is that it is men, not women, who are intensely related to this excess of the surplus-enjoyment over the pacifying func­tioning of the symbolic Law. In terms of the paternal function, the opposition between the pacifying symbolic Law and the excessive superego injunction is, of course, the one between the Name-of-the-Father (symbolic paternal authority) and the ‘primordial father’ who is allowed to enjoy all women; and it is crucial here to recall that this rapist ‘primordial father’ is a male (obsessional), not feminine (hysterical) fantasy: it is men who are able to endure their integration into the symbolic order only when this integration is sustained by some hidden reference to the fantasy of the unbridled excessive enjoyment embodied in the unconditional superego injunction to enjoy, to go to the extreme, to transgress and constantly to force the limit. In short, it is men in whom the integration into the symbolic order is sustained by the superego exception. This superego-paradox also allows us to throw a new light on to the functioning of today’s artistic scene. Its basic feature is not only the much-deplored commodification of culture (art objects produced for the market), but also the less noted but perhaps even more crucial opposite movement: the growing ‘culturalization’ of the market economy itself. With the shift towards the tertiary econ­omy (services, cultural goods), culture is less and less a specific sphere exempted from the market, and more and more not just one of the spheres of the market, but its central component (from the software amusement industry to other media productions). What this short circuit between market and culture entails is the waning of the old modernist avant-garde logic of provocation, of shocking the establishment. Today, more and more, the cul­tural—economic apparatus itself, in order to reproduce itself in competitive market conditions, has not only to tolerate but directly to provoke stronger and stronger shocking effects and products. Just think of recent trends in the visual arts: gone are the days when we had simple statues or framed paintings — what we get now are exhibitions of frames without paintings, dead cows and their excrement, videos of the insides of the human body (gastroscopy and colonoscopy), the inclusion of olfactory effects, and so on.13 Here again, as in the domain of sexuality, perversion is no longer subversive: such shocking excesses are part of the system itself; the system feeds on them in order to reproduce itself. Perhaps this is one possible definition of post- modern as opposed to modernist art: in postmodernism, the transgressive excess loses its shock value and is fully integrated into the established artistic market.”’

#### Their attempt to distance themselves from the failures of the topic through reference to its sexist ideology reinscribes the exact logics they look to escape. Sarah Palin is the obverse of an empty post-feminist politics; the obscene underside of their vapid culture analysis.

Ferguson ‘9 Kathy Ferguson, University of Hawai’i at Manoa, “Bush in Drag,” Borderlands, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2009, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol8no3\_2009/ferguson\_palin.pdf

The second concept in Žižek’s trilogy is ideological disidentification, a process that enables people to maintain some needed psychological distance from ideals they espouse. The excess generated by any political formulation requires management: as Matthew Sharpe explains, ‘ideology is always self-distancing, enabling subjects a (sense of) distance from the very symbolic illusions that its explicit idealistic surface articulates’ (2004: 103, italics in original). That which doesn’t fit, according to Žižek, can be brought back in by the second move of ideology: we see ourselves not fully taking in the Big Idea, and take that failure as indirect testimony to the big Other’s ability to do so for us. Like parishioners listening uncomprehendingly to Latin Mass, Žižek explains, the subjects of ideology can accept their lack of full understanding because they have an intimate relation with ‘the Other who is supposed to know.’ The subject can stand shoulder-to-shoulder with all those who are similarly affected, secure in their relationship to the Extraordinary Thing via their participation with the One Who Knows. Palin’s famous ‘pro-America’ comments at her North Carolina fundraiser on October 16, 2008, evoked the nostalgic political virtues of small-town America: ‘We believe that the best of America is not all in Washington, D.C. We believe’ – here the audience interrupted Palin with applause and cheers – ‘We believe that the best of America is in these small towns that we get to visit, and in these wonderful little pockets of what I call the real America, being here with all of you hard working very patriotic, um, very, um, pro-America areas of this great nation. This is where we find the kindness and the goodness and the courage of everyday Americans. Those who are running our factories and teaching our kids and growing our food and are fighting our wars for us. Those who are protecting us in uniform. Those who are protecting the virtues of freedom’. (quoted in Stein, 2008b) This reference is a clear example of the non-falsifiability of the Big Idea: Palin finds the Real America in the places that are properly pro-American, small town, and good. If this were an empirical statement, one could challenge it by showing people in cities and suburbs who are patriotic and hardworking, or people in small towns who are not. But it is not an empirical statement, it is a gut-level association. Palin supporters from, say, the largely Republican cities of Charlotte, NC, Indianapolis, IN, Fort Worth, TX, Anaheim, CA, or Phoenix, AZ (Frum, 2008) can feel warmed and confirmed in their connections to the iconic small town via Sarah Palin; their link to their big Other overcomes their own urban affiliations and resituates them symbolically with the alleged virtues of small towns where they may seldom visit and have no desire to actually reside. Palin supporters living in small towns and rural areas where, contrary to her summarizing image, factories are closed, farms are foreclosed, and urban sprawl has paved rich farm land, can nonetheless re-image their homes in the intensifying glow of Palin’s nostalgic prism. As Chambers and Finlayson point out, ‘the classic repertoire of populism’ rests on an alleged chasm ‘between a corrupt elite, responsible for all errors and evils, and an otherwise good and decent people truly born of the national and godly community’ (2008: par 26). Palin’s work as the big Other serves as the medium for reorganizing the imagined public so Republican voters from any demographic groups can reinvent themselves as the carriers of small-town virtues.

#### Vote negative to condemn the aff.

#### Condemnation acts upon the ethical necessity of criticism by bringing to the fore practices of violence which we are complicit with. We should reject their move of affirmation to best confront the failings of reformist politics and the violent context of the 1AC.

Dean ‘5 Jodi Dean, Department of Political Science Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “A politics of avoidance: the limits of weak ontology,” The Hedgehog Review, published by the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer 2005, <http://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i_cite/2005/05/butler_and_weak.html>

The ethical disposition Butler finds in the context of address may arise. Or, it may not. It may well be the case that sometimes something more is called for—judgment or perhaps even condemnation. Butler allows for this when she observes that judgment does not “exhaust the sphere of ethics” and when she says that judgments are necessary for political life (36). Yet, Butler holds back, avoiding the political task of condemning those persons and practices, those norms and desires upon which our poorly arranged world depends. For example, she writes, . . . condemnation can work precisely against self-knowledge inasmuch as it moralizes a self through disavowal; although self-knowledge is surely limited, that is not a reason to turn against it as a project; but condemnation tends to do precisely this, seeking to purge and externalize one’s own opacity, and in this sense failing to own its own limitations, providing no felicitous basis for a reciprocal recognition of human begins as constitutively limited (36). It isn’t clear to me why Butler says this. For surely the fact that condemnation can work against self-knowledge does not mean that condemnation everywhere and always does so. And surely it is not always the case that condemnation moralizes a self through disavowal, that it necessarily seeks to purge and externalize opacity and necessarily fails to own its limitations. Can we not imagination a condemnation capable of acknowledging its own limits? Can we not imagination a condemnation born of failure, indeed, a condemnation indebted and responsible to failure? If I condemn racism, homophobia, or cruelty in another, am I necessarily disavowing racism, homophobia, or cruelty in myself? Might I not be addressing it in myself as I confront it in another? Or, better, might I not be calling into question, condemning, practices in which I, as well as those I condemn, am implicated such that I recognize this condemnation as a self-condemnation, a condemnation of us and of our practices? And could it not be the case that such condemnation is my ethical responsibility insofar as it seeks to transform those contexts of address that will and do exceed my own? If I condemn someone for pursuing preventive war, or for defending a notion of preventive war, I need not base this condemnation on a sense that my knowledge is more certain. Indeed, I can base it on the sense that the pursuer of preventive war aims to produce a future that I reject or, that even if these are not his aims, that I fear will arise in the course of its pursuit. My condemnation, again, may be a way of grappling with, of confronting, additional elements of the contexts of address, elements that involve power, hierarchy, and responsibility for other futures, other contexts, other beings. Failure to condemn, then, may risk disavowal of relations of power as well as confrontation with my own complicity. Rather than a responsive ethics, such failure may involve a politics of avoidance. Butler does not always and necessarily avoid condemnation. In fact, important to my argument is the fact that her ethics need not preclude condemnation and that it can and should be sharpened so as to account for such divisive, political moments. Yet, it is striking to me that when Butler does condemn, it’s as if she finds herself in that moment trapped within a discourse she rejects, to which she can only gain access through a condemnation. Thus, in Precarious Life, she condemns “on several bases the violence done against the United States and do[es] not see it as ‘just punishment’ for prior sins.” In her analysis of US policies of indefinite detention in Guantanamo Bay, US violence against Afghanistan, the US’s “shock and awe” attacks on Iraq, and the Bush administration’s hegemonization of political discourse after September 11th in terms of its own position as victim, however, she does not condemn. Rather, she analyzes, explains, contextualizes, interprets, interrogates, and, in so doing, critiques. For me this raises the question of Butler’s separation of condemnation and critique and the political place and function of each. Butler presumes that condemnation involves closure. That is, she treats condemnation as unlike other speech acts, as if condemnation were an act of sovereignty already bent on effacing its own supporting conditions, its own vulnerability and dependence. So even as she recognizes judging as a mode of address and thus premised on the context of address that “can and should provide a sustaining condition of ethical deliberation, judgment, and conduct,” she reads condemnation as essentially an act of violence, one that “erodes the capacity of the addressed subject for both self-reflection and social-recognition” and works to “paralyze and deratify the critical capacities of the subject to whom it is addressed” (37). If the condemned is already positioned in a prior relation of subordination such erosion and paralysis may result. But not necessarily. The condemned may reject the bases, the terms, of condemnation—“I am not who you say I am” or “Because I am who you say I am, you are the one who ultimately suffers, who is left shattered and bereft in condemning me.” The condemned may also accept the words of the condemnation, but challenge the suppositions supporting these words, the suppositions that give it an ethical valence beyond a mere statement of fact—“Yes, I am a godless communist, so?” Condemnation, in other words, may not succeed. Its effects on the addressee as well as its relation to other acts and interpretations cannot be determined in advance. Likewise, if the condemned is in fact more powerful, the President of a mighty military power, say, then associating condemnation with paralysis and deratification surely overstates the power of the address. One could wish that condemnation had such effects, and with respect to Bush’s unconscionable, immoral, unjustified, illegal, imperialist war against Iraq, I certainly do. Bush’s persistence in his preemptive war against Iraq in the face of the condemnation of millions throughout the world, however, points to the weakness and inefficacy of condemnation unbacked by force. In sum, condemnation is not as powerful and efficacious as Butler implies. And, insofar as it occurs within a context of address, condemnation is citational, relying for its efficacy on a set of prior norms that it reiterates, a set of prior practices and values to which it connects. Condemnation does not occur ex nihilo but is based on something, something shared. As with other utterances, condemnation is “uncontrollable, appropriable, and able to signify otherwise and in excess of its animating intentions.” To condemn, then, is to appeal to a prior set of connections as it basis and thereby to open up this basis for investigation, critique, and, potentially, condemnation.

### Case

#### Travel metaphors presuppose an ideology of free movement which privileges masculine sovereignty while producing regulatory violence to ‘keep women home’—the notion of ‘nomadism’ is exclusionary and justifies rejection

Wolff ’93 Janet Wolff, “On the road again: metaphors of travel in cultural criticism,” Cultural Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, May 1993, p. 225-240

The gendering of travel is not premissed on any simple notion of public and private spheres—a categorization which feminist historians have shown was in any case more an ideology of place than the reality of the social world. What is in operation here, I think, is that ideology. The ideological construction of ‘woman’s place’ works to render invisible, problematic, and in some cases impossible, women ‘out of place’. Lesley Harman, in her study of homeless women in Toronto, shows how the myth of home constructs homeless women in a very different way from homeless men. As she puts it, ‘the very notion of “homelessness” among women cannot be invoked without noting the ideological climate in which this condition is framed as problematic, in which the deviant categories of “homeless woman” and “bag lady” are culturally produced’ (1989:10). It seems to me not entirely frivolous to consider the hysterical and violent responses to the film Thelma and Louise in the same way. As Janet Maslin has pointed out (1991), the activities of this travelling duo are as nothing compared with the destruction wrought in many male road movies. She writes in response to an unprecedented barrage of hostile reviews, of which one in People Weekly (10.6.91) is an example: Any movie that went as far out of its way to trash women as this female chauvinist sow of a film does to trash men would be universally, and justifiably, condemned… The movie portrays Sarandon and Davis as sympathetic…. The music and the banter suggest a couple of good ole gals on a lark; the content suggests two self-absorbed, irresponsible, worthless people. My argument is that the ideological gendering of travel (as male) both impedes female travel and renders problematic the self-definition of (and response to) women who do travel. As I have said, I don’t claim to have offered an analysis of this gendering (though I have suggested that, for example, a psychoanalytic account would be worth pursuing). Nor, once again, am I arguing that women don’t travel. I have been primarily interested in seeing how metaphors and ideologies of travel operate. In the final section, I will consider the implications of this for a cultural theory which relies on such metaphors. Feminism, travel and place By now, many feminists have made the point about poststructuralist theory that just as women are discovering their subjectivity and identity, theory tells us that we have to deconstruct and de-centre the subject. Susan Bordo has identified the somewhat suspicious timing by which ‘gender’ evaporates into ‘genders’ at the moment in which women gain some power in critical discourse and academic institutions (Bordo, 1990). In the same way, I’d like to suggest that just as women accede to theory, (male) theorists take to the road. Without claiming any conspiracy or even intention, we can see what are, in my view, exclusionary moves in the academy. The already-gendered language of mobility marginalizes women who want to participate in cultural criticism. For that reason, I believe there is no point in tinkering with the vocabulary of travel (motels instead of hotels) to accommodate women. Crucially, this is still the wrong language. How is it that metaphors of movement and mobility, often invoked in the context of radical projects of destabilizing discourses of power, can have conservative effects? As I said earlier, one would think that feminism, like postcolonial criticism, could only benefit from participating in a critique of stasis. Here I think we confront the same paradox as in the proposed alliance between feminism and postmodernism. The appeal of postmodernism lies in its demolition of grand narratives (narratives which have silenced women and minorities). The problem with an overenthusiastic embrace of the postmodern is that that same critique undermines the very basis of feminism, itself necessarily a particular narrative. Feminists have only reached provisional conclusions here based on either a relative rejection of grand narratives, or a pragmatic retention of (less grand) theory. In the same way, I think that destabilizing has to be situated, if the critic is not to self-destruct in the process. The problem with terms like ‘nomad’, ‘maps’ and ‘travel’ is that they are not usually located, and hence (and purposely) they suggest ungrounded and unbounded movement—since the whole point is to resist fixed selves/viewers/subjects. But the consequent suggestion of free and equal mobility is itself a deception, since we don’t all have the same access to the road. Women’s critique of the static, the dominant, has to acknowledge two important things: first, that what is to be criticized is (to retain the geographic metaphor) the dominant centre; and secondly, that the criticism, the destabilizing tactics, originate too from a place—the margins, the edges, the less visible spaces. There are other metaphors of space which I find very suggestive, and which may be less problematic, at least in this respect: ‘borderlands’, ‘exile’, ‘margins’—all of which are premissed on the fact of dislocation from a given, and excluding, place. Elspeth Probyn (1990) recommends we start from the body—what Adrienne Rich has called ‘the politics of location’ (1986)—to insist on the situated nature of experience and political critique. Caren Kaplan’s (1987) use of the notion of ‘de-territorialization’ similarly assumes a territory from which one is displaced, and which one negotiates, dismantles, perhaps returns to.

#### Their critique of western masculinist subjectivity fails

Lee ‘9 Wendy Lee, professor of philosophy at Bloomsburg, “Restoring Human-Centeredness to Environmental Conscience: The Ecocentrist’s Dilemma, the Role of Heterosexualized Anthropomorphizing, and the Significance of Language to Ecological Feminism,” Ethics and the Environment, vol. 14 no. 1, muse

Acampora and Bender could also object that such an expansion doesn't require a disavowal of self and hence is not necessarily dualistic at all. But this too fails in that (1) the disavowal of the self is central to ecocentric ethics precisely because the self is identified with a centeredness mistakenly coded as chauvinistic by the ecocentrist; the ecocentrist cannot renege here without giving up the very grounds upon which he/she criticizes human-centeredness—however mistaken they may be about it. (2) While they might reject the logic of self/other altogether in favor of some experientially grounded "oneness," this doesn't get us very far. After all, we could no more obviously envision a practicable environmental responsibility following from the pacifism this implies than from the activism Bender and Acampora hope for. Moreover, it simply excludes all of us whose experience does not "achieve" or conform to it. (3) Both Acampora's and Bender's arguments are—denial notwithstanding—implicitly dualistic, and thus inevitably run aground on Cartesian-style shoals for the reasons I've offered. Alternative interpretations of the expansive "I" fare little better—an "I" that appropriates the other into itself is hardly a rejection of chauvinism and a complete dissociation of self faces the problems in (2). The real problem, I think, is that Bender and Acampora simply fail to take seriously enough the meaning of the embodiment or "encapsulation" [End Page 40] to which they themselves appeal—if they did, they would see that human-centeredness is not the enemy of environmental responsibility, but its most vital ally.

#### Their internal link is bogus—a self-ascribed essence is not a sufficient explanation for historical violence

Lee ‘9 Wendy Lee, professor of philosophy at Bloomsburg, “Restoring Human-Centeredness to Environmental Conscience: The Ecocentrist’s Dilemma, the Role of Heterosexualized Anthropomorphizing, and the Significance of Language to Ecological Feminism,” Ethics and the Environment, vol. 14 no. 1, muse

Second, then, is that however indigenous, no necessary implications for ethnicity, gender, sex, or sexual identity follow from human-centeredness (or follow for our concepts of ethnicity, etc.). That we are, for instance, bipedal, color vision equipped, big-brained, sentient mammals implies no particular trajectory for human institutions other than for what falls within the range of physical, cognitive, and epistemic possibility for this species of animal. That we cannot see out the backs of our heads no doubt affects our experience of our somatic and existential conditions, that we are sentient creatures able to experience not only physical but psychological pain certainly contributes substantially to the ways in which our points of view identify us as specific loci of experience. Specific capacities and limitations are not, however, determinations—while species membership delimits the possible, it does not define, for example, the "normal" or "natural" in any other terms but what can be. Nothing necessarily follows for human institutions like government, marriage, or family, however otherwise chauvinistic, sexist, racist, or heterosexist they may be. While human-centeredness is a defining characteristic of human consciousness, the ways in which we realize it is not.

#### Attempts to escape humanist egoism dissolve into nihilistic disdain and fail in political translation

Lee ‘9 Wendy Lee, professor of philosophy at Bloomsburg, “Restoring Human-Centeredness to Environmental Conscience: The Ecocentrist’s Dilemma, the Role of Heterosexualized Anthropomorphizing, and the Significance of Language to Ecological Feminism,” Ethics and the Environment, vol. 14 no. 1, muse

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#### Subjectivity is inescapable—attempts to ‘become one with things’ repeat Cartesian dualisms while occluding the development of a political vision

Lee ‘9 Wendy Lee, professor of philosophy at Bloomsburg, “Restoring Human-Centeredness to Environmental Conscience: The Ecocentrist’s Dilemma, the Role of Heterosexualized Anthropomorphizing, and the Significance of Language to Ecological Feminism,” Ethics and the Environment, vol. 14 no. 1, muse

Bender undertakes this task in the course of promoting his specific version of ecocentrism that he calls "nondualism" but it is telling that, instead of offering an argument that provides grounds for rejecting the "dualism" of experiencing subject and experienced object, he resorts to an experience of "nonduality": I start out…in ordinary, dualistic, waking consciousness, feeling myself a subject amidst myriad objects around me, each experienced as other. I discover I do not exist independently, but am like a node in a web, through which diverse kinds of energy flow. For example, I [End Page 35] take in the Sun's warmth, the in-breath, food, water, human speech, and so on. Meanwhile, I expel many kinds of energy. Like the out-breath, speech, bodily movements, and excreta. The energy I take in and expel circulates everywhere on Earth, passing through others as through myself. Thus I discover my connectedness to all other beings, such that I, like they, am but one manifestation of this energy flow, of planet Earth…. Nonduality emerges as I realize further that natural phenomena are Earth transiently manifest, empty of substantive selfhood (objectivity), since everything is dependently co-originated. Thus, though I am precisely emptiness of substantive or independent selfhood; even so, as one particular manifold of relations, I am unique. (2003, 435) The difficulties here are three-fold: First, this isn't an argument, but rather an experiential narrative, hence it would be folly to think it could establish anything other than that someone can have such an experience. But since such could be motivated by, say, exhaustion, illness, or the use of narcotics, it hardly establishes any metaphysical claim about the nature of identity or being—much less about any capacity to dissociate oneself from "substantive selfhood." Second, however much he may feel himself to be "empty of substantive selfhood" Bender's use of "I' suggests that he confuses the capacity to conceive with the capacity to actually be so emptied. It's one thing to conceive of myself as connected to all other beings—indeed I do so conceive myself, I know this in the abstract to be true and I know of no evidence that contradicts it. It is, however, quite another thing to experience myself as emptied of selfhood. Moreover, it is simply false that what I can conceive, imagine, think, or even describe is necessarily something I can experience per se. Third, although Bender's appeals to intuition, mystical insight, Spinoza's notion of particulars as manifestations of nature (2003, 434–5), or Buddhist inspired meditation (2003, 436–7) might be compelling for someone already convinced that so-called nondualist identification with nonhuman nature is possible, these hardly suffice as an argument convincing to the skeptic who may not share the necessary presuppositions or traditions. Here too, then, Bender's account is unconvincing—the ethical norm he derives from it (among others), "Form one body with all beings!" is likely to be mystifying to anyone unconvinced we can make this leap of faith from centeredness to "one body" or (as the moral dictum requires) from the "I" of subject-object dualism to the disavowal of my body. [End Page 36] Moreover, if I am right that there are good reasons to take the specifically embodied configuration of capacities and limitations that describe human being seriously, no such dissociation from "I" is possible—in fact, it intimates precisely the dualism Bender rejects. However deep my feelings (spiritual sensibilities, affectionate sentiments, desires to connect) go with respect to my appreciation of natural objects and phenomena, I nonetheless remain at the center of my embodied consciousness—and cannot be/do otherwise. Hence, one more version of the ecocentrist's dilemma: the dissociation of self demanded by the moral maxim "form one body with all things" assumes that I can dissociate my consciousness from my body—what else to call this but dualism? The notion that I could dissociate myself without dissociating myself from my situated body to be "one with all things" is comprehensible only if I am not (at least essentially) my body, but rather a consciousness that, even if not fully independent, is capable of not merely conceiving but experiencing "my" body as something other than bound by my own skin, that is, as not my body. Hence I must be dual—a "mind" that, in virtue of its capacity to empty itself of its "substantive selfhood," is merely in a dissociable body. No doubt, Bender would find this objection to his view onerous. However, when he advises us to try to expand our selves through, for example, meditation or to encompass an ever-wider set of relations with and to human and nonhuman others (2003, 423–4), it is hard to see how his view does not fit the dualist shoe. He writes that "[s]uch a practice, over time, should transform your sense of who you are as you discover you are not the separate skin-encapsulated individual you once thought you were, but that you belong to all other living beings, and that other beings are not really other, and that you yourself are not really the center of concern." (2003, 424, my emphasis) Again, Bender confuses what I can conceive with what I can experience—I can conceive myself as "not the center of concern," but not an iota of this moral recognition either requires or makes possible an experience of myself as anything other than "skin encapsulated." Bender hasn't, moreover, the luxury of trading in his metaphysical commitments for the option that he's speaking "merely" phenomenologically or metaphorically. For neither the environmental pragmatist, who would likely deny the need to undertake such a practice in order to have a stake in the future of human [End Page 37] consciousness, nor those who engage in such practices without a smidgeon of the environmental activism Bender hopes will follow, are likely to be moved by anything but an argument for nondualism—and this Bender does not provide.

## 2NC

### Zizek

#### Corporatization and environmental degradation are fundamentally issues of production. Their analysis of public discourse over coal mining omits the socio-historical processes which make resource degradation necessary—namely, the division of labor which centralizes wealth and productive power in the hands of the few.

Magdoff ’12 Fred Magdoff, Professor emeritus of plant and soil science at the Unviersity of Vermont, “Harmony and Ecological Civilization,” Monthly Review, June 2012, Vol. 64, Issue 2, p. 1-9

Nevertheless, for many the role that capitalism plays in ecological destruction is invisible. Thus the ecological and social antagonisms and contradictions of capitalism are frequently misdiagnosed. Some observers suggest that many of these problems are caused by the rise of industrial society. Here, so the thinking goes, any society based on or using industrial production will necessarily have the same resource and environmental problems. Others blame the thoughtless exploitation of natural resources and the great damage done to the environment on the existence of too many people. The large population, exceeding the carrying capacity of the planet, they maintain, is the culprit and the solution is therefore to reduce the population of the earth as quickly as possible. (Not easy to do of course by humane means.) Some ahistorical commentators say the problem is endemic to humans because we are inherently greedy and acquisitive. With a few important exceptions, non-Marxist discussions of the problems neglect to even look at the characteristics and workings of capitalism, let alone examine them at any depth. They are so embedded in the system, that they assume that capitalism, which many mislabel “the market economy,” will go on and on forever—even, it is illogically assumed, if we destroy the earth itself as a place of human habitation—while any other type of economic system is absolutely inconceivable. Economic, societal, and historical contexts are completely ignored. Rational and useful alternative solutions to any problem depend upon a realistic analysis and diagnosis as to what is causing it to occur. When such analysis is lacking substance the proposed “solutions” will most likely be useless. For example, there are people fixated on nonrenewable resource depletion that is caused, in their opinion, by “overpopulation.” Thus, they propose, as the one and only “solution,” a rapid “degrowth” of the world’s population. Programs that provide contraceptives to women in poor countries are therefore offered as an important tool to solving the global ecological problem. However, those concerned with there being too many people generally do not discuss the economic system that is so destructive to the environment and people or the critical moral and practical issue of the vast inequalities created by capitalism. Even the way that capitalism itself requires population growth as part of its overall expansion is ignored. Thus, a critical aspect almost always missing from discussions by those concerned with population as it affects resource use and pollution is that the overwhelming majority of the earth’s environmental problems are caused by the wealthy and their lifestyles—and by a system of capital accumulation that predominantly serves their interests. The World Bank staff estimates that the wealthiest 10 percent of humanity are responsible for approximately 60 percent of all resource use and therefore 60 percent of the pollution (most probably an underestimate). Commentators fixated on nonrenewable resources and pollution as the overriding issues cannot see that one of their main “solutions”—promoting birth control in poor countries—gets nowhere near to even beginning to address the real problem. It should go without saying that poor people should have access to medical services, including those involving family planning. This should be considered a basic human right. The rights of women in this respect are one of the key indicators of democratic and human development. But how can people fixated on the mere population numbers ignore the fact that it is the world’s affluent classes that account for the great bulk of those problems—whether one is looking at resource use, consumption, waste, or environmental pollution—that are considered so important to the survival of society and even humanity? In addition to the vast quantity of resources used and pollution caused by wealthy individuals, governments are also responsible. The U.S. military is one of the world’s prime users of resources—from oil to copper, zinc, tin, and rare earths. The military is also is the single largest consumer of energy in the United States.5 While capitalism creates many of the features and relationships discussed above, we must keep in mind that long before capitalism existed there were negative societal aspects such as warfare, exploitation of people and resources, and ecological damage. However, capitalism solidifies and makes these problems systemic while at the same time creating other negative aspects.

#### Their perspectivism represents the peak of the liberal-capitalist consensus—everyone’s opinion is valid, we are tolerant of all ontologies—meanwhile, capital carries on as the left discards any intellectual weapon to fight it

Holmstrom ’97 Nancy Holmstrom, “Renewing Historical Materialism,” Against the Current 68, May-June 1997, http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/2198

While the defeat of Stalinism might seem to make disagreements on the left about the meaning of Marxism less urgent, today the worldwide triumph of capitalism means not only social and economic barbarism, but worldwide ecological disaster. The struggle against capitalism will continue as long as capitalism does, and sharpened ideological weapons are more essential than ever. Yet it is a striking paradox, as Wood reiterates throughout, that just when capitalism is achieving worldwide domination, theoretical tendencies abound on the left that render this fact unimportant, incomprehensible or even invisible. Post-modernist hostility to any notion of system, structure, and "grand narratives" make it impossible to comprehend capitalism as a system with specific laws or to comprehend its totalizing character; the emphasis on fragmentation, heterogeneity, and particularity make only the most local resistances possible. Clearly, something must be wrong with theoretical tendencies that would so disarm us. And Wood proceeds to show us just what is wrong. Though rich in historical and sociological scholarship, ranging from ancient Greece to feudalism to the present, from Max Weber to Louis Althusser to Post-modernists, this is not primarily an academic work. Like all her work, especially The Retreat from Class, it is a political book whose theoretical explorations aim to provide weapons for ideological struggle against capitalism. Her style is polemical at times, and those who don't love the book will probably hate it. The book is divided into two parts; Part I is entitled "Historical Materialism and the Specificity of Capitalsm," Part II "Democracy Against Capitalism." While readers of Against the Current would probably find Part II most relevant, the crucial point that ties the two together is the absolute centrality of productive relations, i.e. of class, for understanding Marxist theory and guiding its politics. The kernel of historical materialism, in Wood's view, is the idea that each mode of production has specific relations of production, which give the system its specific logic. The relations of production definitive of capitalism are such that for the first time in history, a ruling class can rule without monopolizing political power. Hence democracy, of a socially weak form, is characteristic of capitalism.

#### Discursive framing is backwards—ideology and consumption patterns are determined by material inequalities. Discourse theory cedes politics by reducing radical action to ‘transgressive’ speech acts like the 1AC

Tumino ‘8 Stephen Tumino, professor of English at the University of Pittsburgh, "Materiality in Contemporary Cultural Theory," The Red Critique, Fall/Winter 2008, accessed 1/21/10 http://www.redcritique.org/FallWinter2008/materialityincontemporaryculturaltheory.htm

One of the mainstays of contemporary cultural theory is the argument that the social is primarily shaped by culture. Culture, that is, not as a collection of artifacts or an archive of progress, but, rather, following the writings of Antonio Gramsci, as "an arena of consent and resistance" (Stuart Hall, "Deconstructing" 239) over the shape of the social. Contemporary cultural theory has extended the understanding of culture beyond universalist, and, therefore, supposedly elitist assumptions and normative hegemonic conclusions about culture and instead focused on culture as "the articulation and activation of meaning" (Storey xiii) on the grounds that it is primarily discourse that possesses "the power and the authority to define social reality" (xii). The meaning(s) in a culture that secure and contest the dominant social arrangements are thought to lie in what Michel de Certeau calls "secondary production" (xiii), the sphere of consumption, rather than the economic sphere of production. In these terms, it is the "consumer who in effect 'produces in use'" (xiii) the meaning(s) of the culture that determines social reality. So much has such a focus on the daily practices of consumption and identification been "central to the project of cultural studies" (xi) that some have simply argued that "cultural studies could be described ... perhaps more accurately as ideological studies" (James Carey qtd. in Storey xii). The focus in cultural theory on the constitutive power of discourse to define social reality has shifted the attention of cultural studies from the wider social relations of production which shape ideology and consumption and in fact determine the social real, toward a market theory of culture which valorizes the excessive "uses" and "resignifications" of cultural commodities and in doing so transforms the subject of labor into the subject of consumption who, far from intervening into global capital, supports it through "resistant" desires and "rebellious" acts of consumption. Cultural theory, in other words, rests on the assumption that consumption determines production rather than the other way around. People's "lifestyles" (which is another way of referring to the commodities they consume and how they consume them) are thus assumed to be more significant, in these terms, than the labor relations they must enter into as a necessary precondition of consumption. Such an assumption concludes that the markers and beliefs that position individuals in culture as men and women, black, latino, gay,… are more important than the fact that they are wage workers that must first sell themselves daily to capital before they can acquire the cultural markers of identity. Such an understanding of the priority of the economic is seen on the cultural left as "left conservatism" (Butler, Bové, et. al.) because it forecloses on differences. But as Teresa Ebert has explained, "differences in class societies are always exploitative" (169) because they serve to divide and segment the working class and foster competition between the workers. At the core of the labor theory of culture is the explanation of how culturalism itself has an economic basis in the division of labor – and more specifically, in the crisis of overproduction that is endemic to capitalism since the 1970s—and reflects the interests of those who having had their material needs already met from the labor of the other can afford to focus on their desires in the market.

#### The aff’s pretensions to ‘resistant consumption’ are bourgeois lies

Tumino ‘8 Stephen Tumino, professor of English at the University of Pittsburgh, "Materiality in Contemporary Cultural Theory," The Red Critique, Fall/Winter 2008, accessed 8/25/2012 http://www.redcritique.org/FallWinter2008/materialityincontemporaryculturaltheory.htm

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#### The perm’s avoidance of our position justifies greeting fascism with friendly nudges and generosity

Dean ‘5 Jodi Dean, Department of Political Science Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “A politics of avoidance: the limits of weak ontology,” The Hedgehog Review, published by the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer 2005, <http://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i_cite/2005/05/butler_and_weak.html>

The first generation of the Frankfurt School developed critical theory in an effort to confront and explain fascism. For them, immanent critique was crucial to this project as it enabled them to work from within what was given to grasp what came to be. At its best, immanent critique was a practice of finding lost futures in enlightenment, loss possibilities for meaning and, perhaps, a freer, even reconciled, relation to the world. White’s weak ontology turns immanent critique into immanent affirmation as it finds in critical approaches to the present sources that affirm it. The ambiguity that haunts his account of weak ontology contrasts mightily with the political and ethical positions that gave the Frankfurt theorists their ethical bearings. Could we, should we, imagine a political theory that confronted fascism with nudges, suggestions, and generosity rather than with complete rejection and opposition? Unknowingness conditions our politics as well as our ethics. Rather than an ontological condition somehow compelling us to embrace the contestability and uncertainty of convictions (as if any ethical or political position could follow directly from such an account) or an ethical acknowledgement that renders what is unknown to me the same as what is unknown to the other, in politics unknowingness involves responsibility for that which one cannot but do, for the exclusions and expulsions necessarily implicated in the exercise of power. Yes, one should be willing and able to give an account of these decisions, just as one should be willing and able to condemn and oppose what should be condemned and opposed. Such will, such ability, is crucial if we are to oppose the market and religious fundamentalism threatening the world today.

#### Feminist approaches to labor only contest the inequalities of wage relations without theorizing their fundamental cause. This makes both sexual and class inequality inevitable—only universal resistance to capital creates space for total emancipation.

Cotter ‘1 Jennifer Cotter, Assistant Professor of English at William Jewell College, “Eclipsing Exploitation: Transnational Feminism, Sex Work, and the State,” Red Critique, Spring 2001, http://redcritique.org/spring2001/eclipsingexploitation.htm

This "transnationalism," therefore, is itself a form of crisis management for capitalism that does not go beyond the localism that it claims to contest. Nowhere is this more clear than in transnational feminism's re-theorization and normalization of the concept of class. Under the banner of "transnationalism" the dominant feminism now claims to "return" to issues of class, labor, and "economic production" in the theorization of the material conditions of women's lives, after decades of denying their relationship. For instance, like many feminists, Angela McRobbie wants to distance herself from the failures of post-modern feminism by showing that its culturalist focus on "desire" and "pleasure" in consumption and its subsequent inattention to "the highly exploitative conditions under which [consumer] goods . . . have been produced," have engendered a mode of feminism that has "resulted in the [economic] bottom end . . . of the social hierarchy being dropped from the political and intellectual agenda" (32-33; emphasis added). As a consequence she argues that feminism, if it is to be effective toward social change, must not abandon "class as a primary concept for understanding social structure" (38). Likewise, in their articulation of "transnational feminist cultural studies" Kaplan and Grewal argue for the necessity of "such terms as division of labor, class, capital, commodification, and production" in feminism if it is going to address the material conditions of all women's lives, not just some ("Beyond" 351). However, in transnational feminism and cultural feminist theory generally, "class" is theorized not as the place of the subject in the social relations of production but as his/her location in the social relations of reproduction, exchange, and consumption, or what McRobbie calls the "social relations of shopping." While transnational feminists are now rushing to address "class," the theory of class that they propose is one that displaces economic contradictions in the social relations of production, with moral and ethical contradictions in the "workplace." For McRobbie "class" and "production" are understood in occupationalist terms—in terms of the type of work performed and the social status it has in the workplace—not in terms of one's relationship to the means of production. In her analysis of women in the fashion industry, for instance, she argues that what is necessary in order to change their exploitative conditions of "production" is a "(New) Labor policy" that "think[s] across the currently unbridgeable gap" between various sectors of the international fashion industry by emphasizing collaboration and ethical understanding between designers and pieceworkers and public pressure from fashion magazines, celebrities, and other consumers to move women into "better paid and more highly skilled work" (42). In short, transforming "production relations," according to McRobbie, means embracing solutions that propose to change the position of women within the existing division of labor from one sector to another, or changing the way in which particular sectors are ethically valued by others. In actuality, what she and other feminist theorists today are calling the sphere of "production" is in fact the sphere of the circulation of labor-power as a commodity. That is, they focus on changing the terms under which labor-power is circulated as a commodity: the terms within which it is bought and sold. What is excluded by the theorization of "class" and "production" as modes of "circulation" is the possibility and necessity of transforming the relations under which labor-power is produced as a commodity: the conditions of exploitation that enable it to be bought and sold in the first place. The position of labor-power as a commodity is taken for granted as "given" in transnational feminist discourse and, as a consequence, "class" is normalized. This leads to practices that restrict feminism to cooperation with the existing social relations of production without transforming them.

#### Nomadic politics in opposition to the state turn lines of flight into lines of death

Bülent Diken, lecturer in Sociology at Lancaster University, and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, Ph.D. student at the University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Sciences, September 2001, online: http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/Diken-Laustsen-Enjoy-Your-Fight.pdf

Interestingly, whereas the movie clearly makes a self-reflexive mockery of Project Mayhem in the context of the first danger (macrofascism), the aspects of Fight Club that do not resonate in Project Mayhem (that is, its microfascist aspects) escape its ironic perspective. It seems as if the movie assumes that power predominantly pertains to molar lines. But lines of flight are not exempted from power relations, and there is a microfascism in Fight Club that cannot be confined to Project Mayhem. It is in this context remarkable that Fight Club operates as a deterritorialized line of flight, as a war machine that is violently opposed to the state; its members are not merely the Oedipalized paranoiacs of the capitalist state order. Its micro-fascism can be understood best as a transgressive delirium. “What makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement”, a proliferation of molecular interactions, “skipping from point to point, before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 214-5). If Project Mayhem is the ridiculous Nazi-type organization with unreflexive skinheads who just repeat Tyler’s orders, Fight Club is the molecular face of fascism. The third danger: a line of flight can lose its creative potentials and become a line of death. This is precisely what happens in Fight Club: “the line of flight crossing the wall, getting out of the black holes, but instead of connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence, turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion for abolition” (1987: 229). In fact, fascism is the result of an intense line of flight that becomes a line of death, wanting self-destruction and “death through the death of others” (Ibid. 230). A line of flight that desires its own repression. The point at which escape becomes a line of death is the point at which war (destruction) becomes the main object of the war machine rather than its supplement. Fight Club, transforming into Project Mayhem, becomes an instrument of pure destruction and violence, of complete destratification, a war machine that has war as its object. In other words, the regression to the undifferentiated or complete disorganization is as dangereous as transcendence and organization. Tyler, the alluring and charismatic, the free-wheeling pervert of Fight Club, is as dangerous as society. If there are two dangers, the strata and complete destratification, suicide, Fight Club fights only the first. Therefore a relevant question, never asked by microfascists, is whether it is not “necessary to retain a minimum of strata, a minimum of forms and functions, a minimal subject from which to extract materials, affects, and assemblages” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 270). The test of desire is not denouncing false desires but distinguishing between that which pertains to the strata, complete destratification, and that which pertains to line of flight, a test, which Fight Club does not pass (Ibid. 165). Let’s qualify this point by investigating the way the logic of the cut works in the film.

#### Local changes only shift oppression onto less privileged groups and obscure global social relations of production

Katz 2k Adam Katz, English Instructor at Onodaga Community College. 2000. Postmodernism and the Politics of “Culture.” Pg. 146-147.

Habermas’s understanding of undistorted communication is situated within the same problematic as the postmodernism of Lyotard in a much more fundamental sense than would be indicated by the apparent opposi­tion between them. Both locate emancipatory knowledges and politics in the liberation of language from technocratic imperatives. And the political consequences are the same as well. In both cases, local transformations (the deconstruction and reconstruction of distorted modes of communica­tion) that create more democratic or rational sites of intersubjectivity are all that is seen as possible, “with the goal,” as Brantlinger says, “of at least local emancipations from the structure of economic, political and cultural domination” (1990, 191—192, emphasis added). The addition of “at least” to the kinds of changes sought suggests a broader, potentially global role for critique, such as showing “how lines of force in society can be transformed into authentic modes of participatory decision making” (19711. However, the transition from one mode of transformation to an­other—what should be the fundamental task of cultural studies—is left unconceptualized and is implicitly understood as a kind of additive or cu­mulative spread of local democratic sites until society as a whole is trans­formed. What this overlooks, of course, is the way in which, as long as global economic and political structures remain unchanged and unchal­lenged, local emancipations can only be redistributions—redistributions that actually support existing social relations by merely shifting the greater burdens onto others who are less capable of achieving their own local emancipation. This implicit alliance between the defenders of modernity and their postmodern critics (at least on the fundamental ques­tion) also suggests that we need to look for the roots and consequences of this alliance in the contradictions of the formation of the cultural studies public intellectual.

## 1NR

Jack read more cards written by Casey Harrigan than Jim Schultz would’ve liked

# R8 vs GMU MW

## 1NC

### T-Financial Incentives

#### Incentives must be tied to production

Rosner & Goldberg 11 (Robert, William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor, Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics, and Physics, and the College at the U of Chicago, and Stephen, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, The Harris School of Public Policy Studies, "Small Modular Reactors - Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S.," November 2011, [https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf], jam)

Capital Cost Incentive: A capital cost incentive would reduce the effective overnight capital cost through either direct government cost sharing or through an investment tax credit. 41 There are policy precedents for both. DOE provides direct cost sharing for demonstration projects involving FOAK coal generation technology under the Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI). Congress provided a capital cost incentive for renewable energy projects in the form of an Investment Tax Credit (ITC), which currently can be converted to an upfront cash grant. 42 Capital cost incentives help “buy down” the initial capital cost of SMR deployments, thus reducing the capital recovery requirements that would otherwise be reflected in the LCOE. A direct buy-down of the capital cost protects project sponsors against construction risk for SMRs by shifting a portion of that risk to the government. It also shifts performance risk from the project sponsor to the federal government, i.e., the federal government pays the capital cost incentive regardless of whether the project performs as planned or not. In the case of SMRs, shifting a portion of performance risk from the SMR community to the government also may adversely impact the risk-reward structure guiding the learning process. For example, a capital cost incentive for SMRs would be fixed, regardless of whether the investment achieved the estimated learning performance. Consequently, capital cost incentives were not incorporated into the business case analysis for SMRs. x Production Cost Incentive: A production cost incentive is a performance-based incentive. With a production cost incentive, the government incentive would be triggered only when the project successfully operates. The project sponsors would assume full responsibility for the upfront capital cost and would assume the full risk for project construction. The production cost incentive would establish a target price, a so-called “market-based benchmark.” Any savings in energy generation costs over the target price would accrue to the generator. Thus, a production cost incentive would provide a strong motivation for cost control and learning improvements, since any gains greater than target levels would enhance project net cash flow. Initial SMR deployments, without the benefits of learning, will have significantly higher costs than fully commercialized SMR plants and thus would benefit from production cost incentives. Because any production cost differential would decline rapidly due to the combined effect of module manufacturing rates and learning experience, the financial incentive could be set at a declining rate, and the level would be determined on a plant-by-plant basis, based on the achievement of cost reduction targets. 43 The key design parameters for the incentive include the following: 1. The magnitude of the deployment incentive should decline with the number of SMR modules and should phase out after the fleet of LEAD and FOAK plants has been deployed. 2. The incentive should be market-based rather than cost-based; the incentive should take into account not only the cost of SMRs but also the cost of competing technologies and be set accordingly. 3. The deployment incentive could take several forms, including a direct payment to offset a portion of production costs or a production tax credit.

#### Nuclear power is electricity generation

Gürcan Gülersoy 2012 Preventing future nuclear energy center disasters through the examination of the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi <http://www.rcimun.org/EC1.pdf> Cited by Nuclear Energy Topic Committee Report 5-31-12

Nuclear power: Nuclear power is the use of sustained nuclear fission to generate heat and electricity. Nuclear power provides about 6% of the world's energy and 14% of the world's electricity. [3]

#### The aff’s manufacturing, not production

ICTSD ’11 Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy, “Fostering Low Carbon Growth: The Case for a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement,” International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, November 2011, http://ictsd.org/downloads/2012/05/fostering-low-carbon-growth-the-case-for-a-sustainable-energy-trade-agreement1.pdf

In assessing the implications of policies and incentives for sustainable energy, it is useful to distinguish between incentives provided for sustainable power generation versus incentives provided for equipment manufacture. While nearly every country in the world – depending to a large extent on geographical factors and resource endowment – would benefit from the deployment of sustainable energy, perhaps the same urgency or priority does not hold true for the deployment of manufacturing activity in sustainable energy equipment. Certain countries may be more suited to manufacturing sustainable energy equipment or parts for various reasons, including skills, low labour costs, or infrastructure. Yet most countries desire to attract manufacturing activity, in addition to sustainable power generation. This is due to obvious benefits related to employ- ment generation, economic activity, technology flow and diffusion, along with the need to simply try and establish early leadership in an area that many believe will witness rapid growth in the coming years.

#### Voting issue

#### Ground division—steals neg ground like the mandates CP and spikes fossil fuels tradeoff links because there’s no guarantee of production

#### Limits and precision—makes basically any policy change topical—distinguishing is key to education

EIA ’92 Office of Energy Markets and End Use, Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy, “Federal Energy Subsidies: Direct and Indirect Interventions in Energy Markets,” 1992, ftp://tonto.eia.doe.gov/service/emeu9202.pdf

In some sense, most Federal policies have the potential to affect energy markets. Policies supporting economic stability or economic growth have energy market consequences; so also do Government policies supporting highway development or affordable housing. The interaction between any of these policies and energy market outcomes may be worthy of study. However, energy impacts of such policies would be incidental to their primary purpose and are not examined here. Instead, this report focuses on Government actions whose prima facie purpose is to affect energy market outcomes, whether through financial incentives, regulation, public enterprise, or research and development.

#### Effects T—indirectly leads to production—magnifies unpredictability and diverts topic education

#### Prefer competing interps—most objective

### Foucault K

#### Their environmental expertism is a tool of social normalization to crystallize identity within power formations

Timothy W. Luke, Professor of Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,1999, Discourses of the Environment, p. 149-151

Foucault is correct about the modern state. It is not ‘an entity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence’, because it has indeed evolved ‘as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integ­rated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns’ (Foucault 1982: 214—15). Producing discourses of ecological living, articulating designs of sustainable development, and pro­pagating definitions of environmental literacy for contemporary individuals simply adds new twists to the ‘very specific patterns’ by which the state formation constitutes ‘a modern matrix of individualisation’ (ibid. 215). The regime of bio-power, in turn, operates through ethical systems of identity as much as it does in the policy machinations of governmental bureaus within any discretely bordered territory. Ecology merely echoes the effects from ‘one of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century’: namely, ‘the emergence of “population” as an economic and political problem’ (Foucault 1976: 25).Once demography emerges as a science of statist administration, its statistical attitudes can diffuse into the numerical surveillance of nature, or Earth and its non-human inhabitants, as well as the study of culture, or society and its human members.4 Government and now, most importantly, statist ecology preoccupy themselves with ‘the conduct of conduct’. Previously, the ethical concerns of family, community and nation guided how conduct was to be conducted; but at this juncture, environment emerges as a ground for normalizing individual behaviour. Environments are spaces under police supervision, expert management or technocratic control; hence, by taking environmentalistic agendas into the heart of state policy, one finds the ultimate meaning of the police state fulfilled. If the police, as they bind and observe space, are em­powered to watch over religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, town buildings, public safety, liberal arts, trade, factories, labour supplies and the poor, then why not add ecology — or the inter­actions of organisms and their surroundings to the police zones of the state? Here, the conduct of any person’s environmental con­duct becomes the initial limit on others’ ecological enjoyments; so too does the conduct of the social body’s conduct require that the state always be an effective ‘environmental protection agency’. The ecological domain is the ultimate domain of being, with the most critical forms of life that states must now produce, protect and police in eliciting bio-power: it is the centre of their enviro­discipline, eco-knowledge, geo-power (Luke 1994a, 1994b). Mobilizing biological power, then, accelerated after the 1970s, along with global fast capitalism. Ecology became that formalized disciplinary mode of paying systematic ‘attention to the processes of life.. . to invest life through and through’ (Foucault 1976: 139), in order to transform all living things into biological popu­lations, so to develop transnational commerce. The tremendous explosion of material prosperity on a global scale after 1973 would not have been possible without ecology to guide ‘the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjust­ment of the phenomena of population to economic processes’ (ibid. 141). An anatomo-politics of all plants and animals emerges out of ecology, through which environmentalizing resource managerial­ists acquire ‘the methods of power capable of optimising forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern’ (ibid.). To move another step beyond Foucault’s vision of human bio­power, adjustment of the accumulation of environmentalized plants and animals to that of capital is necessary to check unsustainable growth. Yet, in becoming an essential sub-assembly for trans­national economic development, ecological techniques of power rationalize conjoining ‘the growth of human groups to the expan­sion of productive forces and the differential allocation of profit’, inasmuch as population ecology, environmental science and range management are now, in part, ‘the exercise of bio-power in its many forms and modes of application’ (ibid.). Indeed, a postmodern con­dition is perhaps reached when the life of all species is now wagered in all of humanity’s economic and political strategies. Ecology emerges out of bio-history, circulating within ‘the space for move­ment thus conquered, and broadening and organising that space, methods of power and knowledge’ needed for enviro-disciplinary interventions as the state ‘assumed responsibility for the life pro­cesses and undertook to control and modify them’ (ibid. 101). This chapter has explored only one path through the order of things embedded in contemporary mainstream environmentalism. Ultimately, it suggests that we cannot adequately understand governmentality in present-day regimes, like the United States of America, without seeing how many of its tactics, calculi or institu­tions assume ‘environmentalized’ modes of operation as part and parcel of ordinary practices of governance. Strategic Environmental Initiatives are now standard operating procedures. To preserve the political economy of high-technology production, many offices of the American state must function as ‘environmental protection agencies’, inasmuch as they continue to fuse a politics of national security with an economics of continual growth, to sustain exist­ing industrial ecologies of mass consumption with the wise use of nature through private property rights. Conservationist ethics, resource managerialism and green rhetorics, then, congeal as an unusually cohesive power/knowledge formation, whose actions are an integral element of this order’s regime of normalization.

#### Particularly true in a securitizing concept—the aff freezes national identity to justify imperialism

Jutta Weldes, et al., lecturer in international relations at University of Bristol, Mark Laffey, independent scholar, Hugh, Gusterson, professor of anthropology at MIT, Raymond Duvall, professor of political science at University of Minnesota, George Marcus, professor of anthropology at Rice, Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger, 1999, pg. 9-11

The structure of knowledge in security studies stereotypically takes the form of positing the existence of certain entities—often but not always states—within an environment in which they experience threat(s). The nature of those entities is assumed to be both given and fixed, at least for all practical purposes, and security is thus understood to mean securing these fixed entities against objective and external threats. These foundational assumptions naturalize those actors and their insecurities, while rendering contingent and problematic their actions and strategies for coping with the insecuri­ties. Actors and their insecurities are naturalized in the sense that they are treated as facts that, because they are given by the nature of the interstate system, can be taken for granted. Taken as natural facts, states and other organized actors become the foundational objects the taken-for-granted existence of which serves to ground Se­curity studies. Threats to these foundational objects are taken to be relatively self-evident, or at least discernible by the acute states-person or analyst, and, at the limit, are understood to issue from the ubiquitous “security dilemma” (Herz, 1951 )—the inevitable, perpet­ual, and inherently unstable competition for power and security— that states and other actors face in an anarchic international system. Security studies, then, treats insecurities as unavoidable facts while problematizing, and consequently focusing its attention on, the ac­quisition of security for pregiven entities—usually the state. Invoking security in this conventional sense thus invokes the discourse of or­ganized political actors, particularly the state. If conventional analyses in security studies begin with a set of pre­given entities and asks “how can they be secured?” the papers in this volume flip this strategy on its head. We take discourses of insecu­rity, or what David Campbell (1992) has called “representations of danger,” as our objects of analysis and examine how they work. Analysis begins with a set of discourses and asks “what do they do?” Because we seek to challenge conventional understandings of actors and their security problematics, the focus of all of the analyses pre­sented in this volume is always and expressly on insecurity and its cultural production. In one way or another, each of these studies takes as its object of analysis the organized political actors and their insecurities taken for granted by security studies and calls them into question. In doing so, they seek to denaturalize the state, other com­munities, and their insecurities, in particular by demonstrating how both insecurities and actors such as states and communities are cul­turally produced. Most important, the chapters that follow attempt to show how the cultural production of insecurities implicates and is implicated in the cultural production of the identities of actors. The basic substantive assumption unifying the analyses presented in this volume is thus that insecurities, rather than being natural facts, are social and cultural productions. One way to get at the con­structed nature of insecurities is to examine the fundamental ways in which insecurities and the objects that suffer from insecurity are mu­tually constituted; that is, in contrast to the received view, which treats the objects of insecurity and insecurities themselves as pre­given or natural, and as ontologically separate things, we treat them as mutually constituted cultural and social constructions: insecurity is itself the product of processes of identity construction in which the self and the other, or multiple others, are constituted.’3 Although not all of the following analyses use the same language or concepts, they can all be seen as resting on the assumption that identity and insecurity are produced in a mutually constitute process.

#### This logic culminates in extinction

Michael Dillon, Professor of Politics at the University of Lancaster, 2004, Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics, p. 41

Power is commonly associated with regimes of government and governance that regularly claim universal, metaphysical status for the rights and com­petences that comprise them; regimes whose very raison d’etre, in the form of state sovereignty and raison d’etat, for example, seek to limit and confine if not altogether rid us of politics. Sovereign power, a form of rule gone global, has also come to develop and deploy modes of destruction whose dissemination and use it finds increasingly impossible to control because these have become integral to its propagation and survival; modes of de­struction that put in question the very issue of planetary survival for the human as well as many other species. Despite the fashion of speaking about the demise of sovereignty, political thought and practice have to still strug­gle with terrains of power throughout which the legitimating narratives, iconography and capabilities of sovereign power remain amongst the most persistent, and powerful and threatening globally. As it has come to domi­nate our understanding of rule, so sovereign power has come to limit our imagination in relation to the possibility and to the promise of politics.

#### Text: vote negative to reject securitization

#### This critical moment creates epistemic openness to effectively analyze aff’s knowledge production

Julia H. Chryssostalis, lecturer at the Westminster school of law, “The Critical Instance ‘After’ The Critique of the Subject,” Law and Critique 16, 2005, pg. 16-21

So far, we have looked at some of the ways in which the question of the question is being re-situated in a philosophical terrain that has been radically \_re-marked’ by the critical discourses associated with the deconstruction of subjectivity in French contemporary thought. However, the critical instance involves not only questioning but also judgment as one of its basic tropes. How? To begin with, judgment is found intimately implicated in the semantic economy of the critical: critique, criticism, criterion, critic; they all derive from krisis, the Greek word for judgment; yet, in addition, and more importantly, the very operation of the critical instance seems dominated by judgmental figures, grammars and logics.78 After all, is not the figure of the Tribunal of Reason at the centre of Kant’s critical project?79 And is not the role of critique therein precisely \_that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known [connaıˆtre], what must be done, and what may be hoped’?80 Moreover, from the Enlightenment onwards, is not the critical practised \_in the search for formal structures with universal value’81 that would firmly ground our knowledge, action, and aspirations, and provide the criteria for the evaluation of all claims to authority?82 And does not the critical instance, in this respect, necessarily turn around a \_quaestio juris, the juridical question, [which asks] with what right one possesses this concept and uses it’?83 Finally, does not the critical moment itself – whether found operating in terms of fault-finding (epi-krisis),84 of drawing distinctions (dia-krisis),85 or of drawing comparisons (syn-krisis) – seem always to rely on the basic \_logic’ of judgement: namely, the operation through which the particular is subsumed (and thus also thought and known) under the rule of an already constituted category?86 What is interesting to note about these judgemental grammars and logics organising the operation of the critical instance,87 is that the subjective forms they deploy involve two well-known \_types’ of the figure of the judge. On the one hand, there is the \_judge’ as a sovereign figure whose capacity to pass judgements on our received wisdom, draw distinctions in the field of our knowledge, and set the limits of what can be known, means the capacity to invest the world with a meaning drawn from a more profound knowledge. On the other hand, there is the \_judge’ as a normalising, technocratic figure, a mere functionary of the criteria, which regulate and organise the conceptual gestures of our thought and knowledge. These two \_types’ can be easily seen as antithetical. On the one hand, the figure of the critic in all its dignity, autonomy and sovereignty; on the other, the figure of the critic in, what Adorno calls, the \_thing like form of the object’.88 However, what should not be missed is how much both rely on the philosophemes that organise the \_classical’ configuration of the subject: rationality, mastery, self-presence, identity, consciousness, intentionality, autonomy, the radical difference between subject and object. For does not critical judgement involve in this instance an operation of thinking, where an already given subject takes the initiative of applying an already established category to, say, an object, a text, an event? Is not this \_initiative’ marked not only by the distance between the \_judge’ and the \_judged’, but also by the instrumentality of a masterful, rational and rationalising subject? Moreover, is not the submission of the functionary compensated by the mastery s/he has over the material under his/her authority? And does not the very form of subsumption, with its reliance on already established categories, involve a technique, which assimilates and neutralises the singularity of the particular and forecloses the possibility of thinking something new?89 To return to our initial question, if the critical instance is ruled by judgemental grammars and logics, which in turn rely on \_classical’ configurations of subjectivity, what happens to the critical when reinscribed and re-situated in a philosophical terrain which has been \_re-marked’ by the critique or deconstruction of subjectivity, a philosophical terrain without transcendental guarantees? Following what was said earlier in connection with the question of the question, the critical is also being re-thought and re-worked. Three gestures mark this re-thinking: first, an abandonment of judgemental grammars and logics; second, a re-casting of the critical in terms of the question of the limit; and third, the emergence of an ethic of encounter (with the limit). Let us briefly consider what is involved in the last two gestures. One of the clearest statements of what is at stake in the re-casting of the critical in terms of the question of the limit, the limit as a question, is to be found in Foucault’s two essays, \_What Is Critique?’ 90 and \_What is Enlightenment?’91 Without going into the detail of the argument developed there, I want to focus at a point in the Enlightenment essay, which I think is crucial. This is a point where, to begin with, Foucault affirms that \_[c]riticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits’, thus seemingly locating himself within the basic parameters of the Kantian formulation of the critical. Then, though, he continues: But if the Kantian question was that of knowing [savoir] what limits knowledge [connaissance] must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that the critical question today must be turned back into a positive one: In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point in brief is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing over [franchissment].92 In other words, Foucault’s re-working of the critical involves a notion of the limit not as necessary limitation, as in the Kantian critical project, but as a point of \_a possible crossing over’. For posing the question of the limits of our knowledge, or \_showing the limits of the constitution of objectivity’,93 involves also a dimension of opening up, of transformation and becoming. As such the type of \_work done at the limits of ourselves must’, according to Foucault, \_on the one hand, open up a realm of historical inquiry, and on the other, put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take.’94 In other words, the critical instance rethought in terms of the limit as question does not merely involve a negative moment of transgression. For at the point of this work on the limits (of ourselves), the ethico-political promise/possibility of transformation opens up – which is also why, at this point, the critical instance, for Foucault, becomes intimately linked with virtue.95 Let us now turn to the last gesture involved in the re-thinking of the critical: namely, the displacement of judgemental logics and the emergence of an ethics of encounter – that is to say, an encounter with the question of the limit. Let us move with caution, though. To begin with, it is important to understand that one does not drive to the limits for a thrill experience, or because limits are dangerous and sexy, or because it brings us into tintillating proximity with evil. One asks about the limits of knowing because one has already run up against a crisis within the epistemological field in which one lives. The categories by which social life is ordered produce a certain incoherence or entire realm of unspeakability. And it is from this condition, the tear in the fabric of our epistemological field, that the practice of critique emerges, with the awareness that no discourse is adequate here or that our reigning discourses have produced an impasse.96 Which is to say that the critical instance, as the exposure of the \_limits of the constitution of objectivity’, also involves the experience of the dislocation of our sedimented positivities, in other words, the experience of crisis. Such a recognition is important here because it reinscribes crisis, which is actually another meaning of the Greek word krisis, into the critical, which is thus re-connected with the notion of negativity – negativity in the ontological sense. This negativity, as Stavrakakis notes, has both a disruptive dimension that \_refers to the horizon of impossibility and unrepresentability, which punctuates the life of linguistic creatures’,97 and at the same time a productive one: \_[b]y inscribing a lack in our dislocated positivities, it fuels the desire for new social and political constructions.’98 As such, this negativity is \_neither an object nor its negation: it is the condition of possibility/ impossibility of objects’,99 of objectivity more generally, indeed of all transformative action.100 And it is precisely here that an ethics of the encounter with the limit is located in that such an encounter is a moment, which ought to be acknowledged rather than covered over by quickly \_patching the cracks’ of our universe. It is a moment which should not be foreclosed or assimilated: For at stake in this encounter with the limit, \_is a matter of showing how the space of the possible is larger than the one we are assigned – that something else is possible, but not that everything is possible.’101 And it is precisely here, at the moment when the site of the pre-thetic and the pre-judicative is glimpsed, that the thrust and the promise of a \_re-marked’ critical instance is to be found.

### Fisky Cliff DA

#### Fiscal compromise coming, but Obama’s leadership is key

NYT 11/8 (“Back to Work, Obama Is Greeted by Looming Fiscal Crisis” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/president-obama-begins-work-on-second-term.html?hp&pagewanted=all)

Newly re-elected, President Obama moved quickly on Wednesday to open negotiations with Congressional Republican leaders over the main unfinished business of his term — a major deficit-reduction deal to avert a looming fiscal crisis — as he began preparing for a second term that will include significant cabinet changes.¶ ¶ Mr. Obama, while still at home in Chicago at midday, called Speaker John A. Boehner in what was described as a brief and cordial exchange on the need to reach some budget compromise in the lame-duck session of Congress starting next week. Later at the Capitol, Mr. Boehner publicly responded before assembled reporters with his most explicit and conciliatory offer to date on Republicans’ willingness to raise tax revenues, but not top rates, together with a spending cut package.¶ “Mr. President, this is your moment,” said Mr. Boehner, a day after Congressional Republicans suffered election losses but kept their House majority. “We’re ready to be led — not as Democrats or Republicans, but as Americans. We want you to lead, not as a liberal or a conservative, but as president of the United States of America.”¶ His statement came a few hours after Senator Harry Reid, leader of a Democratic Senate majority that made unexpected gains, extended his own olive branch to the opposition. While saying that Democrats would not be pushed around, Mr. Reid, a former boxer, added, “It’s better to dance than to fight.”

#### SMRs are massively controversial—spending and safety concerns—Obama’s avoiding the fight now

Nelson 9/24 Gabriel is a e&e reporter, “DOE funding for small reactors languishes as parties clash on debt” 9/24/12 <http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/09/24/3>

It's not just wind and solar projects that are waiting for federal help as Congress duels over the importance of putting taxpayer dollars on the line for cutting-edge energy projects. Some of the nation's largest nuclear power companies are anxious to hear whether they will get a share of a $452 million pot from the Department of Energy for a new breed of reactors that the industry has labeled as a way to lessen the safety risks and construction costs of new nuclear power plants. The grant program for these "small modular reactors," which was announced in January, would mark the official start of a major U.S. foray into the technology even as rising construction costs -- especially when compared to natural-gas-burning plants -- cause many power companies to shy away from nuclear plants. DOE received four bids before the May 21 deadline from veteran reactor designers Westinghouse Electric Co. and Babcock & Wilcox Co., as well as relative newcomers Holtec International Inc. and NuScale Power LLC. Now the summer has ended with no announcement from DOE, even though the agency said it would name the winners two months ago. As the self-imposed deadline passed, companies started hearing murmurs that a decision could come in September, or perhaps at the end of the year. To observers within the industry, it seems that election-year calculations may have sidelined the contest. "The rumors are a'flying," said Paul Genoa, director of policy development at the Nuclear Energy Institute, in an interview last week. "All we can imagine is that this is now caught up in politics, and the campaign has to decide whether these things are good for them to announce, and how." Small modular reactors do not seem to be lacking in political support. The nuclear lobby has historically courted both Democrats and Republicans and still sees itself as being in a strong position with key appropriators on both sides of the aisle. Likewise, top energy officials in the Obama administration have hailed the promise of the new reactors, and they haven't shown any signs of a change of heart. DOE spokeswoman Jen Stutsman said last week that the department is still reviewing applications, but she did not say when a decision will be made. "This is an important multiyear research and development effort, and we want to make sure we take the time during the review process to get the decision right," she wrote in an email. That the grants haven't been given out during a taut campaign season, even as President Obama announces agency actions ranging from trade cases to creating new national monuments to make the case for his re-election, may be a sign that the reactors are ensnared in a broader feud over energy spending. Grant recipients would develop reactor designs with an eye toward eventually turning those into pilot projects -- and the loan guarantees that these first-of-a-kind nuclear plants are using today to get financing would be blocked under the "No More Solyndras" bill that passed the House last week ([Greenwire](http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2012/09/14/archive/2), Sept. 14). Congress has given the grant program $67 million for fiscal 2012, shy of the amount that would be needed annually to reach full funding. If the "sequester" kicks in at year's end and slashes DOE funding or the balance of power changes in Washington, the amount of money available could dwindle yet again. Even the staunchest supporters of the federal nuclear program are acknowledging it is a tough time to promise a $452 million check. Former Sen. Pete Domenici, a New Mexico Republican who pushed for new reactors as chairman of both the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, said during a brief interview Tuesday that well-designed loan guarantees won't cost too much because they get repaid over time. The cost could be borne by a "tiny little tax" on the nuclear industry, he said. But when it comes to straight-up spending, like the grants that would support getting these cutting-edge reactors ready for their first demonstrations, the solution may not be so clear. While some Republicans remain staunch supporters of funding for the nuclear power industry, there are others who label the government subsidies as a waste of taxpayer dollars. "It's awful hard, with the needs that are out there and the debt that haunts us, to figure out how you're going to establish priorities," said Domenici, who has advocated for the deployment of new nuclear reactors as a fellow at the Bipartisan Policy Center. "I can't stand here and tell you that I know how to do that."

#### Fiscal cliff collapses the economy—exhausted policy options mean disaster is likely

Morici 12 (Peter, professor of international business at U. Maryland College Park, “Fix fiscal cliff now or face next Great Depression” Fox News 8/7/12 <http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/08/07/fix-fiscal-cliff-now-or-face-next-great-depression/>)

President Obama and Republicans are engaging in dangerous brinksmanship. Putting off a political solution to the looming “fiscal cliff” until after the election risks a second Great Depression.¶ Without a compromise by January, $400 billion in mandatory spending cuts and more than $100 billion in tax increases will immediately go into effect. With our economy only growing by only $300 billion annually, such a shock would thrust it into a prolonged contraction.¶ The failure of the Obama $767 billion stimulus package to adequately jump start growth makes a second such initiative unlikely. Interest rates are at already at record lows. These leave policymakers too few tools once things start unraveling. However, President Obama has given Republicans hardly any political choices but to roll the dice.¶ Facing reelection, he promises to veto any extension of Bush-era tax cuts for middle- income Americans if Congress does not raise rates on upper-income families. He won’t entertain meaningful cuts in entitlement spending or health care.¶ Today, in August, businesses are already curtailing investments in machinery and information technology, as a hedge against a contracting economy in 2013, and consumers are spending less. Retail sales fell each of the last three months.¶ -¶ But, even if Mr. Obama wins reelection in November, he likely will be saddled with a Republican House.¶ Armed with a mandate, he will get higher taxes on upper income families. However, he has made commitments to expand the US naval resources in the Persian Gulf and Asia to counter Iran and China. He can’t finance those without giving Republicans some of the entitlement reforms they want but can’t get now.¶ For the economy, one of three outcomes is likely:¶ 1. President Obama wins in November but doesn’t reach a deal with Republicans before February or March. Mass layoffs begin late this fall, especially in the defense sector, and the economy stumbles badly.¶ 2. Mr. Obama wins and deals with Republicans in Congress by late December. Taxes go up, and overall spending is cut, but not as much as current legislation requires. The combination still derails the fragile recovery.¶ 3. Governor Romney wins and implements a pro growth agenda, but the current situation is too urgent to wait for actions that won’t take effect until at least next spring and summer.¶ Today, in August, businesses are already curtailing investments in machinery and information technology, as a hedge against a contracting economy in 2013, and consumers are spending less. Retail sales fell each of the last three months.¶ The Great Recession was caused by manifest structural problems in the economy: a wide trade gap with China and on oil; banks that had forgotten how to earn profits through sound lending; failed financial regulations and skyrocketing health care costs.¶ President Obama’s policies have mostly exacerbated those problems. That’s why the recovery is so weak, and a second recession now could put the economy down for good.¶ Too many young adults unemployed or in poorly paying jobs are living with aging parents. Many older Americans are running down IRAs before reaching retirement age, hoping for better days.¶ The safety nets provided by parents and savings will soon tear. If the economy goes down again, the negative feedback cycle of fewer jobs, less spending, more layoffs, and so forth will be much more severe than in 2008.

#### Economic collapse causes global wars

Royal ‘10 director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives, pg 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### LFTRs CP

#### The United States Federal Government should fund the development of Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor nuclear technology for the United States military.

#### Absent specific regulation, the they’d pick Westinghouse’s AP-1000 SMR—easiest for licensing and safety clearance

McMahon ’12 Jeff McMahon, covers green tech, energy and the environment for Forbes, “Small Modular Nuclear Reactors By 2022 -- But No Market For Them,” Forbes, 5/23/2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2012/05/23/small-modular-reactors-by-2022-but-no-market-for-them/

The Department of Energy will spend $452 million—with a match from industry—over the next five years to guide two small modular reactor designs through the nuclear regulatory process by 2022. But cheap natural gas could freeze even small nuclear plants out of the energy market well beyond that date. DOE accepted bids through Monday for companies to participate in the Small Modular Reactor program. A number of reactor manufacturers submitted bids, including NuScale Power and a collaboration that includes Westinghouse and General Dynamic. “This would allow SMR technology to overcome the hurdle of NRC certification – the ‘gold standard’ of the international nuclear industry, and would help in the proper development of the NRC’s regulatory framework to deal with SMRs,” according to Paul Genoa, Senior Director of Policy Development at the Nuclear Energy Institute. Genoa’s comments are recorded in a summary released today of a briefing given to Senate staff earlier this month on prospects for small modular reactors, which have been championed by the Obama Administration. DOE defines reactors as SMRs if they generate less than 300 megawatts of power, sometimes as little as 25 MW, compared to conventional reactors which may produce more than 1,000 MW. Small modular reactors can be constructed in factories and installed underground, which improves containment and security but may hinder emergency access. The same summary records doubt that SMRs can compete in a market increasingly dominated by cheap natural gas. Nuclear Consultant Philip Moor told Senate staff that SMRs can compete if natural gas costs $7 to $8 per million BTU—gas currently costs only $2 per MBTU—or if carbon taxes are implemented, a scenario political experts deem unlikely. “Like Mr. Moor, Mr. Genoa also sees the economic feasibility of SMRs as the final challenge. With inexpensive natural gas prices and no carbon tax, the economics don’t work in the favor of SMRs,” according to the summary. The SMRs most likely to succeed are designs that use the same fuels and water cooling systems as the large reactors in operation in the U.S. today, according to Gail Marcus, an independent consultant in nuclear technology and policy and a former deputy director of the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, simply because the NRC is accustomed to regulating those reactors. “Those SMR designs that use light water cooling have a major advantage in licensing and development [and] those new designs based on existing larger reactor designs, like Westinghouse’s scaled‐down 200 MW version of the AP‐1000 reactor, would have particular advantage.”This is bad news for some innovative reactor designs such as thorium reactors that rely on different, some say safer, fuels and cooling systems.

#### LFTRs solve better than all alternatives—avoid the turns

Thompson ‘11 Kalee Thompson [freelance writer who covers science, the environment, and the outdoors] “Concepts & Prototypes: Two Next-Gen Nukes” Posted 06.27.2011 at 9:56 am82 Comments <http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-06/next-gen-nuke-designs-promise-safe-efficient-emissions-free-energy>

Like many of the 20 or so pending Generation III+ facilities in the U.S., the Vogtle plant will house Westinghouse AP1000 reactors. A light-water reactor, the AP1000 prompts uranium-235 into a chain reaction that throws off high-energy neutrons. The particles heat water into steam, which then turns a turbine that generates electricity.¶ The greatest danger in a nuclear plant is a meltdown, in which solid reactor fuel overheats, melts, and ruptures its containment shell, releasing radioactive material. (Want more information? Check out our explainer on how nuclear reactors work--and how they fail.) Like most reactors, the AP1000 is cooled with electrically powered water pumps and fans, but it also has a passive safety system, which employs natural forces such as gravity, condensation and evaporation to cool a reactor during a power outage.¶ The U.S. has 104 nuclear reactors operating at 65 sites in 31 states, all of them approved before 1980.A central feature of this system is an 800,000-gallon water tank positioned directly above the containment shell. The reservoir’s valves rely on electrical power to remain closed. When power is lost, the valves open and the water flows down toward the containment shell. Vents passively draw air from outside and direct it over the structure, furthering the evaporative cooling.¶ Depending on the type of emergency, an additional reservoir within the containment shell can be manually released to flood the reactor. As water boils off, it rises and condenses at the top of the containment shell and streams back down to cool the reactor once more. Unlike today’s plants, most of which have enough backup power onsite to last just four to eight hours after grid power is lost, the AP1000 can safely operate for at least three days without power or human intervention.¶ Even with their significant safety improvements, Generation III+ plants can, theoretically, melt down. Some people within the nuclear industry are calling for the implementation of still newer reactor designs, collectively called Generation IV. The thorium-powered molten-salt reactor (MSR) is one such design. In an MSR, liquid thorium would replace the solid uranium fuel used in today’s plants, a change that would make meltdowns all but impossible¶ MSRs were developed at Tennessee’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the early 1960s and ran for a total of 22,000 hours between 1965 and 1969. “These weren’t theoretical reactors or thought experiments,” says engineer John Kutsch, who heads the nonprofit Thorium Energy Alliance. “[Engineers] really built them, and they really ran.” Of the handful of Generation IV reactor designs circulating today, only the MSR has been proven outside computer models. “It was not a full system, but it showed you could successfully design and operate a molten-salt reactor,” says Oak Ridge physicist Jess Gehin, a senior program manager in the lab’s Nuclear Technology Programs office.¶ One pound of thorium produces as much power as 300 pounds of uranium--or 3.5 million pounds of coal.The MSR design has two primary safety advantages. Its liquid fuel remains at much lower pressures than the solid fuel in light-water plants. This greatly decreases the likelihood of an accident, such as the hydrogen explosions that occurred at Fukushima. Further, in the event of a power outage, a frozen salt plug within the reactor melts and the liquid fuel passively drains into tanks where it solidifes, stopping the fission reaction. “The molten-salt reactor is walk-away safe,” Kutsch says. “If you just abandoned it, it had no power, and the end of the world came--a comet hit Earth--it would cool down and solidify by itself.”¶ Although an MSR could also run on uranium or plutonium, using the less-radioactive element thorium, with a little plutonium or uranium as a catalyst, has both economic and safety advantages. Thorium is four times as abundant as uranium and is easier to mine, in part because of its lower radioactivity. The domestic supply could serve the U.S.’s electricity needs for centuries. Thorium is also exponentially more efficient than uranium. “In a traditional reactor, you’re burning up only a half a percent to maybe 3 percent of the uranium,” Kutsch says. “In a molten-salt reactor, you’re burning 99 percent of the thorium.” The result: One pound of thorium yields as much power as 300 pounds of uranium--or 3.5 million pounds of coal.¶ Because of this efficiency, a thorium MSR would produce far less waste than today’s plants. Uranium-based waste will remain hazardous for tens of thousands of years. With thorium, it’s more like a few hundred. As well, raw thorium is not fissile in and of itself, so it is not easily weaponized. “It can’t be used as a bomb,” Kutsch says. “You could have 1,000 pounds in your basement, and nothing would happen.”

#### Uranium-fueled SMRs are a huge prolif risk

Makhijani and Boyd 2010 – ARJUN MAKHIJANI [Arjun Makhijani is an electrical and nuclear engineer who is President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research] and MICHELE BOYD [Michele Boyd is the former director of the Safe Energy Program at Physicians for Social Responsibility] “Small Modular Reactors No Solution for the Cost, Safety, and Waste Problems of Nuclear Power” Fact sheet completed in September 2010 <http://www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/small-modular-reactors-no.pdf>

In addition, the use of plutonium fuel or uranium enriched to levels as high as 20 percent—four to five times the typical enrichment level for present commercial light water reactors—presents serious proliferation risks, especially as some SMRs are proposed to be exported to developing countries with small grids and/or installed in remote locations. Security and safety will be more difficult to maintain in countries with no or underdeveloped nuclear regulatory infrastructure and in isolated areas. Burying the reactor underground, as proposed for some designs, would not sufficiently address security because some access from above will still be needed and it could increase the environmental impact to groundwater, for example, in the event of an accident.

#### Prolif risks extinction

Kroenig ’12 Matthew Kroenig, Council on Foreign Relations Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and Georgetown University assistant professor of government, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center

Should we worry about the spread of nuclear weapons? At first glance, this might appear to be an absurd question. After all, nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons ever created by man. A single nuclear weapon could vaporize large portions of a major metropolitan area, killing millions of people, and a full-scale nuclear war between superpowers could end life on Earth as we know it. For decades during the Cold War, the public feared nuclear war and post-apocalyptic nuclear war scenarios became a subject of fascination and terror in popular culture. Meanwhile, scholars carefully theorized the dangers of nuclear weapons and policymakers made nuclear nonproliferation a top national priority. To this day, the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries remains a foremost concern of U.S. leaders. Indeed, in his 2012 annual threat assessment to the U.S. Congress, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper argued that nuclear proliferation poses one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security.[1] Recently, however, academics have become more vocal in questioning the threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. Students of international politics known as “proliferation optimists” argue that the spread of nuclear weapons might actually be beneficial because it deters great power war and results in greater levels of international instability.[2] Other scholars, whom I label “proliferation anti-obsessionists,” maintain that nuclear proliferation is neither good nor bad, but irrelevant.[3] They claim that nuclear weapons do not have any meaningful effect on international politics and that the past seventy years of world history would have been roughly the same had nuclear weapons never been invented. Some take this line of argument even further and argue that the only real problem is not the nuclear weapons themselves, but great power nonproliferation policy.[4] They argue that the cure that countries like the United States implement in order to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons is much worse than the disease of the spread of nuclear weapons itself. While these arguments remain provocative, they are far from new. The idea that a few nuclear weapons are sufficient to deter a larger adversary and keep the peace has its origins in the early strategic thinking of the 1940s. Moreover, a critical review of this literature demonstrates that many of these arguments are much less sound than they initially appear. Indeed, both proliferation optimism and proliferation anti-obsessionism rest on internal logical contradictions. In this essay, I argue that the spread of nuclear weapons poses a grave threat to international peace and to U.S. national security. Scholars can grab attention by making counterintuitive arguments about nuclear weapons being less threatening than power holders believe them to be, but their provocative claims cannot wish away the very real dangers posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. The more states that possess nuclear weapons, the more likely we are to suffer a number of devastating consequences including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained U.S. freedom of action, weakened alliances, and the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. While it is important not to exaggerate these threats, it would be an even greater sin to underestimate them and, as a result, not take the steps necessary to combat the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons.

#### AP-1000 removes safeguards against rusting—risks massive radiation damage

Wald ’10 Matthew L. Wald, 30 years at the NYT as an energy correspondent, “Critics Challenge Safety of New Reactor Design,” New York Times, 4/21/2012, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/critics-challenge-safety-of-new-nuclear-reactor-design/

But on Wednesday, Arnie Gundersen, a nuclear engineer commissioned by several anti-nuclear groups, released a report suggesting a different hazard. In existing plants, he pointed out, the containment consists of a steel liner and a concrete dome, but sometimes the steel liner has rusted through. In the new Westinghouse design, the liner and the concrete are now separated, to allow air to flow between them, so the temperature inside the steel structure will be kept down by natural forces. But if the steel rusts through, “there is no backup containment behind it,’’ Mr. Gundersen said. In the new design, he said, metal baffles bolted to the steel direct the air flow, and those baffles are a spot where moisture from the atmosphere could collect. At coastal plants, salty water could collect, and inland, it would be evaporating water from the cooling towers. Inspection, he said, would be difficult. If the dome rusted through and an accident occurred, the plant could deliver a dose of radiation to the public that is 10 times higher than the N.R.C. limit, Mr. Gundersen said. Instead of drawing fresh air past the dome through a chimney effect, the design would expel radioactive contaminants.

#### Radioactive contamination kills—risks extinction

Lendman 11 – Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (Stephen, 03/ 13, “Nuclear Meltdown in Japan,” http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/13/nuclear-meltdown-in-japan)

For years, Helen Caldicott warned it's coming. In her 1978 book, "Nuclear Madness," she said: "As a physician, I contend that nuclear technology threatens life on our planet with extinction. If present trends continue, the air we breathe, the food we eat, and the water we drink will soon be contaminated with enough radioactive pollutants to pose a potential health hazard far greater than any plague humanity has ever experienced." More below on the inevitable dangers from commercial nuclear power proliferation, besides added military ones. On March 11, New York Times writer Martin Fackler headlined, "Powerful Quake and Tsunami Devastate Northern Japan," saying: "The 8.9-magnitude earthquake (Japan's strongest ever) set off a devastating tsunami that sent walls of water (six meters high) washing over coastal cities in the north." According to Japan's Meteorological Survey, it was 9.0. The Sendai port city and other areas experienced heavy damage. "Thousands of homes were destroyed, many roads were impassable, trains and buses (stopped) running, and power and cellphones remained down. On Saturday morning, the JR rail company" reported three trains missing. Many passengers are unaccounted for. Striking at 2:46PM Tokyo time, it caused vast destruction, shook city skyscrapers, buckled highways, ignited fires, terrified millions, annihilated areas near Sendai, possibly killed thousands, and caused a nuclear meltdown, its potential catastrophic effects far exceeding quake and tsunami devastation, almost minor by comparison under a worst case scenario. On March 12, Times writer Matthew Wald headlined, "Explosion Seen at Damaged Japan Nuclear Plant," saying: "Japanese officials (ordered evacuations) for people living near two nuclear power plants whose cooling systems broke down," releasing radioactive material, perhaps in far greater amounts than reported. NHK television and Jiji said the 40-year old Fukushima plant's outer structure housing the reactor "appeared to have blown off, which could suggest the containment building had already been breached." Japan's nuclear regulating agency said radioactive levels inside were 1,000 times above normal. Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster. This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover, under a worst case core meltdown, all bets are off as the entire region and beyond will be threatened with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to live in. On March 12, Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power. Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere."

#### Independently devastates solvency

Bonass et al, 12 (Matt Bonass, Michael Rudd and Richard Lucas are partners in Bird and Bird’s energy and utilities sector group. Mr Bonass and Mr Rudd are co-editors of Renewables: A Practical Handbook. Mr Rudd is head of Bird and Bird’s nuclear practice. Author interviews, Renewable energy: the fallout from Fukushima, http://www.globelawandbusiness.com/Interviews/Detail.aspx?g=910fcfa6-9a2d-4312-b034-9bbcb2dad9e0)

There is no doubt that the events in Fukushima have cast a shadow over the nuclear industry. Previous nuclear disasters, such as those at Three Mile Island in the United States and Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union, have caused significant delays to the development of the nuclear industry. For example, the United States embargoed the building of new nuclear plants for nearly 25 years following the Three Mile Island crisis and many European countries ceased their nuclear development programmes following events at Chernobyl. Our colleagues across our network of European offices are telling us that their clients are approaching them to discuss the implications of the Fukushima events. For example, what will be the effect on the discussions currently taking place in Italy on the referendum to recommence nuclear development activities? What will be the effect of the proposals in Germany to place its plants offline? Will Europe adopt the proposals for a comprehensive risk and safety assessment of nuclear plants (the so-called ‘stress tests’)? Public perception is vital to the nuclear industry. Over the past few years, nuclear has gradually become an accepted part of the low carbon economy, but it may now have become politically unacceptable to many.

### Solvency

#### Long timeframe—authorization and tech development

King et al. ’11 Marcus King, Associate Director of Research, Associate Research Professor of International Affairs, LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations,” CNA Market Solutions, March 2011, http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf

The NRC is responsible for regulation of the nuclear industry, including regulation of reactors, fuel-cycle facilities, materials, and waste. Improvement in and enforcement of regulations and requirements for nuclear plant operations have led to improvements in multiple areas. The number of significant events 8 (i.e., those events that could lead to a serious safety breach) have decreased from almost 2.5 events per plant in 1985 to 0.1 events per plant in 2007. NRC has also recorded a decrease in automatic scrams 9 over the past 20 years. Safety systems are set up throughout the plant to either manually or automatically deal with problems that are detected in the reactor. In 2007, 25 safety system actuations were recorded in the 104 operating nuclear plants. This 2007 figure is smaller than the 1985 figure. The total radiation dose accumulated by workers decreased 20 percent between 1985 and 2007. In 2009, nuclear power plants had a capacity factor of 90.5 percent, generating approximately 800 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity at an average production cost of 2.03 cents/kWh. This production cost includes expenses for uranium fuel, maintenance, and operations [42]. New SMR designs are expected to equal or exceed the standards set by large reactors. SMRs have other important attributes that were described in the DOE preliminary note. While SMRs promise several advantages over large reactors none are currently available. They are currently in the design phase and will require extensive engineering and demonstration before they are ready to be commercialized in the United States.

#### Can’t build new reactors—lack of industrial production facilities and trained workers

Mez September 2012—Lutz Mez [Department of Political and Social Sciences, Freie Universitat Berlin] “Nuclear energy–Any solution for sustainability and climate protection” Energy Policy 48 (2012) 56–63

The nuclear industry has been battling a host of problems for three decades. A global construction boom can be ruled out at present if only due to the lack of production capacities and shortages of technicians; nor will this situation change much over the short and medium term. Only one single company in the world, Japan Steel Works Ltd., is able to forge the large pressure vessels in reactors the size of EPR. Not only the pressure vessel, but also the steam generators in the new Finnish plant come from Japan. In the USA, on the other hand, there is not a single manufacturing plant capable of producing such large components. The sole facility in Europe, the AREVAforgeintheFrenchcityofLeCreusot, is only able to produce components of a limited size and in limited numbers. Beyond this, the nuclear industry is busy with retroﬁtting projects, as replacement of steam generators for power plants whose operating lifetimes are to be extended. Because such large production plants cannot be built overnight, this situation will not improve quickly. New nuclear power plants moreover have to be operated by new personnel—but the nuclear industry and operators are scarcely even able to replace staff who retires. An entire genera- tion of engineers, nuclear physicists and experts on protection against radiation are missing as the industry is challenged twofold: at the same time as new plants are being constructed, plants which have been closed must be torn down and solutions ﬁnally found for nuclear waste.

#### New Tech is bad—it breaks current global convergence increasing cost and lowering safety

Lester and Rosner ‘9 -- Richard K. Lester [Professor of Nuclear Engineering and head of the Nuclear Science and Engineering Department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology] and Robert Rosner [Astrophysicist and founding director of the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago. Director of Argonne National Laboratory from 2005 to 2009] “THE GROWTH OF NUCLEAR POWER: Drivers and Constraints” MIT-IPC-Energy Innovation Working Paper 09-002 July 2009 (forthcoming in Daedalus) http://web.mit.edu/ipc/research/energy/pdf/EIP\_09-002.pdf

In its earliest years, the nuclear power industry also seemed destined to develop along many different trajectories. Nuclear power reactor developers in Canada, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States each introduced a different type of nuclear power reactor technology. National strategies for the nuclear fuel cycle also differed significantly. Eventually, the light water reactor technology that was first introduced in the United States came to dominate the global nuclear power industry. Light water reactors now account for more than 90 percent of installed nuclear capacity worldwide, although today the leading suppliers of this technology are French and Japanese. (The only other power reactor technology with a significant market presence internationally has historically been the Canadian CANDU design.) There is today a fairly high degree of uniformity in the nuclear plans and programs of most of the major nuclear countries, and nuclear power is one of the most highly globalized of all industries. The nuclear power plant supply industry is dominated by a small number of large global suppliers of light water reactor equipment and technology. National regulatory standards and practices are harmonized to a substantial degree. National strategies for the nuclear fuel cycle are also aligned, and major fuel cycle service providers operate globally. And a new class of global nuclear power plant investor-operators is emerging, led by the French utility EDF, whose joint ventures with nuclear power companies in China and the United States, and its recent purchase of the U.K. nuclear operator British Energy, have established it as an important player in all of the world’s largest nuclear power markets. This global convergence has yielded a number of benefits, including economies of scale and accelerated learning. The case for international coordination and standardization of strategies and practices is further strengthened by the special care with which nuclear technology and materials must be handled, and the international consequences of local nuclear accidents or missteps. From time to time this strategic convergence has also served the purposes of nuclear industry leaders and government policy-makers, providing them with a sort of strength-in-numbers defense against local critics. A few years ago, when President George W. Bush announced his support for closing the nuclear fuel cycle in the United States, the new policy was welcomed by the French, British, and Japanese, in no small part because it seemed to legitimize their own longstanding commitment to a closed nuclear fuel cycle, including reprocessing and mixed-oxide fuel use. Thirty years earlier, when the United States abandoned its plans to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and sought to persuade others to do likewise as a nonproliferation measure, the outraged reactions from Europe and Japan were partly stimulated by a fear that the American policy reversal would give ammunition to domestic critics of their own reprocessing plans, which they had no intention of abandoning. The attractions of nuclear conformity remain strong today, yet the prospect of divergent development pathways may now be greater than at any time since the earliest days of the nuclear power industry. What are the implications of this for nuclear energy growth? How might it affect the course of international nonproliferation efforts?

#### No new investment in nuclear—new incentives do nothing

Cooper ’12 Mark Cooper, senior research fellow for economic analysis at the Institute for Energy and the Environment at Vermont Law School, “Nuclear safety and affordable reactors: Can we have both?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2012, vol. 68, no. 4, doi: 10.1177/0096340212451627

Has the heralded ‘nuclear renaissance’ finally arrived? In February 2012, for the first time in more than 30 years, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a license to build two new nuclear reactors. In March, the NRC approved a license for two more new reactors, and utilities have submitted applications for 23 additional reactors. Two of those reactors would be at a brand-new nuclear power plant in Florida’s Levy County, where Progress Energy Florida recently agreed to a settlement that will allow the utility to collect $350 million from customers over the next five years as a down payment. Look more closely at what’s happening in Levy County, however, and you’ll see that the nuclear industry’s slump is not over yet. The new Levy County reactors will not start operating for at least another decade, if ever. It’s all a question of money: The utility estimates that the reactors will cost between $17 billion and $22 billion, not counting financing charges and cost overruns, which have plagued the nuclear industry. (Progress originally estimated that the reactors would cost $5 billion and would commence operation in 2016.) With the demand for electricity growing at a snail’s pace, and natural gas prices at a fraction of what the utility expected when it filed its application for a new plant in 2008, opposition to the project has mounted, threatening a rerun of the 1970s and 1980s, when the majority of nuclear construction plans were canceled or abandoned.

### Warming Adv

#### Nuclear power is worse for climate change. It emits as much CO2 as nat-gas, emits ionizing radiation, and trades off with carbon free renewables

Mez September 2012—Lutz Mez [Department of Political and Social Sciences, Freie Universitat Berlin] “Nuclear energy–Any solution for sustainability and climate protection” Energy Policy 48 (2012) 56–63

The sector of electrical power production accounts for about 27 percent of global anthropogenic CO2 emissions and constitutes by far the biggest and fastest growing source of greenhouse gas emissions. That is why supposedly CO2-free nuclear power plants have frequently been praised as a panacea against climate change. As an argument in favor of civil use of nuclear energy, advocates such as RWE manager Fritz Vahrenholt are fond of pointing out that the operation of nuclear power plant does not cause any CO2 emissions (Vahrenholt in ‘‘Welt online’’, 23 September 2010). And, underscoring the advantages of German nuclear power plants, he added: ‘‘if their output was replaced by power plants using fossil fuels, this would cause additional emissions of 120,000,000 t of CO2 per year.’’ Here Vahrenholt assumed that total nuclear power would be replaced by lignite coal plants. But a turnaround in energy policy would make greater use of renewable energy and decentralized gas- ﬁred combined heat and power plants which do not cause any more CO2 emissions than nuclear power plants (Fritsche et al., 2007). On top of this, viewed from a systemic perspective, nuclear power plants are by no means free of CO2 emissions. Already today, they produce up to 1/3 as much greenhouse gases as large modern gas power plants. CO2 emissions of nuclear energy in connection with its production—depending on where the raw material uranium is mined and enriched—amounts to between 7 and 126 g CO2equ 1 per kilowatt hour (GEMIS 4.7). O ¨ ko-Institut has estimated a speciﬁc emission of 28 g CO2equ per kilowatt hour for a typical nuclear power plant in Germany—including emis- sions caused by the construction of the plant—with enriched uranium from different supplier countries. An initial estimate of global CO2 emissions through the production of nuclear power for 2010 has produced an amount of more than 117,000,000 t CO2equ (see Table 4)—this is roughly as much as the entire CO2 emissions produced by Greece this year. And this data does not even include the emissions caused by storage of nuclear waste. Storm van Leeuwen & Smith calculated the ratio of CO2 emissions from nuclear energy and from a gas ﬁred plant of the same net (electrical) capacity. Electricity generated from atomic energy emits 90–140 g CO2 per kWh. The range is due to the different grade of ores used. Only if the uranium consumed by the nuclear energy system has been extracted from rich ores, does nuclear generation emit less CO2 than gas based generation, giving the impression that the application of nuclear energy would solve the global warming problem. However, uranium is a limited resource; it is estimated to last for 50 to 70 years with current generation technology and demand. And when rich ores become exhausted this ratio increases until it ﬁnally becomes larger than one, making the use of nuclear energy unfavorable compared to simply burning the (remaining) fossil fuels directly. In the coming decades, indirect CO2 emissions from nuclear power plants will moreover increase considerably because more fossil energy will have to be used to mine uranium. In view of this trend, nuclear power plants will no longer have any advantage over modern gas-ﬁred power plants, let alone in comparison to the advantages offered by increased energy efﬁciency or greater use of renewable energies, especially when the latter are used in cogeneration plants. ‘‘In the long term the use of nuclear energy provides us with no solution to the problem’’ (Storm van Leeuwen 2007). And Robert Rosner (2009), Director of Argonne National Laboratory, added: ‘‘Nuclear power is unlikely to play a critical role in limiting CO2 equivalent concentrations in the atmosphere (y) No realistic plan foresees a reactor build rate that allows nuclear power to stay below 550 ppme2 CO2 within the next 30–40 years.’’ Nuclear power plants also contribute to climate change by emitting radioactive isotopes such as tritium or carbon 14. And the radioactive noble gas krypton 85, a product of nuclear ﬁssion, ionizes the air more than any other radioactive substance. Krypton 85 is produced in nuclear power plants and is released on a massive scale in reprocessing. The concentration of krypton 85 in the earth’s atmosphere has soared over the last few years as a result of nuclear ﬁssion, reaching record levels. Even though krypton 85 may have an impact on the climate (Kollert & Donderer 1994), these emissions have not received any attention in international climate-protection negotiations to this very day. As for the assertion that nuclear power is needed to promote climate protection, exactly the opposite would appear to be the case: nuclear power plants must be closed down quickly in order to exert pressure on operators and the power plant industry to redouble efforts at innovation in the development of sustainable and socially compatible energy technologies—especially the use of smart energy services.

#### DOD spending alone can’t make SMR competitive

King et al. ’11 Marcus King, Associate Director of Research, Associate Research Professor of International Affairs, LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations,” CNA Market Solutions, March 2011, http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf

The costs associated with moving from the current stage of development of small nuclear reactors to being ready to build a fully operating power plant are called “first of a kind” (FOAK) expenses, and they are expected to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Our business case analysis shows that a small nuclear power plant project is not economically feasible for DoD if DoD must pay FOAK expenses; however, arrangements could be made for FOAK expenses to be paid by some combination of DOE funding, vendors investments, and direct congressional appropriation for that purpose.

#### Even radical emissions reductions are too little, too late

Dye 10-26 Lee Dye, “It May Be Too Late to Stop Global Warming,” ABC News, 10/26/2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/late-stop-global-warming/story?id=17557814&singlePage=true#.UI58icXR5DA

Here's a dark secret about the earth's changing climate that many scientists believe, but few seem eager to discuss: It's too late to stop global warming. Greenhouse gasses pumped into the planet's atmosphere will continue to grow even if the industrialized nations cut their emissions down to the bone. Furthermore, the severe measures that would have to be taken to make those reductions stand about the same chance as that proverbial snowball in hell. Two scientists who believe we are on the wrong track argue in the current issue of the journal Nature Climate Change that global warming is inevitable and it's time to switch our focus from trying to stop it to figuring out how we are going to deal with its consequences. "At present, governments' attempts to limit greenhouse-gas emissions through carbon cap-and-trade schemes and to promote renewable and sustainable energy sources are probably too late to arrest the inevitable trend of global warming," Jasper Knight of Wits University in Johannesburg, South Africa, and Stephan Harrison of the University of Exeter in England argue in their study. Those efforts, they continue, "have little relationship to the real world." What is clear, they contend, is a profound lack of understanding about how we are going to deal with the loss of huge land areas, including some entire island nations, and massive migrations as humans flee areas no longer suitable for sustaining life, the inundation of coastal properties around the world, and so on ... and on ... and on. That doesn't mean nations should stop trying to reduce their carbon emissions, because any reduction could lessen the consequences. But the cold fact is no matter what Europe and the United States and other "developed" nations do, it's not going to curb global climate change, according to one scientist who was once highly skeptical of the entire issue of global warming. "Call me a converted skeptic," physicist Richard A. Muller says in an op-ed piece published in the New York Times last July. Muller's latest book, "Energy for Future Presidents," attempts to poke holes in nearly everything we've been told about energy and climate change, except the fact that "humans are almost entirely the cause" of global warming. Those of us who live in the "developed" world initiated it. Those who live in the "developing" world will sustain it as they strive for a standard of living equal to ours. "As far as global warming is concerned, the developed world is becoming irrelevant," Muller insists in his book. We could set an example by curbing our emissions, and thus claim in the future that "it wasn't our fault," but about the only thing that could stop it would be a complete economic collapse in China and the rest of the world's developing countries. As they race forward, their industrial growth -- and their greenhouse gas emissions -- will outpace any efforts by the West to reduce their carbon footprints, Muller contends. "China has been installing a new gigawatt of coal power each week," he says in his Times piece, and each plant pumps an additional ton of gases into the atmosphere "every second." "By the time you read this, China's yearly greenhouse gas emissions will be double those of the United States, perhaps higher," he contends. And that's not likely to change. "China is fighting poverty, malnutrition, hunger, poor health, inadequate education and limited opportunity. If you were the president of China, would you endanger progress to avoid a few degrees of temperature change?" he asks.

### Heg Adv

#### Grid’s strong and resilient

Clark ’12 Paul Clark, MA candidate in intelligence studies at American Military University, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” 4/28/2012, http://www.academia.edu/1538543/The\_Risk\_of\_Disruption\_or\_Destruction\_of\_Critical\_U.S.\_Infrastructure\_by\_an\_Offensive\_Cyber\_Attack

In 2003, a simple physical breakdown occurred – trees shorted a power line and caused a fault – that had a cascading effect and caused a power blackout across the Northeast (Lewis 2010). This singular occurrence has been used as evidence that the electrical grid is fragile and subject to severe disruption through cyber-attack, a disruption that could cost billions of dollars, brings business to a halt, and could even endanger lives – if compounded by other catastrophic events (Brennan 2012). A power disruption the size of the 2003 blackout, the worst in American history at that time (Minkel 2008), is a worst case scenario and used as an example of the fragility of the U.S. energy grid. This perceived fragility is not real when viewed in the context of the robustness of the electrical grid. When asked about cyber-attacks against the electrical grid in April of 2012, the intelligence chief of U.S. Cyber Command Rear Admiral Samuel Cox stated that an attack was unlikely to succeed because of the “huge amounts of resiliency built into the [electrical] system that makes that kind of catastrophic thing very difficult” (Capaccio 2012). This optimistic view is supported by an electrical grid that has proven to be robust in the face of large natural catastrophes. Complex systems like the electrical grid in the U.S. are prone to failures and the U.S. grid fails frequently. Despite efforts to reduce the risk out power outages, the risk is always present. Power outages that affect more than 50,000 people have occurred steadily over the last 20 years at a rate of 12% annually and the frequency of large catastrophes remains relatively high and outages the size of the 2003 blackout are predicted to occur every 25 years (Minkel 2008). In a complex system that is always at risk of disruption, the effect is mitigated by policies and procedures that are meant to restore services as quickly as possible. The most visible of these policies is the interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a legally binding agreement allowing combined resources to be quickly deployed in response to a catastrophic disaster such as power outages following a severe hurricane (Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev 2009). The electrical grid suffers service interruptions regularly, it is a large and complex system supporting the largest economy in the world, and yet commerce does not collapse (Lewis 2010). Despite blizzards, earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes that cause blackouts, the economy is affected but does not collapse and even after massive damage like that caused by Hurricane Katrina, national security is not affected because U.S. military capability is not degraded (Lewis 2010). Cyber-security is an ever-increasing concern in an increasingly electronic and interconnected world. Cyber-security is a high priority “economic and national security challenge” (National Security Council n.d.) because cyber-attacks are expected to become the top national security threat (Robert S. Mueller 2012). In response to the threat Congress is crafting legislation to enhance cyber-security (Brito and Watkins 2012) and the Department of Homeland Security budget for cyber-security has been significantly increased (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2012).

#### Squo solves base islanding—microgrids

Pike Research ’11 “Military Microgrid Capacity to Experience More than 700% Growth by 2017,” Pike Research, 9/16/2011, http://www.pikeresearch.com/newsroom/military-microgrid-capacity-to-experience-more-than-700-growth-by-2017

The United States Department of Defense (DOD) is the single largest consumer of petroleum in the world. U.S. military operations are also the largest consumer of all forms of energy globally. Microgrids, which enable distributed energy generation at a localized scale including the ability to “island” themselves from larger utility grids, can shrink the amount of fossil fuels consumed to create electricity by networking generators as a system to maximize efficiency. Microgrids enable military bases – both stationary and tactical – to sustain operations no matter what is happening on the larger utility grid or in the theater of war. According to a new report from Pike Research, the capacity of military microgrids will grow at a rate of 739% between 2011 and 2017, increasing from 38 megawatts (MW) to 316 MW during that period, under a baseline forecast scenario. The cleantech market intelligence firm expects that, under a more aggressive adoption scenario, stationary and mobile military microgrid capacity could reach as high as 817 MW during the same timeframe. “The military’s primary concern is disruption of service from utility transmission and distribution lines,” says senior analyst Peter Asmus. “The lack of control and ownership of these lines – and the uneven quality of power service regionally throughout the United States – has prompted the DOD to reexamine the existing electricity service delivery model. This analysis has led the DOD to the inevitable conclusion that the best way to bolster its ability to secure power may well be through microgrid technology it can own and control.” Asmus adds that, as awareness about the electrical grid’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks has increased in recent times, the U.S. military has become one of the strongest proponents of microgrids, which offer the ultimate secure power supply for fixed base mobile operations. Many army, navy, air force, and other related bases and offices already have vintage microgrids in place. What is new, says Asmus, is that these facilities are looking to envelop entire bases with microgrids and integrate distributed energy generation on-site. These resources, when capable of safe islanding from the surrounding grid, offer the ultimate security since fuel never runs out with renewable energy resources such as solar or wind. The opportunity to help develop these microgrids has attracted a number of powerful technology companies including Lockheed Martin, GE, Honeywell, Boeing, and Eaton.

#### No cyberattacks—safeguards protect

Zenko and Cohen ’12 Micah Zenko, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Michael A. Cohen, Fellow at the Century Foundation, “Clear and Present Safety,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety

A more recent bogeyman in national security debates is the threat of so-called cyberwar. Policymakers and pundits have been warning for more than a decade about an imminent “cyber–Pearl Harbor” or “cyber-9/11.” In June 2011, then Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn said that “bits and bytes can be as threatening as bullets and bombs.” And in September 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described cyberattacks as an “existential” threat that “actually can bring us to our knees.” Although the potential vulnerability of private businesses and government agencies to cyberattacks has increased, the alleged threat of cyberwarfare crumbles under scrutiny. No cyberattack has resulted in the loss of a single U.S. citizen’s life. Reports of “kinetic-like” cyberattacks, such as one on an Illinois water plant and a North Korean attack on U.S. government servers, have proved baseless. Pentagon networks are attacked thousands of times a day by individuals and foreign intelligence agencies; so, too, are servers in the private sector. But the vast majority of these attacks fail wherever adequate safeguards have been put in place. Certainly, none is even vaguely comparable to Pearl Harbor or 9/11, and most can be offset by commonsense prevention and mitigation efforts.

#### No lash-out

Macdonald and Parent ’11 Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Miami, “Graceful Decline?” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, Spring 2011, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ISEC\_a\_00034-MacDonald\_proof2.pdf

With regard to militarized disputes, declining great powers demonstrate more caution and restraint in the use of force: they were involved in an average of 1.7 fewer militarized disputes in the five years following ordinal change compared with other great powers over similar periods. 67 Declining great powers also initiated fewer militarized disputes, and their disputes tended to escalate to lower levels of hostility than the baseline category (see figure 2). 68 These findings suggest the need for a fundamental revision to the pessimist’s argument regarding the war proneness of declining powers. 69 Far from being more likely to lash out aggressively, declining states refrain from initiating and escalating military disputes. Nor do declining great powers appear more vulnerable to external predation than other great powers. This may be because external predators have great difficulty assessing the vulnerability of potential victims, or because retrenchment allows vulnerable powers to effectively recover from decline and still deter potential challengers. Moreover, the rate of relative decline is associated with different levels of hostility across militarized disputes. In particular, great powers experiencing medium or small declines are much less likely to escalate their disputes to high levels of hostility. In the five years following an ordinal transition, states facing small declines experience levels of hostility in their militarized disputes that are two and a half times less than the average great power. These findings suggest that diplomatic moderation and compromise can be a particularly attractive strategy for managing moderate declines. Far from encouraging further predation, compromise appears to be a crucial component of retreating to a more defensible—and credible—set of commitments.

## 2NC

### Topicality

#### Procurement is R&D—distinct from financial incentives

CCES ‘9 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “Buildings Overview—Climate Techbook,” May 2009, http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/Buildings%20Overview%20Final.pdf

The mosaic of current policies affecting the building sector is complex and dynamic involving voluntary and mandatory programs implemented at all levels of government, from local to federal. Government efforts to reduce the overall environmental impact of buildings have resulted in numerous innovative policies at the state and local levels. Non-governmental organizations, utilities, and other private actors also play a role in shaping GHG emissions from buildings through third-party “green building” certification, energy efficiency programs, and other efforts. Various taxonomies have been used to describe the policy instruments that govern buildings, typically distinguishing between regulations, financial incentives, information and education, management of government energy use, and subsidies for research and development (R&D). Each of these is broadly described below. Standards and codes Regulatory policies include building and zoning codes, appliance energy efficiency standards, clean energy portfolio standards, and electricity interconnection standards for distributed generation equipment. Building codes can require a minimum level of energy efficiency for new buildings, thus mandating reductions at the construction stage, where there is the most opportunity to integrate efficiency measures. Zoning codes can provide incentives to developers to achieve higher performance. Because of regional differences in such factors as climatic conditions and building practices, and because building and zoning codes are implemented by states and localities, the codes vary considerably across the country. While substantial progress has been made over the past decade, opportunities to strengthen code requirements and compliance remain. Appliance and equipment standards require minimum efficiencies to be met by all regulated products sold; they thereby eliminate the least efficient products from the market. Federal standards exist for many residential and commercial appliances, and several states have implemented standards for appliances not covered by federal standards (see Appliance Efficiency Standards). Financial incentives Financial incentives can best induce energy-efficient behavior where relatively few barriers limit information and decision-making opportunities (e.g., in owner-occupied buildings). Financial incentives include tax credits, rebates, low-interest loans, energy-efficient mortgages, and innovative financing, all of which address the barrier of first costs. Many utilities also offer individual incentive programs, because reducing demand, especially peak demand, can enhance the utility’s system-wide performance. Information and education While many businesses and homeowners express interest in making energy-efficiency improvements for their own buildings and homes, they often do not know which products or services to ask for, who supplies them in their areas, or whether the energy savings realized will live up to claims. Requiring providers to furnish good information to consumers on the performance of appliances, equipment and even entire buildings is a powerful tool for promoting energy efficiency by enabling intelligent consumer choices. Lead-by-example programs A variety of mechanisms are available to ensure that government agencies lead by example in the effort to build and manage more energy-efficient buildings and reduce GHG emissions. For example, several cities and states, and federal agencies (including the General Services Administration), have mandated LEED or LEED-equivalent certification for public buildings, and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 includes provisions for reduced energy use and energy efficiency improvements in federal buildings. Research and development (R&D) In the long run, the opportunities for a low-greenhouse gas energy future depend critically on new and emerging technologies. Some technological improvements are incremental and have a high probability of commercial introduction over the next decade (such as low-cost compact fluorescents). Other technology advances will require considerable R&D before they can become commercially feasible (such as solid-state lighting). The fragmented and highly competitive market structure of the building sector and the small size of most building companies discourage private R&D, on both individual components and the interactive performance of components in whole buildings. Building Technologies Center. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Buildings Technology Center was established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and performs research into issues including heating and cooling equipment, thermal engineering, weatherization, building design and performance, envelope systems and materials, and power systems. Emerging Technologies. This U.S. DOE-sponsored program develops technology that would reduce energy use in residential and commercial buildings by 60-70 percent. Technologies are in fields including solid-state lighting, space conditioning and refrigeration, building envelopes, and analysis tools and design strategies that would facilitate the development of energy efficient buildings through software and computer-based building analysis.

#### Prefer technical definitions on questions of energy production

Brown ’59 John R. Brown, judge on 5th circuit court of appeals, “CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION,” Dissenting Opinion, 266 F.2d 208; 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 5196; 10 Oil & Gas Rep. 601

Indeed, I do not think that my cautious Brothers would have undertaken this excursion had they not first have found (or assumed) a basis for considering production in its ordinary, common usage. For clearly, what the Court says does not follow if the term is used in the sense of the oil and gas field. For example, the Court states, 'In the ordinary language of purchase and sale of a product where it is in deliverable form the stream of gas is, in a sense, 'produced' at the latest after it has passed through the first master valve. \* \* \*.' Again, it states, 'but this does not change the fact that in the ordinary sense of the terms production of the gas has been completed at or just above the surface of the ground where it is physically deliverable but then is shut in until delivery commences.'To support this approach, the Court frankly states that 'our duty here is not to determine what is generally understood in the industry, in the resolution of other relationships, is meant by 'production." It is, rather, the Court goes on to say 'to determine what Congress meant by the term.' Reading § 1(b) as though it contained only the first part of the sentence and disregarding [\*\*35] altogether the exclusionary phrases at its end, the Court then proceeds to find that the sole Congressional purpose was 'to regulate these interstate sales.' This causes the Court then to reject the industry context and adopt a construction of 'production' which 'is in line with ordinary non-technical usage' so that it will 'effectuate and not \* \* \* frustrate the purpose of the law.'.' The abundant legislative history canvassed by the many Supreme Court cases But Congress was not legislating in an atmosphere of 'ordinary non-technical usage reveals an articulate awareness of the complexities of this whole business. The object of § 1(b) was clearly to define the purpose to regulate [\*220] transportation and sale and companies engaged in such transportation or sale. This was done against the background fully known to Congress that at one end of the process was the production of the natural gas, that at the other end was the consumer, and in between were those who transported and distributed it. As pointed out in Part I above, the Court has been emphatic in ascribing an intention to Congress to exclude those matters which relate to the local production activities [\*\*36] traditionally reserved to states for their exclusive control.We are told that § 1(b) exclusion is a provision '\* \* \* that \* \* \* precludes the Commission from and control over the activity of producing or gathering natural gas. \* \* \*.' Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 1945, 324 U.S. 581, 603, 65 S.Ct. 829, 839, 89 L.Ed. 1206. Two years later this was reiterated in Interstate Natural Gas Company v. FPC, 1947, 331 U.S. 682, 690, 67 S.Ct. 1482, 1487, 91 L.Ed. 1742. 'Clearly, among the powers thus reserved to the States is the power to regulate the physical production and gathering of natural gas in the interests of conservation or of any other consideration of legitimate local concern. It was the intention of Congress to give the States full freedom in these matters.'Within another two years this was reemphasized in FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 1949, 337 U.S. 498, 509-13, 69 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 93 L.Ed. 1499. 'To accept these arguments springing from power to allow interstate service, fix rates and control abandonment would establish wide control by the Federal Power Commission over the production and gathering [\*\*37] of gas. It would invite expansion of power into other phases of the forbidden area. It would be an assumption of powers specifically denied the Commission by the words of the Act as explained in the report and on the floor of both Houses of Congress. The legislative history of this Act is replete with evidence of the care taken by Congress to keep the power over the production and gathering of gas within the states.'How Congress expected to preserve the absolute freedom of the States in matters concerning production unless that term was used in the context of that industry is nowhere made clear by my Brothers. If Congress were to adhere to its purpose, carefully to regulate some but not all of the natural gas moving of dedicated to move in interstate commerce, it was required to prescribe the boundary limits of each in terms of the business and industry to be regulated. That is the usual, not the extraordinary, principle of statutory construction long ago set forth in Unwin v. Hanson, (1891) 2 Q.B. 115, 119, approved in O'Hara v. Luckenback Steamship Co., 1926, 269 U.S. 364, 370-371, 46 S.Ct. 157, 160, 70 L.Ed. 313:'If the act is one [\*\*38] passed with reference to a particular trade, business, or transaction, and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business, or transaction, knows and understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning, though it may differ from the common or ordinary meaning of the words.'And see 50 Am.Jur., Statutes § 277 (1944).What is 'production of natural gas' is to be determined in the light of the actual substantive conditions and engineering-business requirements of that great field of scientific mechanical activity. Such activity is not to be assayed by Judges who, learned in the law, have naught but the limited technical experience and cumulative knowledge of the ordinary person.Judged by the standards of the industry, not only by what was said and uncontradicted, but by what was done on a large scale in this very field, the Commission could only find that all of Continental's facilities were essential to and a part of the production of gas. [\*221] IV.The Court's action and opinion is portentous. It is so precisely because it is based on an erroneous assumption and an equally [\*\*39] erroneous construction. It assumes that we are fact finders to supplant or supplement the expert agency. It finds the capacity to cope with this problem by relieving it of all technical complexities and casting it in the mold of the ordinary meaning of production.The Court finds 'that in the ordinary sense of the term production of the gas has been completed at or just above the surface of the ground where it is physically deliverable \* \* \*.' (emphasis in the original) Tying this in to the point of delivery (at the very extreme end of Continental's 4-inch master value and at the very beginning of El Paso's swage), the Court has necessarily adopted the approach of the Commission that facilities for the sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission are those 'serving to contain the gas at the point of delivery.' That it means to champion this construction is likewise established by the Court's unqualified approval, both here and in Sun Oil Company v. FPC, 5 Cir., 1959, 266 F.2d 222, of J. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, 3 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d 550, 556 and Saturn Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 10 Cir., 1957, 250 F.2d 61, 69, [\*\*40] the latter of which states: 'To us it is clear that facilities necessary to effect a sale of gas in interstate commerce are facilities used in interstate commerce and are within the jurisdiction of the Commission. This would seem to be the plain intent of section 7(c). The Third Circuit has so held in J. M. Huber Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 3 Cir., 236 F.2d 550, 556.'The vice of this rationale is compounded by the Court's interpretation of 'production' or 'production facilities' in terms of ordinary non-industry connotation. But even without this, if the test is to be stated in terms of that piece of equipment which is needed to effectuate the sale or contain the gas at the point of sale delivery, then there is in fact no physical limitation. In those terms the master valve (whether upper or lower, or both) does not alone contain the gas. The master valves are ineffective without the continuation of the leakproof surface casing, the production casing or many other parts of the well, all of which operate simultaneously and indispensably to bring and hold the gas under effective control.That is critical since § 7(c) requires certification [\*\*41] of facilities which are to be constructed or extended. And once a little intrusion is made into the forbidden 1(b) area of production, it is only logical to expect (and justify) application of the full reach of this concept. It stops in a given well where, but only where, the particular piece of equipment may be said to directly assist in the containment of the gas at delivery point. Worse, it means that by the force of § 7(c), the drilling and equipping of a new well could only be done by express approval of the Commission.We and all others have now firmly held that on the commencement of the first jurisdictional sale, the Commission's power attaches at least to the sale. The Court by our present opinion holds that simultaneously power attaches to some piece of gas well equipment. If the jurisdictional sale setting all of this Federal control in motion is in the common form of a long-term dedication-of-reserves- contract by which the mineral owner undertakes to develop a field and deliver all production to the long line pipe line purchaser, the result will be that the drilling of additional wells may not be done except on Commission terms and approval. In such [\*\*42] a situation the 'new' well would, of course, be the means by which to effectuate the sale of the gas. Since this would constitute 'the construction or extension of any facilities' for the sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and would result in the acquisition and operation of 'such facilities or extensions thereof,' it would, as § 7(c) demands, positively require that the Commission issue a certificate of public [\*222] convenience and necessity 'authorizing such acts or operation.'Combining this opinion and Sun Oil, this day decided, this Court binds a gas well owner to produce gas for as long as the Commission prescribes. Neither the length of the contract nor the production-nature of the facility by which the 'service' (sale) is performed are an effective limitation. Until nature shuts off the gas the Commission is the perpetual regulator from whose power the Commission's own brief says, '\* \* \* there is no \* \* \* hiding place.'Congress did not mean to invest its creature with these scriptural powers (Psalms 139:7, 8). Section 1(b) draws the line at production.

### Solvency

#### Alt cause: skilled worker shortage

Toni Johnson, Council on Foreign Relations, “Nuclear power expansion challenges” CFR 3/8/11 <http://www.cfr.org/united-states/nuclear-power-expansion-challenges/p16886#p6>

Skilled Workers. Another issue both for construction and operation of reactors is lack of trained personnel. In the United States, 35 percent of nuclear workers will reach retirement age (US News) within the next few years. University majors and other educational programs supporting the industry have diminished in the past two decades, as has the number of students going into such programs.

#### Workforce is retiring—shortage of skilled labor is incoming

Retief ’10 Hilmar Retief, Product Manager, Bentley Systems, Incorporated, “Knowledge Management: Solving the Nuclear Industry’s Brain Drain: How to Capture and Manage Your Company’s Institutional Knowledge for Immediate Action,” 2010, http://ftp2.bentley.com/dist/collateral/docs/assetwise/wp\_knowledge-management\_hilmar-retief.pdf

As the nuclear renaissance takes shape, many organizations in this industry face a shortage of skills and knowledge due to retiring baby boomers. These retirements threaten nuclear facility bottom lines and compromise the safety and reliability of plant operations. The heyday of global nuclear development drew top talent from the best universities and an abundant pool of engineering and nuclear knowledge workers. However, in the United States, there hasn’t been a new nuclear power plant come online since the mid-1980s. This latency in the evolution of nuclear power not only reduced the number of university programs dedicated to nuclear, but also discouraged new engineers from pursuing disciplines in the nuclear field. The global freeze on new nuclear plant development during this same period further limited the amount of new talent entering the industry. Today, the new emphasis on green energy, smaller carbon footprints, and reducing the ecological impact and cost of fossil fuels is reviving the nuclear industry, resulting in more demand for nuclear professionals and an increased awareness of the need to maintain, sustain, and increase the nuclear knowledge base. But the growth of the industry will be impeded unless viable solutions are implemented to capture and apply the knowledge of the existing nuclear workforce. In 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published a report titled Risk Management of Knowledge Loss in Nuclear Industry Organizations. The report states that the U.S. is facing a ‘graying’ workforce in which literally half the current workers will reach retirement age within the next five years. And the bad news doesn’t stop there. It goes on to say that, “The lead time required to produce an individual capable of safely operating the complex nuclear systems and technologies may exceed the time frame available until substantial retirement of the existing workforce begins.”

#### A maximum of 4 LWRs can be produced on earth per year

Jackson 2008— David Jackson [PhD. Professor (Adjunct) of Engineering Physics at McMaster University] Will forgings be available for Canadian light water reactors? May 21, 2008, <http://reactorscanada.com/2008/05/21/will-forgings-be-available-for-canadian-light-water-reactors/>

If light water reactors (LWR’s) such as those proposed by Areva, Westinghouse and GE Hitachi (now out of the race) are to be built in Ontario then these companies must assure their Canadian customers that the forgings for them are available. This is a critical resource problem limiting the building of new LWR’s everywhere in the world for the next five to ten years. A Bloomberg article appeared March 12, 2008 that explains this: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&refer=home&sid=aaVMzCTMz3ms It reports that Japan Steel Works Ltd. is the only manufacturer of these forgings left in the world. They developed the technology during the Second World War for producing large bore guns for battleships. All the facilities elsewhere in the world were shut down during the long drought in reactor orders that is only now ending. This is a major bottleneck because each new LWR requires at least one of the largest forgings for its pressure vessel but Japan Steel Works makes only four per year. Ultimately this means only four new light water reactors can come on stream per year. It takes in the order of eight to ten years or more to construct an LWR and at any given time many reactors may be on order and in various stages of completion. Even though some reactor vendors may have a few forgings “in the bank” at an estimated $100 million, four LWR’s per year is now a fundamental limitation.

### LFTRs CP

#### Evaluate a high risk of our impacts. Dispersing standard nuclear power magnifies all risks.

Smith ’11 Gar Smith, “Don’t Mini-mize the Dangers of Nuclear Power,” Earth Island Journal, Summer 2011, http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/eij/article/dont\_mini-mize\_the\_dangers\_of\_nuclear\_power

But SMRs still depend on designs that generate intense heat, employ dangerous materials (highly reactive sodium coolant), and generate nuclear waste. SMRs also retain all the risks associated with supplying, maintaining, safeguarding, and dismantling large nuclear reactors – only now those risks would be multiplied and decentralized. The planet can’t afford nuclear energy – be it mega or mini. As Dave Brower observed 30 years ago: “Is the minor convenience of allowing the present generation the luxury of doubling its energy consumption every 10 years worth the major hazard of exposing the next 20,000 generations to this lethal waste? “We are at the edge of an abyss and we’re close to being irrevocably lost,” Dave warned. “As the Welshman Allen Reese puts it: ‘At the edge of the abyss, the only progressive move you can make is to step back.’”

#### SMRs cause accidents

Makhijani and Boyd 2010 – ARJUN MAKHIJANI [Arjun Makhijani is an electrical and nuclear engineer who is President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research] and MICHELE BOYD [Michele Boyd is the former director of the Safe Energy Program at Physicians for Social Responsibility] “Small Modular Reactors No Solution for the Cost, Safety, and Waste Problems of Nuclear Power” Fact sheet completed in September 2010 <http://www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/small-modular-reactors-no.pdf>

Increased safety and proliferation problems Mass manufacturing raises a host of new safety, quality, and licensing concerns that the NRC has yet to address. For instance, the NRC may have to devise and test new licensing and inspection procedures for the manufacturing facilities, including inspec tions of welds and the like. There may have to be a process for recalls in case of major defects in mass-manufactured reactors, as there is with other mass-manufactured products from cars to hamburger meat. It is unclear how recalls would work, especially if transportation offsite and prolonged work at a repair facility were required. Some vendors, such as PBMR (Pty) Ltd. and Toshiba, are proposing to manufacture the reactors in foreign countries. In order to reduce costs, it is likely that manufacturing will move to countries with cheaper labor forces, such as China, where severe quality problems have arisen in many products from drywall to infant formula to rabies vaccine. Other issues that will affect safety are NRC requirements for operating and security personnel, which have yet to be determined. To reduce operating costs, some SMR vendors are advocating lowering the number of staff in the control room so that one operator would be responsible for three modules. 12 In addition, the SMR designers and potential operators are proposing to reduce the number of security staff, as well as the area that must be protected. NRC staff is looking to designers to incorporate security into the SMR designs, but this has yet to be done. 13 Ultimately, reducing staff raises serious questions about whether there would be sufficient personnel to respond adequately to an accident.

#### Any accident turns the case

Squassoni ‘8 Sharon Squassoni, “Nuclear Power in a Warming World: Solution or Illusion?” TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND GLOBAL WARMING, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/12/2008, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/squassoni\_testimony\_20080312.pdf

A few caveats with respect to projecting nuclear energy expansion are necessary. Nuclear energy is undoubtedly safer and more efficient now than when it began fifty years ago, but it still faces four fundamental challenges: waste, cost, proliferation, and safety. It is an inherently risky business. Most industry executives will admit that it will only take one significant accident to plunge the “renaissance” back into the nuclear Dark Ages. Because of this, estimates are highly uncertain. For example, the U.S. Energy Information Administration does not use its computer model to estimate nuclear energy growth because, among other things, key variables such as public attitudes and government policy are difficult to quantify and project. That said, estimates tend to extrapolate electricity consumption and demand from gross domestic product (GDP) growth, make assumptions about nuclear energy’s share of electricity production, and then estimate nuclear reactor capacity.

#### Prolif causes brinksmanship which guarantees miscalc, accidental launch, or out-of control escalation

Kroenig ’12 Matthew Kroenig, Council on Foreign Relations Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and Georgetown University assistant professor of government, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 5/26/2012, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30

First and foremost, proliferation optimists do not appear to understand contemporary deterrence theory. I do not say this lightly in an effort to marginalize or discredit my intellectual opponents. Rather, I make this claim with all due caution and with complete sincerity. A careful review of the contemporary proliferation optimism literature does not reflect an understanding of, or engagement with, the developments in academic deterrence theory in top scholarly journals such as the American Political Science Review and International Organization over the past few decades.[35] While early optimists like Viner and Brodie can be excused for not knowing better, the writings of contemporary proliferation optimists ignore the past fifty years of academic research on nuclear deterrence theory. In the 1940s, Viner, Brodie, and others argued that the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) rendered war among major powers obsolete, but nuclear deterrence theory soon advanced beyond that simple understanding.[36] After all, great power political competition does not end with nuclear weapons. And nuclear-armed states still seek to threaten nuclear-armed adversaries. States cannot credibly threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they still want to coerce their adversaries. This leads to a credibility problem: how can states credibly threaten a nuclear-armed opponent? Since the 1960s academic nuclear deterrence theory has been devoted almost exclusively to answering this question.[37] And, unfortunately for proliferation optimists, the answers do not give us reasons to be optimistic. Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational means by which states can threaten nuclear-armed opponents.[38] He argued that leaders cannot credibly threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they can make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”[39] They can engage in a process, the nuclear crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. As states escalate a nuclear crisis there is an increasing probability that the conflict will spiral out of control and result in an inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange. As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the incremental increase in the risk of nuclear war, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherently credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of nuclear war before back down will win the crisis as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for this reason that Thomas Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a “competition in risk taking.”[40] This does not mean that states eagerly bid up the risk of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching decisions at each stage of the crisis. They can quit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Or they can the escalate the crisis in an attempt to prevail, but only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear exchange. Since 1945 there were have been many high stakes nuclear crises (by my count, there have been twenty) in which “rational” states like the United States run a risk of nuclear war and inch very close to the brink of nuclear war.[41] By asking whether states can be deterred or not, therefore, proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that Iran will not intentionally commit national suicide by launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the United States or Israel. This does not mean that Iran will never use nuclear weapons, however. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to think that a nuclear-armed Iran would not, at some point, find itself in a crisis with another nuclear-armed power and that it would not be willing to run any risk of nuclear war in order to achieve its objectives. If a nuclear-armed Iran and the United States or Israel have a geopolitical conflict in the future, over say the internal politics of Syria, an Israeli conflict with Iran’s client Hezbollah, the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf, passage through the Strait of Hormuz, or some other issue, do we believe that Iran would immediately capitulate? Or is it possible that Iran would push back, possibly even brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to deter its adversaries? If the latter, there is a real risk that proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war. An optimist might counter that nuclear weapons will never be used, even in a crisis situation, because states have such a strong incentive, namely national survival, to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used. But, this objection ignores the fact that leaders operate under competing pressures. Leaders in nuclear-armed states also have very strong incentives to convince their adversaries that nuclear weapons could very well be used. Historically we have seen that in crises, leaders purposely do things like put nuclear weapons on high alert and delegate nuclear launch authority to low level commanders, purposely increasing the risk of accidental nuclear war in an attempt to force less-resolved opponents to back down.

#### Breakout prolif risks nuclear war—small arsenals aren’t effective deterrents

Kroenig ’12 Matthew Kroenig, Council on Foreign Relations Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and Georgetown University assistant professor of government, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 5/26/2012, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30

Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities and eliminate the threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use ‘em or loose ‘em pressures. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.[54] If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. In a future Israeli-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent.

#### It snowballs—prolif causes more prolif

Kroenig ’12 Matthew Kroenig, Council on Foreign Relations Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and Georgetown University assistant professor of government, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 5/26/2012, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30

Further proliferation. Nuclear proliferation poses an additional threat to international peace and security because it causes further proliferation. As former Secretary of State George Schultz once said, “proliferation begets proliferation.”[69] When one country acquires nuclear weapons, its regional adversaries, feeling threatened by its neighbor’s new nuclear capabilities, are more likely to attempt to acquire nuclear weapons in response. Indeed, the history of nuclear proliferation can be read as a chain reaction of proliferation. The United States acquired nuclear weapons in response to Nazi Germany’s crash nuclear program. The Soviet Union and China acquired nuclear weapons to counter the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The United Kingdom and France went nuclear to protect themselves from the Soviet Union. India’s bomb was meant to counter China and it, in turn, spurred Pakistan to join the nuclear club. Today, we worry that, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, other Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, might desire nuclear capabilities, triggering an arms race in a strategically important and volatile region.

#### Prolif’s net destabilizing:

#### Stability/instability paradox

Kroenig ’12 Matthew Kroenig, Council on Foreign Relations Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and Georgetown University assistant professor of government, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 5/26/2012, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30

The final gaping weakness in the proliferation optimist argument, however, is that it rests on a logical contradiction. This is particularly ironic, given that many optimists like to portray themselves as hard-headed thinkers, following their premises to their logical conclusions. But, the contradiction at the heart of the optimist argument is glaring and simple to understand: either the probability of nuclear war is zero, or it is nonzero, but it cannot be both. If the probability of nuclear war is zero, then nuclear weapons should have no deterrent effect. States will not be deterred by a nuclear war that could never occur and states should be willing to intentionally launch large-scale wars against nuclear-armed states. In this case, proliferation optimists cannot conclude that the spread of nuclear weapons is stabilizing. If, on the other hand, the probability of nuclear war is nonzero, then there is a real danger that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the probability of a catastrophic nuclear war. If this is true, then proliferation optimists cannot be certain that nuclear weapons will never be used. In sum, the spread of nuclear weapons can either raise the risk of nuclear war and in so doing, deter large-scale conventional conflict. Or there is no danger that nuclear weapons will be used and the spread of nuclear weapons does not increase international instability. But, despite the claims of the proliferation optimists, it is nonsensical to argue that nuclear weapons will never be used and to simultaneously claim that their spread contributes to international stability.

#### Chain reactions of armament risk pre-emption

Kroenig ’12 Matthew Kroenig, Council on Foreign Relations Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and Georgetown University assistant professor of government, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 5/26/2012, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30

Wohlstetter’s study undermined a key pillar of proliferation optimism. If nuclear forces were potentially vulnerable, encouraging an enemy nuclear attack, it was not a great leap to argue that the spread of nuclear weapons would not necessarily lead to peace. Just as a belief in minimum deterrence supports the idea of a nuclear peace, attention to nuclear vulnerability and counterforce nuclear war necessarily leads to proliferation pessimism. Indeed, it is difficult to find analysts who simultaneously believe that the details of nuclear posture matter and that the spread of nuclear weapons necessarily leads to peace. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Albert Wohlstetter was a proliferation pessimist. In subsequent writing, Wohlstetter catalogued the potential downsides of nuclear proliferation for U.S. interests, even if nuclear weapons spread to friendly states, such as America’s NATO allies.[13] First, he identified nuclear war as a potential problem. A few nuclear weapons would not be enough for deterrence, but rather “The problem of deterring a major power requires a continuing effort because the requirements for deterrence will change with the counter-measures taken by the major power.”[14] But, if that investment was not made, deterrence could fail and nuclear war could result. Second, Wohlstetter worried that the spread of nuclear weapons within the NATO alliance would undermine alliance cohesion by making the allied states less interdependent. Third, Wohlstetter forecasted that the spread of nuclear weapons would lead to the further spread of nuclear weapons. He criticized U.S. decision makers for calculating the pros and cons of nuclear proliferation to an “Nth” state without also figuring in the potential negative consequences of what he called the “N+1 problem.”[15]

#### Empirics are meaningless—they don’t falsify any of the devastating risks accompanying prolif

Kroenig ’12 Matthew Kroenig, Council on Foreign Relations Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and Georgetown University assistant professor of government, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 5/26/2012, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30

The anti-obsessionists make some thought-provoking points and may help to reign in some of the most hyperbolic accounts of the effect of nuclear proliferation. They remind us, for example, that our worst fears have not been realized, at least not yet. Yet, by taking the next step and arguing that nuclear weapons have been, and will continue to be, irrelevant, they go too far. Their arguments call to mind the story about the man who jumps to his death from the top of a New York City skyscraper and, when asked how things are going as he passes the 15th story window, replies, “so far so good.” The idea that world history would have been largely unchanged had nuclear weapons not been invented is a provocative one, but it is also unfalsifiable. There is good reason to believe that world history would have been different, and in many ways better, had certain countries not acquired nuclear weapons. Let’s take Pakistan as an example. Pakistan officially joined the ranks of the nuclear powers in May 1998 when it followed India in conducting a series of nuclear tests. Since then, Pakistan has been a poster child for the possible negative consequences of nuclear proliferation. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have led to further nuclear proliferation as Pakistan, with the help of rogue scientist A.Q. Khan, transferred uranium enrichment technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.[50] Indeed, part of the reason that North Korea and Iran are so far along with their uranium enrichment programs is because they got help from Pakistan. Pakistan has also become more aggressive since acquiring nuclear weapons, displaying an increased willingness to sponsor cross-border incursions into India with terrorists and irregular forces.[51] In a number of high-stakes nuclear crises between India and Pakistan, U.S. officials worried that the conflicts could escalate to a nuclear exchange and intervened diplomatically to prevent Armageddon on the subcontinent. The U.S. government also worries about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, fearing that Pakistan’s nukes could fall into the hands of terrorists in the event of a state collapse or a break down in nuclear security. And we still have not witnessed the full range of consequences arising from Pakistani nuclear proliferation. Islamabad has only possessed the bomb for a little over a decade, but they are likely to keep it for decades to come, meaning that we could still have a nuclear war involving Pakistan. In short, Pakistan’s nuclear capability has already had deleterious effects on U.S. national security and these threats are only likely to grow over time.

#### Bioweapons don’t cause extinction—natural resistance and health tech solves

Easterbrook ‘3 Gregg Easterbrook, editor of The New Republic, “We’re All Gonna Die!” Wired, July 2003, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html

3. Germ warfare! Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn't kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today's Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.

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### Fisky Cliff DA

#### Causes global conflict that escalates to extinction

Austin 9 (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187, AV)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

A card that’s also like, double dip coming now (U.S. consumer spending, European debt crisis warrants, etc) would be helpful. This is just so you have a fast TF for DA debates because at the moment, your impact is about a long recession instead of a short collapse. That’s cool because you don’t have to win that the plan is absolutely amazing for the econ, just that it makes it resilient, revives enough to stave off collapse. I guess idk.

#### Sequestration independently turns heg- cripples hard power and irreversibly sets back procurement

Bucci and Graham 12 (Steven Bucci, PhD in IR from USC, professor of terrorism studies and cyber security policy at Long Island U., and senior research fellow for defense and homeland security at the Heritage Foundation. Owen Graham, masters of international politics from American U. and research coordinator for national security and foreign policy at Heritage. “Sequestration’s Shadow on the Defense Industrial Base” Heritage 7/13/12 <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/07/13/sequestrations-shadow-on-the-defense-industrial-base/>)

Unless the President and Congress change current law, the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces will soon face an indiscriminate, across-the-board cut of more than $500 billion over the next decade.¶ Known as “sequestration,” this massive reduction in defense spending comes in addition to the $487 billion in long-term military cuts already proposed by President Obama this year.¶ Civilian and military leaders have repeatedly warned of the dangers of these deep defense cuts. In a November 2011 letter, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta cautioned lawmakers that sequestration cuts will be “devastating” to national defense, yielding the “smallest ground forces since 1940,” “a fleet of fewer than 230 ships, the smallest level since 1915,” and the “smallest tactical fighter force in the history of the Air Force.” Moreover, General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, bluntly told the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2012, “I am prepared to say that sequestration would pose unacceptable risk” to national security.¶ Although the multi-year process of sequestration does not technically begin until January 2, 2013, it is already casting a dark shadow on the future readiness and responsiveness of America’s defense industrial base. As Robert J. Stevens, chairman and chief executive officer of Lockheed Martin, warned:¶ The sequestration process has occurred independent of any correlation with strategy, force structure, technology needs or operational reality.… The impact on industry would be devastating, with a significant disruption of ongoing programs and initiatives, facility closures and substantial additional personnel reductions that would severely impact advanced manufacturing operations, erode engineering expertise, and accelerate the loss of skills and knowledge, directly undermining a key provision of our new national security strategy, which is to preserve the industrial base, not dismantle it.¶ Once such effects take hold, they will not be easy or inexpensive to reverse. What’s worse, they could have dire implications for the defense industrial base’s future readiness and responsiveness to the competitive and ever-changing international threat environment and also for the U.S. military’s future combat capabilities in unforeseen crises. To help safeguard the country’s long-term national security, the White House and Capitol Hill should therefore act quickly to responsibly reverse sequestration.

#### Specifically wrecks the ability to deter attacks like cyber attacks

Maginnis 11 (Robert, retired Army lieutenant colonel, “‘CATASTROPHIC’ DEFENSE CUTS SEEN AS TIPPING POINT OF U.S. MILITARY SUPREMACY” Human events 10/20/11 <http://www.humanevents.com/2011/10/20/catastrophic-defense-cuts-seen-as-tipping-point-of-us-military-supremacy/>

Our nuclear deterrence could diminish. Cuts would undermine our nuclear triad—our ability to detect and defend against missile attack, nuclear weapons inventories, and satellite space-launch capabilities. These cuts could cause allies and adversaries to question our ability to provide a nuclear response to an attack, concludes the Republican staff.¶ ¶ Military infrastructure and the industrial base could suffer a serious blow. Shipyards could be closed, long-planned military construction projects may be scuttled, and a new round of Base Realignment and Closure would be necessary. Much of the armed services’ equipment modernization and recapitalization could be put on hold or canceled, including the Joint Strike Fighter and the much-needed aerial refueling tanker.¶ ¶ Defense spending may be discretionary, but constitutionally national security is government’s top responsibility. We live in a dangerous world which demands a significant armed force to protect America across all domains—air, land, sea, space and cyberspace. ¶ ¶ America must get its fiscal house in order, and defense should share the burden. But providing national security on the cheap to avoid cutting social programs to help Democrats’ political fortunes is wrongheaded, and may in fact create a tipping point for America as the world’s leading military power.

#### Yes deal – Obama reelect leading to compromise

Montgomery 11/11 (Lori, WaPo, On edge of brutal ‘fiscal cliff,’ some see an opportunity to end debt paralysis http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/on-edge-of-brutal-fiscal-cliff-some-see-an-opportunity-to-end-debt-paralysis/2012/11/11/40d5e6d0-2bfa-11e2-89d4-040c9330702a\_print.html)

Many Republicans say Obama’s victory will serve to break the stalemate. With his post-election speech, Boehner essentially offered to reverse three decades of GOP orthodoxy on taxes.¶ “The movement on the part of the GOP to say that revenues are part of this mix is significant,” said Rep. Peter Roskam (R-Ill.), who as chief deputy whip will be responsible for rounding up votes. “Obama can take his victory lap on more revenue. Let’s give the GOP a victory lap on keeping rates low and call it a win.”

#### Yes compromise – bipart momentum towards a deal

Williams 11/11 (Matt, the Guardian, “Fiscal cliff deal can be reached, say leading Republicans and Democrats http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/11/fiscal-cliff-deal-republicans-democrats)

Both sides of Washington's political divide expressed optimism Sunday that a deal could be struck to avoid the "fiscal cliff" of swinging spending cuts and tax increases that could put the US economy back into reverse.¶ Speaking on Fox News Sunday, Republican senator Bob Corker acknowledged that raising revenue from America's rich would have to be part of the plan to reduce soaring national debt. But he pushed for the closing of loopholes as a way to increase the government take, rather than upping the tax rate on millionaires.¶ Nonetheless, Corker suggested that a "basis for the deal" with Democrats existed. David Axelrod, one of President Barack Obama's closest aides, also appeared to suggest there was room for compromise.¶ "Obviously there is money to be gained by closing some of these loopholes and applying them to deficit reduction," Axelrod told CBS's Face the Nation. "I think there are a lot of ways to skin this cat, so long as everybody comes with a positive attitude towards the task."¶ Such comments will raise hopes that a deal will be reached before scheduled $600bn spending cuts and tax increases take effect at the end of the year. Some economists fear that a failure to avoid falling off the so-called "fiscal cliff" could be catastrophic for the US economic revival, plunging it back into recession.

#### Yes deal – GOP moving towards tax increases

Litvan 11/11 (Laura, Bloomberg, Lawmakers in Both Parties See Resolution to U.S. Fiscal Cliff http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-11-11/lawmakers-in-both-parties-see-resolution-to-u-dot-s-dot-fiscal-cliff)

Top lawmakers in both political parties today predicted a resolution to the standoff on the U.S. fiscal cliff that threatens to yield $607 billion in tax increases and automatic spending cuts in January. They said details of a debt-cutting deal may come later.¶ Senate Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad, a North Dakota Democrat, said he thinks lawmakers can reach a “framework agreement” directing tax and spending panels in Congress to craft a broad deal next year that cuts soaring budget deficits. At the same time, he said, they could agree now to a smaller package of spending cuts and some tax-code changes before the year is over.¶ If the legislative panels don’t act, all sides would have to agree to a fallback plan that would be more acceptable than the automatic approach that is sparking economic uncertainty, Conrad said on “Fox News Sunday.”¶ “I absolutely believe there is room for agreement,” Conrad said.¶ Senator Bob Corker, a Tennessee Republican, said he agrees there is little chance of the automatic policies occurring, and said Republicans are open to some tax increases if Democrats would be willing to embrace a broad reform of the Medicare health insurance system for the elderly to yield big cost savings. Short of a broad-based deal, he said at the very least any extension of current policies shouldn’t be the type of several-months stop-gap that has marked the deadlocked fiscal policy debate.

#### GOP will come around- GOP hopeful on compromise, Boehner can sell a deal

Cooper and Weisman 11/10 (Helene and Jonathan, NYT, “Obama to insist on tax increase for the wealthy” <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/us/politics/obama-and-boehner-circle-each-other-on-budget-impasse.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20121110&pagewanted=all>)

The speaker, who has struggled with his more conservative rank and file in the past, said he was confident that he could pass a deal if one was reached with the White House. “When the president and I have been able to come to an agreement, there has been no problem getting it passed here in the House,” he said.¶ House Republican leadership aides found some positive signals in Mr. Obama’s combative tone. They noted that he never specified he wants tax rates to rise, only that he wants additional revenues generated by taxes on the rich. That would give both sides the latitude to devise a restructured tax code that eliminates or limits tax deductions and credits for the rich — or that follows Mitt Romney’s proposal to cap deductions at a set limit for rich households, though many analysts say that approach alone cannot raise the revenue Democrats want.

#### SMRs create congressional conflicts—fiscal discipline, waste, safety

Hopf 11

Jim is a blogger at NuclearCafe.org, 10/25/2011, “Roadblock in Congress for SMR Development” <http://ansnuclearcafe.org/2011/10/25/congress-smr/>

As discussed in my [June 20 post](http://ansnuclearcafe.org/2011/06/20/small-modular-reactors-and-current-policy-initiatives/), small modular reactors (SMRs) have many potential advantages, and could very well represent nuclear’s best prospect for the future. The industry has run into trouble, however, in getting government support for getting SMRs off the ground. The Obama administration has made a multi-year, $450 million [request](http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/07/14/8) for SMR development, including $67 million this year to support SMR licensing. The U.S. House of Representatives has included the $67 million in its 2012 [budget](http://www.politico.com/morningenergy/1011/morningenergy354.html) bill. That funding got removed from the U.S. Senate budget bill, however, by the Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee, due primarily to opposition from Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein (D., Cal.). Feinstein cited the fact that SMRs would create additional nuclear [waste](http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/07/14/8), for which there is still no permanent disposal site, as a reason for her opposition. She also said that federal nuclear R&D money should be spent on [safety](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-06/senate-panel-led-by-democrats-cuts-obama-s-clean-energy-programs.html), as opposed to new reactor development, in light of the Fukushima disaster.

#### Opposition to SMRs—fear of waste, contamination, terrorism

Smith ’10 Rebecca Smith, “Small Reactors Generate Big Hopes,” Wall Street Journal, 2/18/2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703444804575071402124482176.html

"We see significant benefits from the new, modular technology," said Donald Moul, vice president of nuclear support for First Energy, an Ohio-based utility company. He said First Energy, which operates four reactors at three sites in Ohio and Pennsylvania, has made no decision to build any new reactor and noted there's "a lot of heavy lifting to do to get this reactor certified" by the NRC for U.S. use. Indeed, the smaller reactors still could incite major opposition. They face the same unresolved issues of where to put the waste and public fear of contamination, in the event of an accident. They could also raise alarms about creating possible terrorism targets in populated areas. Still, the sudden interest in small reactors illustrates a growing unease with the route that nuclear power has taken for half a century. What many regard as the first commercial reactor built in the U.S., in 1957 at Shippingport, Pa., was only about 60 megawatts in size. By the time construction petered out three decades later, reactors had grown progressively bigger, ending up at about 1,000 megawatts of capacity.

#### Empirically causes fights – kills bipart

Restuccia 12 (Andrew, The Hill, Feb 13, [thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/210335-energy-dept-nears-approval-of-83b-nuclear-loan-setting-up-capitol-hill-fight], jam)

Energy Secretary Steven Chu said Monday he expects to finalize an $8.3 billion taxpayer-backed loan for two new nuclear reactors in Georgia, setting up another battle on Capitol Hill over the government’s investments in energy projects. The Energy Department offered the loan guarantee to Southern Co. in February 2010, but finalization of the deal was conditioned on a number of key regulatory approvals. Chu signaled Monday that the loan guarantee is nearing final approval, less than a week after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) greenlighted the license for the project. “We expect that one to close and go forward,” Chu told reporters Monday afternoon, but cautioned that “there are a number of other milestones” the project must achieve before getting the final OK from the Energy Department. NRC’s decision last week to approve the license for the project — allowing construction and conditional operation of two reactors at the existing Vogtle power plant near Waynesboro, Ga. — marked a major milestone for the nuclear industry. It’s the first time the commission has approved construction of new reactors since 1978. But the project faces major resistance from some Democrats in Congress, who are hoping to use Republicans’ eagerness to probe the $535 million loan guarantee to failed solar firm Solyndra against them. Rep. Edward Markey (R-Mass.), a senior member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, criticized Republicans Monday for not objecting to the pending nuclear loan guarantee, which is more than 15 times larger than the one given to Solyndra in 2009. “The Republican push for a loan guarantee for a nuclear reactor project exponentially riskier than Solyndra proves that their interests are not in financial stewardship but in political game playing,” Markey said. Markey, in a letter Monday, pressed Chu not to finalize the nuclear loan guarantee until the Energy Department makes improvements to its loan program recommended in a White House-mandated report released last week. The report — conducted by Herb Allison, the former Treasury Department official who oversaw the Troubled Asset Relief Program — calls for several steps to improve oversight of the loan program, but also provides lower estimates of taxpayer risk than an earlier federal forecast. “Given the massive taxpayer debt to be assumed and the extraordinary risk associated with the Vogtle project, we should not act on final approval of the Southern Company loan guarantee unless all of the improvements recommended in the Allison report have been put in place to reduce the likelihood of a multi-billion dollar taxpayer bailout,” Markey said. Republicans have hit the administration hard on Solyndra’s September bankruptcy, alleging that the decision to grant the company a loan guarantee was influenced by politics and raising broader questions about the administration’s green energy investments.

#### Fukushima killed support

YPCC ’12 “The Climate Note,” Yale Project on Climate Change Communication, 3/11/2012, http://environment.yale.edu/climate/the-climate-note/nuclear-power-in-the-american-mind/

How did American images of nuclear power change in response to the Fukushima disaster? Using two separate nationally representative surveys – one conducted in June of 2005 and the second in May of 2011 – we asked Americans to provide the first word or phrase that came to mind when they thought of “nuclear power.” We then categorized these free associations to identify the most common images of nuclear power in the American mind. Compared to 2005, Americans in May of 2011 were significantly more likely to associate nuclear power with images of “disaster” (including many direct references to Fukushima) or “bad” (including bad, dangerous, and scary). And as described in our report: Public Support for Climate & Energy Policies, only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area. Fukushima was a “focusing event” – a crisis that generates massive media and public attention and ripple effects well beyond the disaster itself. The meltdown and release of radioactive materials at Fukushima directly impacted the air, water, soil, people, and biota in the immediate vicinity of the facility, but the ripple effects of the disaster cascaded through broader Japanese society, causing, among other things, the prime minister to pledge the end of nuclear power in Japan. Further, the ripples, like the tsunami that triggered the crisis, ricocheted across the world, leading the German government to pledge the phase-out of nuclear power, reviews of nuclear plant safety in other countries, and shifts in global public opinion about nuclear energy, including a shift in the meaning of "nuclear power" in the American mind.

#### Obama can’t convert wins into capital

Massie ‘11 Alex, How Good is Barack Obama at Politics? The Spectator, http://www.spectator.co.uk/alexmassie/7341259/how-good-is-barack-obama-at-politics.thtml

Even so, where Ponnuru is right, I think, is his suggestion that Obama struggles to understand why anyone would disagree with him. He lacks the empathy the greatest politicians enjoy (politicians here should not be confused with statesmen). He's not a Reagan or a Clinton or a Blair. He is, in some respects, much more normal than any of them. But he is also a product of his environment and that environment has been wholly liberal ever since he was a child. In a British context, Blair was so much more gifted a politician than Gordon Brown because he grew up in places where it was not automatically assumed that every decent person would be a Labour supporter. Brown and before him John Smith were both modernisers but neither was capable of the intuitive, emotional leaps across partisan boundaries that Blair could make so easily. Individiaul Tories might be just about acceptable (on a limited basis) but fundamentally they were a wicked, deluded tribe to be scorned and looked down upon. Blair never thought like that which is one reason why he was able to communicate with people who voted for Thatcher and Major and would later vote for Cameron. That was partly a matter of background and partly a matter of political and emotional intelligence. I'm not sure, for all his qualities, Obama possesses those talents as abundantly as Blair or Clinton did. When he talked about "bitter" white voters in small rural towns "clinging" to their bibles and their guns he wasn't just pandering to an audence of San Francisco liberals, he was demonstrating the limits of his worldview and showing, in this particular instance, that whatever empathy he possessed was laced with condescension. It was a meaningful, revealing slip. So when Obama makes what he considers a useful step towards compromise, I think his opponents often see a President treating them as though they must be cretins (sometimes they may be!). I think what the White House considers constructive engagement others see as arrogant condescension. I think that Obama hasn't found a way to talk to people who were not already predisposed to like him. I think there are times when he seems to be lecturing people, not talking to them. I think this should worry his team as they prepare for next year.